

ABD LATIF

## The Conflict between Bone Kingdom and the British Authority in South Sulawesi, 1812-1816

**ABSTRACT:** This article aimed to discuss the conflict between Bone Kingdom and the British Authority in South Sulawesi, Indonesia, during the period of 1812 through 1816. The political dynamics in Europe toward the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and early 19<sup>th</sup> century had affected the political dynamics in all areas of their colonies. In 1811, the Netherlands had to hand over their sovereignty over the Dutch Indies to the Britain, including South Sulawesi in March 1812. Before the British force arrived in Makassar, Bone Kingdom was the main Dutch ally and supporter in handling the political affairs in South Sulawesi. When the British force started to consolidate their position in South Sulawesi, the Kingdoms of Bone, Ternate, and Suppa refused to join forces nor to support the British authority. The result of the research also revealed that the Kingdom of Bone, which had so far a great role in the political affairs in South Sulawesi, was not invited to participate in the plan of the power transfer from the Dutch to the British authority. Therefore, Bone considered that the transfer of powers in South Sulawesi from the Dutch to the British was illegal and could not be recognized. This challenge by Bone, Ternate, and Suppa had made the British unable to control the whole territories which were used to be under the Dutch control, i.e. "Oostder Provincie" or the Eastern Province and "Noorder Provincie" or the Northern Province. During the British occupation, both Provinces was under the control of Bone; so, the British authority was concentrated in the City of Makassar.

**KEY WORDS:** Kingdom of Bone, Britain, Rampegading palace, conflict, alliance, and Eastern Province and Northern Province in Sulawesi.

### INTRODUCTION

On 31 December 1799, the Dutch Business Enterprise in East India or VOC (*Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*) was declared bankrupted by the Dutch government and the entire colony was submitted to the Dutch government. Unfortunately, the Dutch government was unable to strengthen its power on the whole *Nusantara* (Indonesian archipelago) after their loss in the war against the British. On September 1811, Jan Willem Jansen, the Governor-General of the Dutch Indies, agreed to the Semarang (Central Java) capitulation marking the transfer of the entire area of the Dutch colony in *Nusantara* to the British authority. And the British government installed Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles as the Lieutenant General of Java and its surroundings. On 6 March 1812, the British

installed Captain Richard Phillips as the Resident of Makassar in South Sulawesi and its surroundings.

During the period between 1812 through 1816, there were three British consecutively became the Residents of Makassar, namely Captain Richard Phillips, Captain Wood, and Major D.M. Dalton. However, none of them was able to control the *Noorder Provincie* (Northern Province) and *Oostder Provincie* (Eastern Province), which were actually the colonies of the Dutch and should be submitted to the British control. The British authority could only consolidate their power in Makassar City. Cooperating with Sidenreng, the British, in the middle of 1814, was able to drive away Suppa and Bone from Parepare port, which they later submitted to the King of Sidenreng, because the British would like to

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Dr. Abd Latif is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of History, Faculty of Humanities UNHAS (Hasanuddin University) in Makassar City, South Sulawesi, Indonesia. For academic purposes, the author can be contacted via his e-mail address at: [latifunhas@hotmail.com](mailto:latifunhas@hotmail.com)

consolidate the power over Makassar in order to protect their inter-insular trades in the eastern part of Indonesia.

### **THE FIRE OF RAMPEGADING PALACE**

In July 1812, Latenrituppu, the 15<sup>th</sup> King of Bone (1775 – 1812), died in *Rampegading* Palace in Bontoala region. In order to replace him, the Bone *Hadat* (Custom) Council installed Toappatunru as the 16<sup>th</sup> King of Bone (1812 – 1823). Toappatunru was the son of Latenrituppu. After the installment, the regalia of Gowa, named *kalompoang*,<sup>1</sup> was in 1777 taken over by I Sangkilang Batara Gowa, but in 1785 it was submitted again to the new King of Bone (Omar, 2003).

According to Toappatunru, Arung Mampu, the King of Gowa, should have been reinstalled as the King of Gowa. Therefore, *kalompoang* was submitted to Arung Mampu who was at that time living in *Rampegading* Palace under the protection of the King of Bone. In December 1812, Arung Mampu and his army tried to attack the fortification of the Acting King of Gowa,<sup>2</sup> but failed because the troops of Gowa led by Karaeng Pangkajene and aided by the British, Sidenreng, and Soppeng troops succeeded to drive back the troops of *Arung Mampu* (Daeng Patunru, 1989:224-225).

*Arung Mampu*, who had lost the battle, suggested that Toappatunru, the King of Bone, armed the people of Bone who were staying in Makassar and Toappatunru agreed. His action meant that he was clearly ready to fight against the acting King of Gowa. Noticing the war preparation of the King of Bone, the British ordered their troops to stay alert and help the acting King of Gowa. Similarly, the British also asked the Kings of Sidenreng and Soppeng to position their troops in Makassar, so that when time came, they would be able to support the troops of Gowa.

<sup>1</sup>*Kalompoang* was the legitimate means of power in Gowa kingdom. The installment of the King of Gowa was considered illegitimate without using the regalia called *kalompoang*. Whoever possessed *kalompoang*, he would properly called the master (*dipertuan*) by the people. On the other hand, whoever was installed as the king without *kalompoang* would find it difficult to obtain the obedience from the people. See, for further information, Mukhlis Paeni *et al.* (2002:28).

<sup>2</sup>At the time when I Mannawari Karaeng Bontolangkasa, King of Gowa died in 1810, the Gowa *Hadat* Council installed I Mappatunru Karaeng Lembangparang without *kalompoang*.

The unfavorable relationship between Bone and Gowa forced the British to get involved and fully aided Gowa. This situation was worsen by the fact that some Dutch officials were still employed by the British, and who stated that the political conditions in South Sulawesi was unstable due to the unharmonious relationship between Bone and Gowa (Emanuel, 1948:29). Such a suggestion was interpreted by the British that in order to solve the dispute between Gowa and Bone, *kalompoang* which was under the control of Bone should be returned to Gowa.

