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## Dynastic Politics: The Culture of Regent's Appointment in the Past and Present Java, Indonesia

**ABSTRACT:** This article studies on the dynastic politics in the appointment of Regents in past and present Java. The past means the era before Indonesian independence in 1945, while the present era is the era after Indonesian independence (1945-1968), especially the New Order era (1968-1998) and Reform era (1998 to date). A comparison will be made about dynastic politics from time to time. The method used is a historical research, including heuristics, criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The result of this study is that in the era of pre-Indonesian independence (Dutch colonial government), dynastic politics was implemented by appointing Regent candidates from the descendants of Regents or other bureaucratic elite families. This policy was carried out in because it hoped the Regent candidates came from good descendants. They had been raised as officials, so that they can be accepted by the community. The candidates who would be appointed as Regents should have been suitable with the qualifications demanded by the modern bureaucracy. To execute, it was choosing candidates who were educated and experienced in the government bureaucracy. In addition, they must have come from reputable noble families. On the other hand, the dynastic politics at the era of post Indonesian independence (1945 to date) was not only based on descent, or blood relations, but also business networks and interest groups.

**KEY WORDS:** Dynastic Politics; Regents of Java; Past and Present Era.

### INTRODUCTION

Politics of Dynasty has recently become a trending topic, when discussing the issue of selecting Regional Heads. Dynastic politics itself is actually not a new issue but old things, because in the Dutch colonial era (1816-1942), the Dutch East Indies government had imposed dynastic

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politics when filling in empty governmental position in Java and Madura. Dynastic politics in the Dutch colonial era meant choosing candidates, who would occupy important positions in the indigenous government bureaucracy; offspring are used as a basis for determining candidates for these officials, so that dynasties that often dominate positions are formed in the bureaucracy in their respective regions.

The implementation of dynastic politics in the current era still refers to kinship politics, but what is meant by kinship politics is not only limited to blood relations, but also business networks and interest groups. As stated by newspaper of *Kompas* in Jakarta:

*They are already in a strong network, so they have no power to refuse, and let the minimal political experience. The impact of this politics is that after becoming regents, it is not uncommon to become a family ATM machine for projects. According to Aditya, this condition has a negative impact on Indonesia's democracy, because the position of the political elite only revolves around certain groups of families or networks and closes the potential for political participation.<sup>1</sup>*

Dynastic politics in the Dutch colonial era was not applied singly, but was supported by the requirements that had to be fulfilled to complete the descent as a basis for the appointment of someone to become an official in the government bureaucracy. These requirements, for example, the candidates must be educated or have the experience of being officials in the government bureaucracy, of good descendants, family; and he is loyal to the Dutch East Indies government or meritorious to the Dutch East Indies government. Such requirements caused only elite families to meet these requirements, and there was rarely vertical mobility due to these heavy requirements. Dynastic politics in the present era also includes certain requirements. What is the difference with the dynastic politics of the past?

This article discusses how dynastic politics was applied in the appointment of Regents in Java from the pre-independence era to the present. Until this article was written, studies on dynastic politics have not been found, but there have been several studies which mention aspects of inheritance or dynasty as a prerequisite for the appointment of someone to become Regent. For example, [Retno Winarni \(2018\)](#)'s study, entitled "Enduring in the Strengthening of Colonial Power: Regents in Residency Besuki, 1830s to 1930s", discussed how the Regents in the Besuki Residency, East Java, retained a position for themselves and their descendants in the face of the colonial government policies, which they

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, [News on "Produk Politik Dinasti Bermasalah" in newspaper of Kompas. Jakarta: 6<sup>th</sup> September 2016, pp.1 and 15.](#)

felt were a threat to themselves and their beauty. This is because the policy of modernization of the indigenous government bureaucracy leads to a rational legal government, where the recruitment of Regent candidates is not only based on aspects of heredity, but also on skills acquired by Western education (Winarni, 2018).

Similar studies are Heather Sutherland (1983)'s works focused on ins and outs of Dutch colonial government bureaucracy and the indigenous government bureaucracy. More specifically, Heather Sutherland (1983) focused the Regent as a bureaucratic elite. Therefore, in Heather Sutherland (1983)'s work, there was discussion about the status, position, power, and activities of Regents in government. In addition, it also discussed changes in the appointment of a Regent candidate, who originally based on heredity. However, it changed based on skills. It was also said that the Regents fought their utmost to adapt to the new regulations, by providing modern (Western) education to their children and siblings. Hence, when the regulation was really carried out by ignoring heredity, the Regent's family were ready to adapt. Thus, dynastic politics continued (Sutherland, 1983).