The effort to return *kalompoang* to Gowa was important, since such a transfer was necessary to restore the loyalty of the Gowanese living in the hinterland of Bone to the acting King of Gowa. And if that was realized, it would be possible to create order and peace in Gowa. It was also crucial for the British side, because the free trade activities could also be carried out in South Sulawesi.

In December 1813, Captain Richard Phillips, the Resident of Makassar and its surroundings, had ordered Karaeng Pangkajene and his troops to help the troops of Sidenreng and Soppeng to attack the Gowanese people in the hinterland of Bone who still recognized the King of Bone as their legitimate king. However, Captain Richard Phillips' decision to invade the hinterland of Bone did not succeed, because the troops of Bone assisted the Gowa people to retaliate the invaders (Daeng Patunru, 1989:225). Consequently, Captain Richard Phillips, who wanted to solve the *kalompoang* problem, tried to persuade the British authority in Batavia (Jakarta now) to immediately send troops to Makassar in order to fight Bone who was so difficult to negotiate with.

In the end, the request for the troop assistance was granted by the British authority in Batavia. On 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1814, the troop assistance of 900 soldiers, consisting of the British soldiers and the Madurese soldiers, arrived in Makassar (Abduh *et al.*, 1985:45). Before invading Bone, on 6<sup>th</sup> June 1814, Major General Nightingale, who had just arrived from Batavia, declared an announcement that the King of Bone were given time until 12.00 at midnight to consider and confess his wrong

doings ever since.

However, that ultimatum was ignored by the King of Bone. Then, the British authority issued a manifest which enumerated the wrong doing of the King of Bone: (1) the Buginese villages which the King of Bone acquired as a loan had been armed and consolidated with wide defense fortifications, the west side up to the sea and the east side up to Bontoala; (2) the King of Bone had approced and treated Arung Mampu as the legitimate King of Gowa, and that was against his own oath at his coronation as the King of Bone; (3) the King of Bone had presented the Gowanese regalia to Arung Mampu or had kept it for his own use; (4) the King of Bone had assisted the people of Gowa to rebel against the installed officials in Gowa; (5) the King of Bone had taken over and controlled Tallo, formally owned by the Dutch and now by the British, and installed a new king there; (6) the King of Bone had granted freedom to his followers to exploit the rice wet fields which were not their properties, and which were in fact within the territory under the British control; (7) the King of Bone had ordered people of Bone to force the tax officials not to collect the ten per cent taxes; (8) the King of Bone had stirred up the people in the territories under the British control, such as in Makassar, Bantaeng, Bulukumba, and Maros so that a translator in Maros was murdered and there was an attempt to assassinate Resident Phillips; (9) the King of Bone demanded that he was given a position beside the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings in the execution of the government; (10) the King of Bone hampered the trades in Makassar, both on land and on sea; and (11) the King of Bone demanded that there would be no member of the allies or of the delegates would allowed to meet the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings without being escorted by the King of Bone or his vice; such demand was disagreed by the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings as well as by the Commander-in-Chief of the British troops (Abduh *et al.*, 1985:46).

Because the above demands was ignored by Toappatunru as King of Bone, on 7<sup>th</sup> June 1814, before dawn three military company of the British troops attacked the villages of

the Buginese people in Bontoala, the post of the King of Bone. The king eventually had to accept the victory of the British who had been assisted by the troops of Gowa, Soppeng, and Sidenreng (Pompe, 1863:301; and Anonymous, n.y.c:26). The palace of the King of Bone in Bontoala was burned down causing the King and his guards had to leave Bontoala without taking along the regalia of Gowa.

The regalia was, then, taken over by the King of Soppeng, and did not present it to the acting King of Gowa nor to the British side. The King of Soppeng, then, presented the regalia to Arung Mampu who further presented it to the British authority in Makassar. The British authority instead proposed to Gowa *Hadat* Council to install and crowned a new king. Eventually, by using the regalia or *kalompoang*, I Mappatunru Karaeng Lembangparang (1816-1825), the son of I Makkasuma Karaeng Tallo and Mangkubumi Gowa, became the 30<sup>th</sup> King of Gowa (Emanuel, 1948:30-31).

By using this *kalompoang* in the coronation of the King of Gowa, the authority and the power of Gowa was reestablished again. The people of Gowa who was once divided into two factions, because of the involvement of the King of Bone in the internal conflict in Gowa, were reunited and sworn again the loyalties to the holder of *kalompoang*, the recently crowned King of Gowa.<sup>3</sup>

### THE CONFLICT IN OOSTDER PROVINCIE

The Eastern Province (*Oostder Provincie*) included 14 districts, led by the Assistant Resident, who was posted in Bantaeng (Kartodirdjo *et al.*, 1973:273-274), while each district was led by a local noble man entitled *karaeng*, *arung*, or *loqma*. This region was quite potential and the soil was very fertile, many *phinisi* sail boats were made in various places, particularly in Lemo-lemo and Tanah Baru. It was located in the southeast of the south peninsula of Sulawesi island; in other

<sup>3</sup>Another source told that asked Arung Mampu to go and take the *kalompoang* which was then under the control of Toappatunru, King of Bone. However, when Arung Mampu met Toappatunru as King of Bone in *Rampegading* Palace, Arung Mampu suggested that Toappatunru should be installed as the King of Gowa, because *kalompoang* was in his hands and of course he had the right to become the King of Gowa according to the family tree of his father. See, for further information, Anonymous (n.y.b.:147-148).

words, on the meeting lines of Flores sea to the south and Bone bay to the east. Also, this region was the transition area between the influence of Bone power to the north and that of Gowa power to the west.