Soekesi Soemoatmodjo (1985) discusses more specifically the specific spatial scope, that is the north coast of Java. He studied the lifestyles of the rural Regents in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, included patterns of appointment of Regents, based on descent similar to dynasties. These are symbols of greatness, clothing, and the shape of the houses of the Regents of *Pasisiran* (Soemoatmodjo, 1985).

From this description, it can be said that despite studies on dynastic politics, the period they chose was different from dynastic politics in this study. It is included three periods, these are the Dutch Colonial era (1900-1942), the New Order era (1968-1998), and the Reform era (1998 to date). Thus, this theme still needs to be studied. To support the explanation in the discussion, the specific problems are formulated: (1) How to implement dynastic politics from time to time?; (2) Why dynastic politics is chosen?; and (3) What is the political impact on democracy and governance in the region?

## METHOD

This research uses qualitative approach, historical method, and literature study, these are selecting topic, searching the source (heuristics), criticizing, interpreting, and historiography (Kartodirdjo, 1992; Kuntowijoyo, 1995:89-105; Zed, 2008; Creswell, 2010; Sjamsuddin, 2016). About the heuristics, it is process of searching and finding the source, which is relevant to the topic. The main source needed is the primary source. The primary source is the source coming from person or

tool (recorder) that witnesses the researched occurrence. This source is called as eyewitness source, because it comes both from the eyewitness and the recorder, when the historical event happens (Kuntowijoyo, 1995; Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Sjamsuddin, 2016).

This research uses the source, both primary and secondary. The primary sources consist of *Staadblad* and *Regering* calendar. The secondary sources function as the primary sources. They come from books and articles in the academic journals discussing elite bureaucracy in Besuki Residence, East Java, Indonesia (Howell & Prevenier, 2001; Zed, 2008; Sjamsuddin, 2016).

The data analysis is through historical methods by selecting the found sources, external and internal criticizing, and defining the authenticity and credibility of the sources. After criticizing, there will be a statement about the event, which is called as historical fact in history science. The historical fact is used as the half-done source for being the basics in the next steps. The third step is interpreting, that is the process of correlating the separated historical facts for getting the more meaningful history understanding (Garaghan, 1940:99-101; McCullagh, 1984; Sjamsuddin, 2016).

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

***Dynasty Politics in the Era Before Independence.*** Dynastic politics had become a culture in the appointment of Regent candidates in the era before independence (1945). The era had the kingdoms, the VOC (*Vereneegde Oost-Indische Compagnie* or Dutch East India Company) era (1602-1799), and the era of the Dutch East Indies government (1816-1942). A pattern showed that the heir to the position of Regent is the direct or indirect descendant or relative of the Regent. The filling of the Regent's position which is generally ascriptive is determined that the heir to the position of Regent is prioritized by the Regent's family, mostly the first son born from *Garwa Padmi* (Queen or Empress). If these conditions could not be fulfilled, then there are other considerations (Tjokrodiwikromo, 1952:34).

The appointment of a candidate to replace the Regent could also be made at the request or suggestion of the Regent, who will be replaced while still alive. The appointment of a successor candidate, child or maybe the brother, before the VOC came to power was reported to the central government of the kingdom. However, during the VOC period, it was reported to the VOC. Moreover, in the era of the Dutch East Indies government in Batavia was reported. The proposal was usually agreed if the candidate does not show an attitude of opposition to the government,

but sometimes there was a case that the government wanted other candidates (Tjiptoatmodjo, 1983:344-345).

The right to inherit this position is then guaranteed by a government decision. The government regulation containing the principle of inheritance is *Regeringsreglement* in 1836, which allows indigenous people to remain under direct leadership and power from the indigenous heads themselves, as far as conditions permit. This idea in *Regeringsreglement* in 1854 was maintained. The special position of the next Regent was also recognized in the government regulation by recognizing the right to replace the Regent's position from generation to generation within certain limits.

The Dutch East Indies government supported the politics of this dynasty, because the Dutch East Indies government realized that the indigenous people had traditional authority. Indigenous people thought specifically about the authority and tradition of their leaders. The people always respect, obey, obey, and obey the Regents who came from families that had ruled them for centuries. If a child replaced his father as Regent, respect and sense of devotion and loyalty to his ancestors automatically switched to the new Regent. By this way, the stability of the colonial government could be maintained. The Dutch East Indies government then tied influential families from the Regents to central authority. On this basis the principle of inheritance based on inheritance was incorporated into the legislation of the Dutch East Indies colonial government (Lubis, 1998:93).

The Dutch East Indies government had actually tried to foster a rational legal bureaucracy since the H.W. Daendels era (1808-1811), but the reality had not yet been implemented. For appointing new officials, although conditions had been determined that status in certain standards are obtained based on efforts (achieved status) based on Western education and loyalty; heredity is still a major consideration. This means that dynastic politics prioritized the favorite families of the colonial government who could dominate positions ranging from the lowest position to the highest position in the indigenous government bureaucratic structure (Hasan, 2012).

The Dutch colonial government actually realized that dynastic politics had many weaknesses. Because of prioritizing aspects of heredity then, often the elected Regent was often incompetent in running the government. There were still those in the 19<sup>th</sup> century who could only sign autographs after being read by their secretaries (employees). This fact caused anxiety for the Dutch colonial government, because he saw that the job of a Regent was getting heavier and more diverse. Therefore, the

Dutch colonial government tried to find solutions related to the demands of the work. The Dutch colonial government saw the need to modernize the indigenous government bureaucracy. This modernization policy was implemented starting in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (1870s). One of the bureaucratic modernization agendas was the modernization of the model for appointing indigenous officials, including the Regent. Appointment based on hereditary factors was still maintained, but in order for the chosen candidate to meet the qualifications, supplementation was needed for the hereditary factor.

Some categories that must be possessed by *ambtenaar* candidates (prospective employees) who would apply for a job are: the first was to pass a diploma from *Hoofdenschool*, a special school for native candidates. The second was passing diploma *klein ambtenaars examen*, that is a test for low-ranking employees. The third was having certificate explaining that a prospective official has attended the *Europesche School* course. The implementation of the regulation has been started since 1863, by requiring special examinations for prospective officials. This test was called *grott ambtenaars examen*. The exams were originally in the Netherlands at Delf and Leiden, but were later also held in Batavia (Jakarta now), with the opening of section B at the Willem III Gymnasium in 1867. While the original *klein ambtenaar examen*, in 1864, was obliged to lower ranks in the colonial bureaucracy. These employees were mostly *Indo*, but even this provision also finally applied to indigenous government employees (Overduyn, 1900:4-21; Simbolon, 1995:178).<sup>2</sup>

Rationalization efforts in the appointment of Regents and other officials had caused anxiety among the Regents. They were restless and worried about the fate of their children in the future. Usually the Regents surrendered to the policies of the colonial government, but if it concerns the future of the children and their families, the Regents would try, so that their children were not displaced from the government bureaucracy circle. From that time on, they realized that Western education was very important, so the adaptation strategy was carried out by the Regents in order to deal with new demands from the Dutch colonial government. They tried to provide Western education to their children. One of the ways they did it was by utilizing their relationship with Dutch people, who had been intertwined for so long. This was due to the fact that their relationship with the Dutch people and their culture was the right media in order to introduce their children to Western traditions and culture.

The Dutch colonial government itself actually seemed to want to

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<sup>2</sup>See also, for example, "Bijblad 4762 in 1864", *Unpublished Colonial Archive*, Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia]; and "Article 6 of Staatsblad van Nederlandsch Indie, 1864, No.194", *Unpublished Colonial Archive*, Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

maintain dynastic politics in order to recruit officials in the indigenous government bureaucracy. It could be seen that although in the modern bureaucratic system of education was the main condition, the Dutch East Indies government still opened another avenue to achieve certain positions, that was the applied tradition of the apprenticeship institution. This apprenticeship system was arranged together with other regulations regulating the appointment, promoting and giving of pensions to indigenous employees in Java and Madura. In this regulation, it was stated what levels (ranks) of positions that apprentices (applicants) must go through. These regulations were each apprentice to reach class/level A, he had to start at level C, then B, and only to level A. As candidates/interns to rank Regents had to go through level A first or at least had served *Wedana* or *Patih* for two years with excellent title. This regulation was put into effect since 1887 (Kartodirdjo, 1997:104).<sup>3</sup>