During the early time of British occupation in South Sulawesi, Richard Phillips, the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings (1812 – 1814), was still unable to overcome the actions of the King of Bone who controlled Maros, Bantaeng, Bulukumba, and some other areas in the south of Makassar. In order to help Richard Phillips to consolidate the British authority in South Sulawesi, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1814, a troop under the commandment of Major General Nightingale arrived in Makassar. In order to carry out his job to secure South Sulawesi from the political upheaval, Major General Nightingale was given the full authority to handle the political and military problems in South Sulawesi.<sup>4</sup> And to guarantee good coordination among all the war troops, Richard Phillips informed all the officers in South Sulawesi about the special tasks of Major General Nightingale.<sup>5</sup>

Upon arriving in Makassar, Major General Nightingale's actions, in relation to Bone occupation of the Eastern Province (*Oostder Provincie*), were to dispatch a troop to Ujung Loe and to take over Bulukumba Fortress (*Benteng Bulukumba*) which had been so long under the control of Bone.<sup>6</sup> Ujung Loe was the first choice, because that region had been so long controlled by robbers and thieves. The *Karaeng* of Ujung Loe did not attempt to eradicate the rodders and the thieves; instead the *Karaeng* tried to protect them so that they would not commit robbery in Ujung Loe and make it as an asylum.

The *Karaeng* of Ujung Loe chose such an

<sup>4</sup>See "The Letter of Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to C. Addison, Secretary of the British Government, on 1 July 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/2*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>5</sup>See also "The Letter of Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to C. Addison, Secretary of the British Government, on 1 July 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.266*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>6</sup>"The Letter of Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, Lieutenant General of Java and its Surroundings, on 5 July 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

option, because he was unable to face Bone who he believed protect those robbers and thieves. Ujung Loe was chosen by the robbers and thieves as a secure post (asylum) because they thought the area had not been controlled by the British authority and neither by other authority who opposed Bone. In addition, the sea port of Ujung Loe had been used as the main harbor by the robbers, the thieves, and the black traders.<sup>7</sup>

After the British acquired Bulukumba Fortress in the middle of June 1814, the local kings started quarreling about the presence of the British in South Sulawesi. The *Karaengs* of Gantarang and Ujung Loe immediately stated their loyalty to the British authority, but other local kings decided to remain faithful to Bone; particularly, the *Karaeng* of Bulukumba often communicated with some nobilities who resided in Kajang.<sup>8</sup> Meanwhile, Toappatunru, King of Bone (1812-1823), knowing that the *Karaengs* of Ujung Loe and Gantarang had taken side with the British authority, immediately ordered his troops to build a defense fortress in Beba and asked them to defend it as possible as they could (*ibidem* with footnote 8). Beba, which was located in the west and not far from Bantaeng, was chosen by Toappatunru as the center of the defense in the eastern region, because aside from being the basis of the rebellion of *Karaeng* Data, there was a possibility to cooperate with him, and also Beba could be made as the primary fortress to hamper the movement of the British troops and their allies who came through land route from Makassar.

Noticing how strong the troops of Bone and its allies were and how wide the influence of Bone in South Sulawesi was, it seemed that the British troops and the weapons they possessed could not match them. Knowing their weakness, the British authority tried to establish a friendly relationship with *Arung Ponre*, one of the local king who was allied

<sup>7</sup>See, for further information, "The Letter of Charles Lepey to Captain Wood, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, on 13 may 1815" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>8</sup>See also "The Letter of Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, Lieutenant General of Java and its Surroundings, on 31 July 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/2*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

with Bone. The main target of the British to ask *Arung Ponre* to friendly was to disintegrate the alliance between those local kings and Bone. However, the letter sent by Owen Phillips, the Assistant Resident of the Eastern Province, in order to ask for his friendship was refused by *Arung Ponre*. As a signal of his refusal, *Arung Ponre*, who had received assistance from Bone, declared war against Bantaeng.<sup>9</sup>

*Ponre's* war against Bantaeng involved allies of the two opponents. Bantaeng was fully aided Britain, Gowa, and Sidenreng. Sidenreng was involved in the war because at that time the King of Sidenreng was in Makassar to attend a meeting with Richard Phillips, and was asked to help Bantaeng (*ibidem* with footnote 8). Meanwhile, *Arung Tompobulu*, who had been loyal to *Arung Mampu*, stated that he took side with Bone, and, therefore, would fully help *Arung Ponre* (*ibidem* with footnote 8). That *Arung Tompobulu* was siding with Bone and readiness to help *Arung Ponre* in the war against Bantaeng showed how wide and strong the influence power of Bone in the Eastern Province was.

The war of *Ponre* and his allies against Bantaeng and his allies did not last long. Toward the end of June 1814, the Sepoy troops which was sent to Bantaeng by Major General Nightingale had to withdrawn back to Makassar. This failure was caused by the fact that Gowa did not fully support the British troops, while the people and the local kings under Gowa remained loyal to Bone. Because the British troops were unable to help and defense Bantaeng, Richard Phillips ordered Owen Phillips, the Assistanct Resident of the Eastern Province, and Lieutenant Colonel Macloed as the Commander-in Chief of the British troops, to study the factors supporting Bone and its allies. They were also asked to identify the strategic and easy to control areas which could be made as the British defense fortresses.<sup>10</sup> The identification and control of

the places which were considered strategic was very important for the British, because aside from the local kings had become the allies and, hence, under the protection of Bone, those places were also located along the coastal areas of Flores sea and Bone bay and had become very good stopping spots for the trading sailors and perhaps for the robbers without passing through Makassar port, which was under the British control.

While Lieutenant Colonel Macloed was carrying out his jobs in Bulukumba, the War Commander in Batavia suddenly ordered him to return to Java. The Lieutenant Colonel Macloed reported about the letter to Richard Phillips asked to find the best solution to the matter. Richard Phillips immediately answered the letter that whatever the decision about whether to leave to Batavia or not, it fully depended on Lieutenant Colonel Macloed. Nevertheless, Richard Phillips tried to persuade Batavia so that the departure was postponed. Richard Phillips said that the soldiers and the weapons of the allies in Eastern Province were inadequate to match the power on the local kings. Similarly, Bone were always ready to protect them. If the local kings decided to unite, Bone definitively would support them, and that would make it even more difficult for the British authority and its allies to face them.