This regulation showed that the Dutch colonial government viewed the Regent's office as a career position, because it was based on a career-learning process starting from the bottom. Candidates for Regents even began their careers from the ground up, for example there were those who served as the paramedics of the Dutch government coffee warehouse, *kawedanan* (sub-district)'s clerks.<sup>4</sup>

Thus by pursuing a career from below, a prospective official would know the task which must be completed by an official. They could find out what problems were in the community that needed to be resolved immediately. For example the Regents in Panarukan Regency, Raden Mas Tumenggung Suriodiputro (1872-1885), before being appointed as Panarukan Regent replacing his brother, Raden Tumenggung Surioamijoyo (1859-1872), he had served as a tax collector in Pasuruan, East Java. Raden Ario Mochamad Iman, then Raden Tumenggung Pustokopranowo (1908-1925), before being appointed as the Panarukan Regent replacing his father, Raden Tumenggung Kusumodiputro (1885-1908), he had served as an Assistant of *Wedana* in Onder Tapen District, Wonosari District, Bondowoso Regency (Sutherland, 1974:34; Guntur, 2007; *Ibidem* with footnote 4).

Another effort that could give dynastic politics a chance to survive was the establishment of OSVIA (*Opleiding School Voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren* or Training School for Indies Civil Servants). This elite school was the result of the re-arrangement of the three old *Hoofden Scholen* (School of Heads), which had been established in Bandung (West Java), Magelang

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<sup>3</sup>See also "Staadtsblad van Nederlandsch Indie, 1887, No.192". *Unpublished Colonial Archive*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia]; and "Bijblad 4762 in 1864". *Unpublished Colonial Archive*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>4</sup>See, for example, the work history of the Regents in Panarukan and Bondowoso, East Java, as shown in "Sejarah Bupati-bupati di Panarukan dan Bondowoso", *Unpublished Academic Work*, Jember City: Owned by Author; and "Silsilah Bupati-bupati di Besuki", *Unpublished Academic Work*, Jember City: Owned by Author.

(Central Java), and Probolinggo (East Java). It was a school that was clearly planned to produce government employees. His education period was five years, with Dutch as the medium of instruction. This school was more open than *Hoofden Sholen*, meaning it was open to all Indonesians who had completed European Low School. Prospective students no longer had to come from the aristocratic elite, because the high school fees for low-income families sending their children to OSVIA was still very difficult (Ricklefs, 2005:236-237).

Besides that, student admission depended on the personal recommendations of local officials of the BB (*Binnenlands Bestuur* or Interior Administration) and the Regent. The Regents did not waste this opportunity. Regents used their patron rights to propose children, relatives, and people they like to be sent to school at the institution (Sutherland, 1983:109).

The kinship system was thus maintained. The results could be traced in the history of the appointment of Regents and other officials in various places. Raden Achmad Djajadiningrat's family was a progressive family, his father was the Regent of Serang (1894-1899) in Banten, a Regent who was forward-thinking. He gave Western education to his children. In 1898, his eldest son, Raden Achmad, graduated from HBS (*Hoogere Burger School* or Higher Civic School). The second one, Mochamad, passed the *Menak* (Aristocratic) School examination in Bandung, West Java. His younger son, Hasan, went up to grade 2 of HBS. The fourth son was admitted to HBS. It was Raden Achmad who later was appointed as Regent of Serang (1901-1906), became Regent of Bantam (1917-1924) and Regent of Betawi (1924-1929). His father and grandfather were the Regent of Serang (Djajadiningrat, 1936:109).

Based on this evidence, it could be said that the continuity in holding the position of Regent was maintained. Even, the Djajadiningrat family was already a dynasty. Another example was mentioned by Nina H. Lubis (1998) that in Priangan, five of the seven Regents had fathers and grandfathers, who were also Regents (Lubis, 1998:100).