Lieutenant Colonel Macloed, who had known much about the Eastern province, of course knew better how weak the British authority in the region. Richard Phillips stated that Lieutenant Colonel Macloed, who had a long experience in the region, knew better what should be done by the British troops and its allies compared to any other officers who had never assigned in the region.<sup>11</sup> Actually, Richard Phillips also intended to replace Lieutenant Colonel Macloed with Captain Cameron, but that plan was cancelled and the two officers had been informed. His

<sup>9</sup>*Ibidem* with footnote 8 above. According to the writer, the *Ponre* was not the area located in the region of Bone kingdom, but *Ponre* which was located between Tompobulu and Gantarang. "The Letter of Owen Phillips, Assistant Resident of the Eastern Region, to *Arung Ponre*" was the basis of this reason.

<sup>10</sup>See, for example, "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Lieutenant

Colonel Macloed, the Troops Commander, on 29 June 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/2*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>11</sup>See also "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Lieutenant Colonel Macloed, the Troop Commander, on 18 July 1814" in *ANRI Clection: Makassar File No.265/2*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

reason was that Captain Cameron had another heavy task, i.e. he was the Assistant Resident of the Eastern Province. Therefore, it would not be easy for him to assume concurrent responsibilities.

The picture presented by Richard Phillips, about the possibility of the local kings to unite as allies in the Eastern Province under the protection of Bone, does not only show that the political and military situation in the regions was very sensitive, but it was also a clear picture that although some local kings had allied with the British authority, such alliance did not at all guaranteed peace and order in the region. Unlike the Northern Province (*Noorder Provincie*), which was geographically quite close to Makassar, the Eastern Province was far away to the east of Makassar.

The political and military sensitivity in the Eastern Province did not give a good chance to the British authority to manage the economic sources of the region. In relation to the farm tax problems in the region, on 25 June 1814, Richard Phillips ordered Owen Phillips, the Assistant Resident of the Eastern Province, to defend Sarajoko region as a source of the 10% taxes of the farm products. And the Commander-in-Chief of the British troops in Bulukumba was ordered to defend the fortresses around Sarajoko. As for the town of Bulukumba, Richard Phillips trusted *Karaeng Ujung Loe* to establish a friendly relationship with *Karaeng Bulukumba*.

The British hope to get support from *Karaeng Bulukumba* proved to be false. At the end of June 1814, *Karaeng Bulukumba* in fact ordered his troops to take over Rejang Lawie by force.<sup>12</sup> This sudden action of *Karaeng Bulukumba* was apparently out of the British expectation. The British troops which had left for Sarajoko could not prevent the troops of *Karaeng Bulukumba*, and of course could not deliver the arm aids to Rejang Lawie. In order to anticipate the cruel action of *Karaeng Bulukumba* in Rejang Lawie, the detachments

of the Volunteers Battalion 5 and 6 which were positioned in Bulukumba defense fortress were ordered to help Rejang Lawie, but this assistance could not help much, and was even driven back by the troops of Bone who had joined the troops of *Karaeng Bulukumba*. Actually, the detachment troops of Battalion 5 and 6 were temporarily posted in Bulukumba in order to anticipate any action in that region, while waiting for the further order from the War Commander in Batavia (Jakarta now) about whether or not Lieutenant Colonel Maclod would be withdrawn and returned to Java.<sup>13</sup>

The reason why the British troops were reduced in Bulukumba was that on 10 July 1814, the passenger vessels of Drummound and Fleetwood had arrived to transport the troops from Bulukumba. The British troops were withdrawn because of the order of Major General Nightingale who wanted additional troops in the Northern Province (*ibidem* with footnote 11). The reason was not clear why Major General Nightingale wanted to withdraw some of the troops from Bulukumba, when in fact the region itself was politically and militarily sensitive. One possible reason was that probably because the Northern Province was close to Makassar, hence, it needed additional troops. At least, the troops with their allies who were on duty in the Northern Province would be able to blockade the troops of Bone, Tanete (Ternate), and Suppa and their allies from invading the city of Makassar. Of course, the British authority would try the best to defend Makassar City, because in this city was concentrated the activities of the British government in South Sulawesi and its surroundings.

Beside Major General Nightingale's order to bring in some of the British troops from Bulukumba to help in the Northern Province, there came up another problem. Several British officers were reported missing while traveling to and from Bulukumba. Richard Phillips stated that he was not responsible for those cases, and that he would not pay the cost which should be paid for those events. He also informed Captain Green, the Commander of

<sup>12</sup>"The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Owen Phillips, Resident Assistant of Oostder Provincie, on 25 June 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/2*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>13</sup>See the footnote 11. No information about whether Lieutenant Colonel Maclod would return to Java or not.

the Carrier Armada, that he was not prepared to agree with the report about the events which would be sent to Batavia, except when Major General Nightingale had stated his agreement.<sup>14</sup>

This action of Richard Phillips showed that the interest to develop a single coordinated system of the management of politics in South Sulawesi was still lacking. Richard Phillips' action could also signaled that the British authority in South Sulawesi did not prepare adequate funds to pay for the war. This could be seen in the logistic supply for Rotterdam fort in Makassar in September 1814: rice was only 13,050 lbs; sago was only 1,000 lbs; fish was only 139 lbs; salt was only 3 lbs; coffee was only 138 lbs; oil was only 31.11 lbs; almond was only 877 lbs; and dry meat was only 84 lbs.<sup>15</sup>

The inadequate number of the military troops had made the British authority unable to carry out the massive military operation. On the other hand, Bone, Tanete (Ternate), and Suppa, and their allies were still very strong and often helped the local kings who became the targets of the British military attacks. Because the British authority could not attacked massively, they tried to find another way. They proposed to the local kings who remained faithful as their allies, like *Karaeng* Ujung Loe, *Karaeng* Gantarang, and *Karaeng* Bantaeng to persuade Bulukumba *Hadat* Council to fire *Karaeng* Bulukumba and appoint someone else as his successor in order that his successor would become the British ally.