The next policy adopted at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was in the era of Ethical Politics. At this time, the Dutch colonial government tried to rid the Regent of the old tradition. They must be considered only as one of the links in the bureaucratic world. Consequently, they need to get education for the sake of higher efficiency demands in carrying out the tasks that are charged to them. Besides that, in accordance with social progress due to increasing number of educated people, in the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the government issued a policy in the nomination of Regents. The policy in is an addition to the Regent candidates that he



must have at least two years experience as *Wedana* or *Patih* with great achievement. It has been implemented since 1887. Furthermore, the Regent candidates had to understand and could speak in Dutch language. Indeed, there were no tests, but it was confirmed that the skills considered eligible if at least the candidates graduated from the *Hoofden-School* (Indigenous Civil Service School).<sup>5</sup>

Nina H. Lubis (1998) said also that the regulation was imposed because in government research, there were still many illiterate indigenous heads (Lubis, 1998:96). However, since then a new generation has begun to be born. At that time, the Regents and other officials who had seen the importance of education for their children had given birth to a new Western-educated generation. Therefore, whatever the government regulations, including neglect of heredity, the elite families still qualify for important positions in the government bureaucracy. For example, in Panarukan District in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, there were educated and intelligent young people, such as Raden Mas Tumenggung Pustokopranowo, Regent of Panarukan (1908-1925), who was an educated Regent (Anonymous, 1914; Sutherland, 1973).<sup>6</sup>

The previous Bupati, R.M.T.A. (Raden Mas Tumenggung Ario) Kusumodiputro (1885-1908) was one of the four members of the Welfare Commission established by the Dutch East Indies government (Lubis, 1998:96). Likewise, the replacement of R.M.T. (Raden Mas Tumenggung) Pustokopranowo, Raden Adipati Ario Sudibiokusumo (1925-1942), he was a Regent who came from a good, educated, and smart family (Soerjadi, 1974:69; Sutherland, 1975; Muarif, 2020).<sup>7</sup>

***Politics of Dynasty Early in the Era of Independence until the New Order Period.*** After independence, 1945-1968, dynastic politics was no longer based only on descent or blood ties, but also business networks and interest groups. In Indonesia, these interest groups were more prominent than business networks. These interest groups were mainly political parties or socio-religious organizations. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the dynastic political independence, it was still not visible. It only appeared prominent in the New Order era (1968-1998), although dynastic politics was no longer referring to hereditary aspects and business networks, but based on interest groups. The interest groups in the New Order era could be appointed by the Armed Forces, which was hoped to be able to secure the interests of the New Order ruling group.

The selection of candidates for Regional Heads, both the Head of the

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<sup>5</sup>See "Bijblad 8579 in 1913". *Unpublished Colonial Archive*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>6</sup>See also "Regering Almanak 1908". *Unpublished Colonial Archive*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>7</sup>See also, for example, "Regering Almanak van Nederlandsche Indie, 1929". *Unpublished Colonial Archive*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

Level I and the Level II Regions, actually had rules. The Level II Regional Head was appointed and dismissed by the Minister of Home Affairs with the approval of the President.<sup>8</sup> Whereas according to Law No.5 of 1974, the Heads of Level II Regions were nominated by and elected by the Regional People's Legislative Assembly from at least 3 (three) candidates and a maximum of 5 (five) candidates. They should be deliberated and mutually agreed between the Board Leaders Regional People's Representatives/ Faction Leaders with the Governor of the Region. The government strives for the priority of the people/candidates from the Armed Forces, and based on the facts on the ground in various regions. The elected Level II (*Bupati*) were from ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* or Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), for example in Jember Regency, from 1969 to 1998, the Jember Regents came from ABRI. The Regents were Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hadi, 1969-1979; Lieutenant Colonel Soepono, 1979-1984; Lieutenant Colonel Soeriadi Setyawan, 1984-1989; Lieutenant Colonel Priyanto Wibowo, 1989-1994; and Colonel Drs. Winarno, 1994-1999 (Aspinal & Fealy eds., 2010; Widuatie et al., 2016).<sup>9</sup>

Actually there was no stipulation that the Regent, as head of the region, had to be from the Armed Forces. However, there were certain missions from the central government, so ABRI was considered being able to carry out the task properly. The military presence was used by the New Order government to maintain the stability and dynamics of national development implementation. Stability of security and order was considered very necessary, and the military was the most appropriate and able to carry the burden of the task. The political turmoil and conflict resulting from the G-30-S (*Gerakan 30 September* or 30<sup>th</sup> September Movement) of 1965 needed recovery of security and order to facilitate the running of the government and development programs that had been prepared by the New Order government. Government would not be effective and development would not succeed optimally if it was not conducive. These reasons and considerations still seemed to be acceptable to all parties, and in the interest of national development and improvement of people's welfare. The existence and involvement of the military in the government could also be understood and accepted.