However, the three local kings (*Karaeng* Ujung Loe, *Karaeng* Gantarang, and *Karaeng* Bantaeng) refused to do what the British wanted. Hence, Major General Nightingale requested Owen Phillips, the Assistant Resident of the Eastern Province, to replace *Karaeng* Bulukumba.<sup>16</sup> Because the idea

of replacing *Karaeng* Bulukumba did not succeed, the British authority together with their allies chose another way, i.e. an attempt to assassinate *Karaeng* Bulukumba who was drunk because of the excessive consumption of opium. He run amuck and attempted to hurt other people around him, including *Karaeng* Bantaeng who was sitting beside him. He hit *Karaeng* Bantaeng on the nape with his opium pipe, and at the same time he drew out his dagger and stabbed *Karaeng* Bantaeng in two spots. Fortunately, *Karaeng* Bantaeng's younger brother, who was also present, immediately snatched the dagger and stabbed *Karaeng* Bulukumba dead. This quick action by *Karaeng* Bantaeng's younger brother saved the life of *Karaeng* Bantaeng.<sup>17</sup> It was not clear whether this event, which occurred in the Palace of *Karaeng* Bulukumba, was designed by the British authority or whether it was the initiative of *Karaeng* Bantaeng himself.

The murder of *Karaeng* Bulukumba forced the *Hadat* (Custom) Council to immediately elect the new *karaeng*. The British authority wanted *Karaeng* Ujung Loe, but Bulukumba *Hadat* Council refused to elect him. The *Hadat* Council chose and inaugurated the younger brother of *Karaeng* Bulukumba, called *Daeng* Manalangga as the new *Karaeng* Bulukumba. The new *Karaeng* of Bulukumba was also opposing the British, and like his brother, he also remained an ally of Bone. On 5 August 1814, *Daeng* Manalangga, *Karaeng* of Bulukumba, who was supported by Bone, invaded Ujung Loe. This invasion failed to achieve its target to control Ujung Loe, because the troops of Gantarang, Bantaeng, and some British soldiers aided Ujung Loe immediately (*ibidem* with footnote 17).

On August 7, 1814, a letter from Lieutenant Rawlins, one of the leaders of the British troops in Bulukumba, made a report to Richard Phillips that *Arung* Cina and Luwu King were now in Kajang, a place located

<sup>14</sup>See "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Captain Green, Commander of the Freight Armada, on 14 July 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265.1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>15</sup>See, for example, "Brieven aan dan Resident" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.267/1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>16</sup>"The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Owen Phillips, Resident Assistant of

Bantaeng and Bulukumba, on 25 July 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>17</sup>See, for further information about this event, "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, Lieutenant Governor of Java and its Surroundings, on 13 August 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.266*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

between Bulukumba and Sinjai. In his letter, Lieutenant Rawlins reported that the information, given by the two kings, the War Commander of Bone and his troops were on the way to Kajang. That the two kings were making a quick report to the British soldiers because according to them, they were considered enemy by Bone.

In reality, Kajang was a region under the influence of Bone. If *Arung Cina* and the King of Luwu had been the enemy of Bone, the why did they come to Kajang. The question was whether both of them wanted to establish alliance with Bone or with the British. In order to obtain clear information, the British authority in Makassar delegated the Kings of Gowa and Sidenreng to meet them in Kajang. The British authority wanted that the Kings of Gowa and Sidenreng could continue the trip from Kajang to Bone. Both Kings were expected to persuade the War Commander of Bone to put off his invasion to Kajang.<sup>18</sup>

Beside the approach to Bone was through diplomacy used by the Kings of Gowa and Sidenreng, at the beginning of August 1814, the British government in Makassar also mobilized most of their military forces to Bulukumba. Nautilus Cannon Ship, which was already present in Bulukumba, could not function well and could not come closer to the coast, because they thought the enemy was still too strong. In order to assist Nautilus Cannon Ship and to reinforce the fortress in Bulukumba, Richard Phillips ordered the Cannon Vessel No. 7 to sail for Bulukumba carrying the British soldiers, a number of Ambonese who would serve as the navy with an officer.<sup>19</sup>

Besides, the Cannon Vessel No. 7 would also carry additional ammunitions, 80 guns, and it was expected that some additional officers from the army would join. The 80 guns should be distributed to Bugis-Makassar troops, particularly to those who served as

reporting troops.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, the British government in Makassar ordered the Commandant of Cannon Vessel No. 9 to join the Cannon Vessel No. 7 to sail to Bulukumba. That vessel was carry the Ambonese troops, several British officers, and food and drink supplies. The troops carried by the Cannon Vessel No. 9 were to assist in defending the fortresses.<sup>21</sup>

The British authority in Makassar thought that the numbers the troops and ships, which were already stationed in Bulukumba and those which were still on the way, were still inadequate and were unable to combat the enemy's troops. Therefore, Minerva Vessel was ordered to return empty to Batavia, and it was expected that the War Commander would dispatch about 200 or 300 soldiers to Makassar (*ibidem* with footnote 17). A part of these troops would be stationed in Makassar and a part would be sent to Bulukumba. Those additional troops were stationed in Makassar because some of the garrison troops, who were assigned in Makassar, were sick and were unable to defend Makassar city whenever it was attacked (*ibidem* with footnote 17).

The British troops and the supporting Bugis-Makassar troops found it difficult to combat Bone troops and their allies. Every battle that occurred would only reduce the areas which were under the British control. The numbers of dead soldiers and the amount of casualties on both sides were never known. Some information stated that in the middle of August 1814, the Bugis-Makassar troops had left their kingdoms while the British troops had left Bulukumba for Makassar. After the British troops had left Bulukumba in the middle of August 1814, until the British authority had handed over their power in South Sulawesi to the Dutch authority on 25 September 1816, the power of Bone in the Eastern Province (*Oostder Provincie*) was established again. The British inability to subdue the local kings, who opposed them,

<sup>18</sup>*Ibidem* with footnote 17. No clear information about whether the diplomatic task undertaken by the Kings of Gowa and Sidenreng was successful or not. The source found did not explain whether the kings accepted or refused their task or not.

<sup>19</sup>See, for example, "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to the Commanders of Nautilus Gun Boat and Gun Boat No.7 and to Lieutenant Rawlins, on 10 August 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.266*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>20</sup>See also "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Lieutenant Rawlins, on 13 August 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.266*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>21</sup>*Ibidem* with footnote 20. In his letter, Richard Phillips trusted Lieutenant Rawlins to lead and coordinate all the military actions in Bulukumba.

had resulted in the loss of some economic resources for the British. The only economic resource, that was left for the British, was to levy several types of taxes in Makassar city.

### THE CONFLICT IN NOORDER PROVINCIE

The intended *Noorder Provincie* (the Northern Province) covered 28 districts located in the north of Makassar, and led by an Assistant Resident who stationed in Maros; while each district was headed by a local noble man entitled *Loqmo, Karaeng, Daeng, Lolo, Arung, Sulewatang, or Gallarang*. Since the VOC (*Vereneegde Oost-Indische Compagnie*) era, the Northern Province was obliged to pay ten per cent taxes of their farming yields (Kartodirdjo *et al.*, 1973:271-272).

In the middle of June 1814, the British government in Makassar sent Lieutenant Jackson and his troops to Maros to reinforce their troops in the Northern Province; and if it was possible, they drove away the troops of Bone, Tanete (Ternate), Suppa, and Sawitto, who were then not just stationed there but also on behalf of the King of Bone ordered the people to work on farming lands.<sup>22</sup> Such an action should be done as soon as possible, because they did not only work on the farmlands, but they also forced the local people to pay 10% taxes to Bone without the knowledge of the British authority. Similarly, Tallo which shared boundaries with Makassar, was invaded by Bone troops.

Lieutenant Jackson's strategy had not yet realized to eradicate the Northern Province from the influence of Bone, suddenly Richard Phillips, the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, received a letter from the King of Soppeng reporting about the plan of the King of Bone to invade Soppeng in a short time. In order to protect their ally, Lieutenant Jackson immediately mobilized his troops to help Soppeng.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup>See, for example, "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Owen Phillips, Assistant Resident of Oostder Provincie, on 25 June 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>23</sup>See also "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, Lieutenant General of Java and its Surroundings, on 14 July 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

At the same time, Richard Phillips announced that Bone people who were residing in the British territory should leave their homes if they remained loyal to the King of Bone. Bone hostile actions forced the British authority to design further strategy to attack Bone from three directions. They asked their allies to get involved their plan. The troops of Gowa would attack from the south, the Soppeng troops from the west, and the Sidenreng troops from the north, while the British troops would be spread among the three forces (*ibidem* with footnote 23).

That strategy was intended to replace the Toappatunru, King of Bone, who took position in *Rampegading* Palace. The British candidate to replace the King of Bone was *Datu Pattiro*, the son of the King of Soppeng (*ibidem* with footnote 23). For the purpose of invading the central territory on Bone and replacing the King of Bone, the Kings of Gowa, Soppeng, and Sidenreng were invited to come to Makassar in order to confer with the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings.<sup>24</sup> However, because the three Kings reported that the troops of Bone were very strong and that there was a worry that Wajo would help Bone if the military invasion was directly aiming the central part of Bone, Richard Phillips as the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings cancelled the plan to invade central Bone.

Although the conference of the 12 August 1814 had cancelled the invasion plan to heart of Bone, the British authority could no longer doubt the loyalties of their allies in South Sulawesi. The willingness of the Kings of Gowa, Soppeng, and Sidenreng to attend the conference and their suggestions during the conference had convinced the British authority to draw a conclusion that what they had done so far in South Sulawesi could be accepted. Such loyalty had also been shown by the local kings who in fact had remained faithful as the British allies.

Lieutenant Jackson, who was cancelled to attack Bone, then proposed to the British

<sup>24</sup>"The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, Lieutenant General of Java and its Surroundings, on 16 July 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/2*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

authority in Makassar that in Maros, some fortresses were built in order to guard and defend the Northern Province which was at the moment always under the threats from the troops of Bone, Tanete (Ternate), Suppa, and Sawitto. Therefore, Richard Phillips, the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, sent a letter to Captain Nixon, the Secretary of the War Commander in Batavia, informing that he needed some aids for weapons and materials to renovate the military barracks and to build defense fortresses in the Northern Province. However, the requests had not yet been fulfilled,<sup>25</sup> and on 17 July 1814, Lieutenant Jackson reported that the troops of Bone had attacked the central British defense in Maros.<sup>26</sup> The people of Bone who were residing in the Northern Province also trying to make the situation chaotic, hoping the local people would feel insecure.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, the purpose of Bone to make the situation in the Northern Province chaotic was to make the local people feel insecure under the British protection; in other words, so that Bone could get the sympathy of the local people. That the local people would be more secure or peaceful and did not have to pay any other new taxes if they remained loyal to Bone. This case was important to Bone, because on 5 August 1814, Richard Phillips forced Lieutenant Jackson and Mr. Wallner to implement a new taxation regulation in the Northern Province. This new regulation required everyone who planted rice in the British territories should pay taxes and *sima*.<sup>28</sup>

For the permanent tax, the system of 10% of the harvest yields was implemented. As for the *sima*, there was no clear regulation, but

it was fixed that a new type of tax should be levied from the local people. If any inhabitant did not pay the taxes, or any other reason forced the British authority to perform a confiscation, 2/3 of the people's harvest yields would be confiscated by the British authority.<sup>29</sup> It seemed that this new regulation had been practiced far before August 1814.

The British Assistant Resident in Maros had not been able to implement the new tax regulation, because the British control in the Northern Province was still limited to the town of Maros, which was not even fully peaceful. On the other hand, the British authority in Makassar insisted that the new farm tax regulation was implemented immediately in order to meet the logistic needs which were growing faster. According to the estimation made by the British government in Makassar, for the month of August 1814, they needed 12 thousand bunches of paddy.<sup>30</sup> It was not clear whether that amount was for the whole troops and other British personnel in South Sulawesi or only for the Northern Province only.