During this period, GOLKAR (*Golongan Karya* or Functional Group), which had emerged as a strong organization, was identical with government-owned organizations. History records for the first time of

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<sup>8</sup>See also, for comparison, "Penetapan Presiden No.6 Tahun 1959". *Unpublished National Archive*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia]; and "Undang-Undang No.18 Tahun 1965". *Unpublished National Archive*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia].

<sup>9</sup>See also "Undang-Undang No.5 Tahun 1974". *Unpublished National Archive*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia], particularly Article 16 and Paragraph 1.

New Order government, on 3 July 1971 General Election was held for members of the Indonesian Parliament, Level I DPRD and Level II DPRD. The GOLKAR campaign, like what happened in Jember Regency, East Java, was attended by thousands of people and bureaucrat figures, such as Haji Hadatoellah, one of the officials in the Regional government as PNS (*Pegawai Negeri Sipil* or Civil Servant). In that era, the power of the government was supported by ABRI, Bureaucrats, and Governors as Head of Province.

The collected bureaucracy was even obliged to win the GOLKAR Joint Secretariat. Jember Regent Dpb (*Diperbantukan* or Assisted) as an important official in the region was obliged to mobilize civil servants to win GOLKAR. They were not only civil servants and the community, but also the wives of civil servants and students, such as GEMA KARYA UNEJ (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Karya Universitas Jember* or Functional Student Movement of Jember University). Directing the Functionary of Central GOLKAR, Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwana IX met the government officials of Jember Regency in the Jember PTP (*Perusahaan Terbatas Perkebunan* or Plantation Limited Company) XXVI hall, on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1971. At that time, apart from the government apparatus from the center to the corners of the region, both ABRI, also POLRI (*Kepolisian Republik Indonesia* or Indonesian Republic Police) were obliged to win GOLKAR in the General Election. Monoloyalty for KORPRI (*Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia* or Republic of Indonesia Civil Service Corps) was implemented, requiring KORPRI to enter the GOLKAR ([Tim DPRD Jember, 2007:4-6](#)).

The result could be ascertained that in the 1971 General Election, GOLKAR came out as a winner with a vote of 403,404; NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama* or Islamic Scholars Awakening) + SI (*Syarekat Islam* or Islamic Federation) = 375,404; PARMUSI (*Partai Muslimin Indonesia* or Indonesian Muslim Party) = 60,489; PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* = Indonesian National Party) = 24,430; PSII (*Partai Syarekat Islam Indonesia* or Indonesia Islamic Federation Party) = 20,245; PARKINDO (*Partai Kristen Protestan Indonesia* or Indonesian Protestant Christian Party) = 2,294; PK (*Partai Katholik* or Catholic Party) = 1,452; PERTI (*Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* or Islamic Education United) = 1,164; IPKI (*Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia* or Indonesian Independence Supporters Association) = 936; Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) = 224 voters. Likewise in the 1977 General Election, GOLKAR still won Elections with PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or United Development Party) = 432,192 votes; GOLKAR = 530,216 votes; and PDI (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* = Indonesian Democracy Party) = 33,776 votes ([Tim DPRD Jember, 2007:11 and 243](#)).

During the New Order government, the General Elections from 1971-1997 were always won by GOLKAR. This condition made the New Order government under General Soeharto's leadership was very solid with the support of the DPR/MPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or House of Representatives/People's Consultative Assembly), because the majority came from the civil servants and representatives from ABRI. GOLKAR had the legitimacy to continue to be a single majority that determined the democratic process in parliament, both central and regional. Thus, the New Order government had succeeded in creating a culture of competition, and instead prioritizing uniformity. Command political culture felt more prominent than participatory (Liddle, 1992; Pratikno, 1998:24; Tim DPRD Jember, 2007:243).

This ongoing GOLKAR victory determines the leadership elements in the legislature. For example, based on PP (*Peraturan Pemerintah* or Government Regulation) No.2/1970, there should be as many as 40 legislative members. Nevertheless, based on the Jember Regency DPRD (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* or Regional People's Representative Assembly) decree results from the 1971 General Election, the leadership structure and members of the Jember Regency DPRD results from the 1971 General Election consisted of 32 people. Members of the DPRD were chosen by 7 people, so that there were 39 people. With the acquisition of the most seats, it would be able to smooth ABRI to assume the position of regional head. For example, in the election of Regents for the period 1974-1979, there was a single candidate, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Hadi. He was appointed as a single candidate. He was chosen due to either his services in building Jember, or support from GOLKAR and the ABRI Faction (Tim DPRD Jember, 2007:16).