In order to anticipate the attack of Bone troops to Maros and the chaotic situation made by the Bone people around Maros, the British were forced to immediately build a military camp in the areas. This camp was intended to protect the 4 fortresses, each fortress could accommodate 6 soldiers. The location of the camp, which was under construction, was between the two fish ponds of the King of Bone, which were extending from north to south. Hence, the north-south courses was considered secure militarily and, therefore, there was no need to exert any cost and effort to make trenches in both courses. It was only necessary to clear the trees which hampered the view, starting from the camp to the edges of the fish ponds. The trench digging was only needed in the east-west directions. The measurements both sides of the camp were 45 feet and it was expected that the camp

<sup>25</sup>See, for example, "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Captain Nixon, Secretary of the War Commander, on 16 July 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/2*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>26</sup>See also "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Lieutenant Colonel Macloed, the Troop Commander in Makassar, on 18 July 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>27</sup>"The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, Lieutenant General of Java and its Surroundings, on 31 July 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/2*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>28</sup>*Sima* was the tax which should be paid using money.

<sup>29</sup>See, for example, "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Lieutenant Jackson and to Mr. Wallner in Maros, on 5 August 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/2*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>30</sup>*Ibidem* with footnote 29 above. Each bundle of paddy should contain the net unhusked paddy of 25 kilograms. The estimation was based on the size of the paddy bundle as done by most Bugis-Makassar people in the inner land of South Sulawesi.

should be ready in a short period of time.<sup>31</sup>

The construction of the camp, which was underway, was reported by Richard Phillips to the Secretary of the War Commander in Batavia, in his letter of 2 August 1814. On that very day, Richard Phillips also sent a letter to Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, the Lieutenant Governor of Java and its Surroundings, stating that the actions of stealing and robberies in South Sulawesi could not be controlled, particularly in the regions under the British control. He suggested to the British authority in Batavia to guard some of the sea ports, starting from Penang in Malay peninsula to Ambon in Indonesia archipelago; and if necessary, using the destroyer ships.<sup>32</sup> The control of certain sea ports was deemed important by the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, at least to guard the security of the Bugis-Makassar merchants, particularly the Wajo merchants who often tried to avoid the sea ports which were under the British control.

The merchants of Wajo avoided the ports under the British control, because Pare-Pare sea port was controlled by Sidenreng, the British ally, who probably implemented certain regulation which was disliked by the merchants of Wajo.<sup>33</sup> Such a situation had forced the merchants of Wajo to cooperate with the merchants of Bone in the east.<sup>34</sup>

Wajo started to show signals of their challenge against the British authority and their alliance with Bone in the middle of August 1814. For example, the letter written by *Arung Gandra* to the British authority in Makassar, and was delivered by *Daeng Mamala*, saying that his people were not

willing to pay taxes to the British authority. Similarly, the King of Bone had issued an order for the Bone people, who were living in Wajo, not to pay taxes to the British government. Richard Phillips understood the letter as showing the hostile attitudes, especially the letter was not in an envelope.<sup>35</sup>

The British authority found it even more difficult to face the troops of Bone who were always supported by Suppa and Tanete (Ternate), especially now that the majority of Wajo people were also supporting Bone. In fact, in order to support Bone, Suppa had succeeded to acquire support from three neighboring kingdoms: Alitta, Sawitto, and Rappang (Rasyid, 1985:175). This situation was even worsened by the fact that more of the British troops were sick. In Rotterdam Bastion, there were 70 sick Europeans, 215 sick natives; and in the last three weeks, the number of sick personnel increased by about 70 persons.

In order to temporally solve the problem, the British authority put the patients who could not be accommodated in the hospitals in Chinese homes in the city, especially the Europeans. The report about this health problem was written by Richard Phillips on 15 August 1814. Richard Phillips also reported that from the seven persons employed by Captain Walker in the coast, 5 of them had died from suffering fever. Meanwhile, the medicine supply had decreased rapidly; therefore, those seriously ill patients, whom the doctors could not handle anymore, would be moved to Surabaya in East Java.<sup>36</sup>

Tanete (Ternate) tried to take advantage of this health worsening conditions of the British troops in South Sulawesi to occupy Sigeri at the end of September 1814. Consequently, Lieutenant Jackson had to withdraw his troops from Sigeri to Maros; in fact, he was ordered to immediately go to Makassar.<sup>37</sup> Until the

<sup>31</sup>"The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to the Secretary of the War Commander in Batavia, on 2 August 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>32</sup>See, for example, "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, Lieutenant General of Java and its Surroundings, on 2 August 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>33</sup>This suspicion was based on the fact that since the British authority governed the South Sulawesi, only Makassar sea port was declared as a free port. Pare-Pare port, on the other hand, was lent by the British authority to Sidenreng.

<sup>34</sup>Obviously, here, the merchants of Wajo, who remained loyal to the British government and were living in Makassar, were exempted.

<sup>35</sup>See, for example, "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, Lieutenant General of Java and its Surroundings, on 13 August 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.266*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>36</sup>"The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to Captain Nixon, Secretary of the War Commander, on 15 August 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.266*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>37</sup>See "The Letter from Owen Phillips to Lieutenant Jackson

end of October 1814, the political influence of the British authority had not been fully established. The British troops and their allies, namely Gowa, Soppeng, Sidenreng, and several small kingdoms in the Southern regions were still unable to face the troops of Bone and their allies who were still in control of the Northern regions.

It could be concluded that at that time, the British authority could only defend their fortresses in Maros. What is more, in the very same month, the news was spread that Richard Phillips had died (cited in Rasyid, 1985:175). Then, the British authority appointed Captain Wood to take his place as the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings (1814-1815).

Toward the end of 1814, or during the early period of Captain Wood's government, Tanete (Ternate) attempted to extend his territories, not only over Sigeri and Pangkajene but also over Maros. La Patau, the King of Tanete (Ternate), who was aided by Bone, was unable to over run the British defense in Maros, because the British troops were helped by the troops of Gowa, Polongbangkeng, and a troop from Java (Abduh *et al.*, 1985:46).

In this battle, there was no information about Sidenreng as the British ally aiding the British troops. Most likely, they were hampered in Pare-Pare by Suppa troops and their allies, i.e. Alitta, Sawitto, and Rappang. Even, if Sidenreng troops tried the south route, they should then pass through Bone defense (Anonymous, n.y.a). Soppeng, who intended to help the British troops, had to face the fierce opposition of and even was forced to withdraw by Bone troops who apparently had controlled Camba and its surroundings (Abduh *et al.*, 1985:47).