The smooth path of ABRI in the position of Regional Head of Jember Regency also occurred in the future. For example, the election of Lieutenant Colonel Soepono was inseparable from government interference (military center). Another event occurred at this time was the election of the Regent of the Level II Jember Region, period 1984-1989. The DPRD in this case has the duty to determine 3-5 candidates, but the determination of these candidates must be consulted with the Minister of Home Affairs. The proposed Regent candidate must get a recommendation from the Minister of Home Affairs.<sup>10</sup> From the three candidates, Lieutenant Colonel Suryadi Setiawan won the Jember Regent election with a fantastic vote. Lieutenant Colonel Suryadi Setiawan got

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<sup>10</sup>See again "Undang-Undang No.5 Tahun 1974". *Unpublished National Archive*. Jakarta: ANRI [Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia], particularly Article 13 and Paragraph 1.

34 votes; Adi Soewarno, S.H. (*Sarjana Hukum* or Bachelor of Law) got 4 votes; and Drs. Syamsi got 1 vote.

Likewise, the election of the next Regents, for the period 1989 to 1994 according to prevailing regulations and legislation, was not carried out directly by the people. It was carried out by the DPRD, which represented the voice of the people. In this election, there were three Regent candidates, they are: Lieutenant Colonel Priyanto Wibowo from ABRI; Drs. Roekan from the Regional Office; and Handanu Hendro, S.H. from the BAPPEKAB (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Kabupaten* or District Development Planning Agency). The election was done through voting too. The winner of this election was predicted based on the most votes. Lieutenant Colonel Priyanto Wibowo from the Indonesian Armed Forces won 38 votes; Drs. Roekan got 3 votes; and Handanu Hendro, S.H. got 4 votes.

The last Regent election in the New Order era had the same pattern (1994-1999). There were three candidates, they were Colonel Drs. Winarno from ABRI; Guntur Anantodihardjo, a Head of the Department of Education and Culture of Jember Regency; and Kadarisman Sastrodiwiryo, who at that time was Mayor of Jember. The Regent of Development and the Indonesian Armed Forces fractions won, because they had a majority vote, and the candidates from FKP (*Fraksi Karya Pembangunan* or Fraction of Upbuilding Work) owned by GOLKAR and FABRI (Fraction of Indonesian Armed Forces) were then consulted with the Commander before being officially nominated by FKP and FABRI. The results of the DPRD plenary session on 24<sup>th</sup> May 1994, Colonel Drs. Winarno was appointed as winner. Each vote was Colonel Drs. Winarno got 38 votes; Guntur Anantodihardjo got 1 vote; and Kadarisman Sastrodiwiryo got 4 votes ([Tim DPRD Jember, 2007:16](#); [Winarni & Widuatie, 2018 and 2020](#)).

The description above showed that the dynastic politics of the ORBA (*Orde Baru* or New Order) government did not experience obstacles. This was applied to almost all Regions I and Level II throughout Indonesia. How did it happen? ABRI's domination of leadership in the region was due to the first continuous victory of GOLKAR since 1971-1977 ([Anwar, 2018:23](#)). The most votes determine the acquisition of seats in the DPR. GOLKAR always won the General Elections, it did not apart from the status of GOLKAR itself which was often identified with the government party. Therefore, it could use government facilities in the campaign. Furthermore, it required officials to become members of GOLKAR, civil servants, BUMN (*Badan Usaha Milik Negara* or State-Owned Enterprises), BUMD (*Badan Usaha Milik Daerah* or Regionally-Owned Enterprises) to become members of GOLKAR. Even, it required regional heads who had been won in the Regional Head Election to win GOLKAR. It was just like a

vicious circle and it continued. The election of regional head candidates from the government always got almost 90% of the votes in the DPRD, whereas when viewed from the composition of seats in the DPRD, for example in Jember, the difference in the acquisition of seats in DPRD was not much. For example in 1982, PPP had 15 seats; GOLKAR had 15 seats; and PDI had 2 seats (Tim DPRD Jember, 2007:16; Winarni & Widuatie, 2018 and 2020).