These opposing actions, which were often demonstrated by Bone, forced Captain Wood, the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to take measures in order to expel all the people of Bone who were living in Makassar, with the exception of those who had stated their loyalties to the British government. Such an order was in effective until 31 December

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on 1 and 2 October 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

1814.<sup>38</sup> The British government in Makassar probably took this step, because Toappatunru, King of Bone (1812-1823), was found difficult to convene with.

For the whole May 1815, Captain Wood remained in Batavia; therefore, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, the Lieutenant General of Java and its Surroundings, trusted Lieutenant Jackson to represent the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings.<sup>39</sup> Early in June 1815, Captain Wood returned to Makassar and took over his position as the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings. Meanwhile, at the beginning of June 1815, when Bone invaded Soppeng, the British troops tried also to help the ally, but the land route to Soppeng was hampered by the troops of Bone and Tanete (Ternate).

Thus, the British troops which were then led by Lieutenant Jackson were forced to sail from Makassar and harbored in Pare-Pare; and from Pare-Pare, they intended to take the land route to Soppeng. Unfortunately, they were hampered by the troops of Suppa. Hence, the battle between the two sides could not be avoided. However, because the troops of Suppa were aided by the very strong troops of Alitta, Sawitto, and Rappang; the British troops had to retreat and never reached Soppeng. In this battle, Lieutenant Jackson was announced dead (Rasyid, 1985:175-176).

During the tenure of Captain Wood, the British troops suffered defeats in many battles. Although the local small kingdoms remained as the British allies and often assisted the British troops, because of the inadequate arms, the health problems, and the fact that the funds of 6,395.65 *Rupees* should be delivered to Batavia, the British government in Makassar could not do much in handling all the problems they had to face in South Sulawesi. The enemies controlled the areas outside Makassar; while the thieves and robbers supported by the local kings, who

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<sup>38</sup>See, for example, "The Letter from Charles Lopey to Captain Wood, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, on 21 April 1815" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.267*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia]. The conditions that should be met as the proofs of the loyalties to the British government could not be found.

<sup>39</sup>"The Letter from Charles Lopey to Captain Wood and to Lieutenant Jackson, on 4 May 1815" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.267*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

opposed the British government, plagued the inside areas of Makassar.<sup>40</sup>

Captain Wood had not succeeded in solving the opposing actions of Bone, Suppa, and Tanete (Ternate). He already had to leave Makassar in October 1815, because Major D.M. Dalton (1815-1816) had arrived to replace him as the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings (Rasyid, 1985:176). Four days after he was installed as the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, Major D.M. Dalton gave an order to his troops, together with Gowa troops, to invade the Northern region, particularly Tanete (Ternate) fortresses in Kalibone and Sangkara, two areas located in the north outskirts of Maroa town. Again, the troops of Britain and Gowa could not pass through the defense of Tanete (Ternate) which was helped by Bone troops. Up to the end of 1815, there occurred three times battles between both sides, but the British troops did not achieve any victory at all. Tanete (Ternate) and Bone, with their allies, maintained their control over the Northern region (Abduh *et al.*, 1985:47).

Within the period between the months of January through August 1816, Major D.M. Dalton gave order to his troops and their allies, particularly Gowa, to attack the troops of Bone and Tanete (Ternate) who did not only had control over the Northern region but also tried to enter the City of Makassar and control Tallo (Rasyid, 1985:176). Once again, Major D.M. Dalton's effort did not bring him any satisfactory success. The inadequate arms and the stronger troops of the enemies had forced the British troops to retreat to the City of Makassar. At the same time, on 25 September 1816, the British authority had to hand over South Sulawesi to the Dutch authority (Van der Kamp, 1817).

## CONCLUSION

The British found it difficult to establish its power in South Sulawesi. During the British control in South Sulawesi, the opposition of

Bone and its allies often occurred. The British obtained helps from the kingdoms which had become its allies, such as Gowa, Soppeng, and Sidenreng, but they were never capable of subduing the power of opposing kingdoms like Bone, Tanete (Ternate), Suppa, and several other small kingdoms. Little by little, regions under the British control were taken over by the kingdoms opposing them. Maros, Tallo, Bantaeng, and Bulukumba were the four regions which were successfully taken over by Bone and its allies from the British authority. Meanwhile, Gowa, Soppeng, and Sidenreng were the three kingdoms which had alliance with the British authority, but failed to provide full assistance.

The British apparently did not understand well the political attitudes of the kingdoms which had become their allies. As reported by Richard Phillips, the Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, that at a certain time, there spread an issue that while Bone and Wajo were about to attack Soppeng, a report was delivered that the Kings of Bone, Gowa, and Soppeng were convening at a certain place. Because of the difficulties of understanding the political attitudes of the allied kingdoms and the internal conflicts in Gowa, and also because of the great number of the British soldiers who fell sick and the lack of the assistance from Batavia, had resulted in the British inability to maintain its control over Maros, Tallo, Bantaeng, and Bulukumba. On the other hand, Bone and its allies were harder to take over those regions. Thus, at the end of its power in South Sulawesi on September 1816, the British could only control the City of Makassar and some parts of the Southern Region.

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- "The Letter from Richard Phillips, Resident of Makassar and its Surroundings, to the Secretary of the War Commander in Batavia, on 2 August 1814" in *ANRI Collection: Makassar File No.265/1*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].
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**British Authority in South Sulawesi Region**  
(Source: [www.google.com](http://www.google.com), 14/1/2014)

The British found it difficult to establish its power in South Sulawesi. During the British control in South Sulawesi, the opposition of Bone and its allies often occurred. The British obtained helps from the kingdoms which had become its allies, such as Gowa, Soppeng, and Sidenreng, but they were never capable of subduing the power of opposing kingdoms like Bone, Tanete (Ternate), Suppa, and several other small kingdoms.