***Politics of Dynasty in the Reform Era: Direct Election of Regional Heads.*** In the Reform era (1998 to date), due to the enthusiastic spirit of democratization in various sectors of people's lives, there had been a polarization of authoritarian politics into laizesfair. Euphoria due to the fall of the New Order regime (1968-1998) brought a new atmosphere in national politics. The Presidential and Regional Head elections that were previously carried out indirectly were later changed by direct elections by the people. When this system was implemented, political parties returned to play an important role. Political parties acted as locomotives of democracy. The party had the duty to prepare competent, honest, and trustworthy human resources. This meant that a candidate for Regional Head should be nominated by a political party.

Political parties had a strategic role to produce true and complete national leaders. In this regard, it is hoped that political parties will carry out their functions in accordance with the nature of the formation of political parties. Every political party must carry out political education systematically, programmatically, and continuously. In addition, political parties must build a more transparent, participatory, selective, competitive, and accountable recruitment system.<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless in reality, political parties had not been able to become the driving force of representative democracy and democratic governance as required by Article 22E Paragraph (3) and Article 6A of the 1945 Constitution. This could be seen in relation to the election which was always marked by money politics, horizontal conflicts, fraud to abuse state and government facilities. Political parties were pawned for vehicles for candidates who had money (Surbakti, 2016; *Ibidem* with footnote 11).

According to political observer from the University of Jember, M. Hadi Makmur, which occurred in Jember 2015 showed no party cadres were advancing as candidates for regional heads. Both candidates were seemed not to have a mass base, so that they had the potential to make money politics. The party failed to carry out its leadership regeneration internally. In his opinion, the ideal party succeeded in producing cadres

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<sup>11</sup>See, for example, News on "Proses Demokrasi Memusingkan Rakyat" in newspaper of *Kompas*. Jakarta: 17<sup>th</sup> September 2016.

who had long been in the party. As a pillar of democracy, ideally every political party must properly regenerate these cadres (Faizin, 2019; Solichah & Kusbiantoro, 2020).<sup>12</sup>

The cadres should be trained and equipped with the substance in accordance with the platform and ideology of the party, so that later the cadres were able to carry out their duties as representatives of the people and also as candidates for regional leaders. These cadres would later be distributed to fill strategic positions in the parliament and government. However, political parties did not carry out political recruitment, which was carried out through democratic and fair selection and competition in a democratic manner. The absence of this function made it difficult for political parties to have party elites or cadres who could be trusted to sit in public and parliamentary positions. On the other hand, political parties did not build a culture of substantial democracy, but they more concerned with formal procedural and legal aspects. Political parties also did not conduct good and conducive political education for citizens, especially education for their constituents regarding the political values and ideals of the party concerned. Because they did not have this function, political parties found it difficult to find qualified cadres in terms of vision, mission, commitment, character, and behavior as well as skills in carrying out people's trust (Sahasrad, 2016; *Ibidem* with footnote 12).

In addition, almost all parties had no standard mechanism for determining candidates for Regional Heads. On paper, the administrative process of registering candidates for Regional Heads was indeed carried out, but the decision to determine candidates was very closed to the public. This was also caused by the lack of regulation in the Political Party Law concerning the nomination of public officials. The law only stated that the determination of candidates proposed by political parties through General Elections was carried out democratically. In its implementation, there was almost no clear measure to determine whether recruitment by political parties has fulfilled democratic elements or not (Syahravi, 2016).

In the Law on Political Parties, decision making was in the hands of members. However, other reasons that political parties in Indonesia had not been managed democratically, yet they are managed oligarchically. Decision-making laid with a small group of party elites, even for a number of parties managed personally in the hands of the General Chairman. Finally, dynastic politics returned to national politics. In Banten Province, Western Java, for example, the family of Ratu Atut Chosiah, who held positions of Regional Head is Subang Regent, West Java for 2013-2018 period, Ojang Sohadi. He had been the adjutant of the previous Subang

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<sup>12</sup>See also, for comparison, News on "Kegagalan Kaderisasi Partai" in newspaper of *Kompas*. Jakarta: 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2015.

Regent, Eep Hidayat. In his second term, 2008-2013, Eep Hidayat took part as his representative. Not yet finished his term of office, Eep Hidayat was dismissed, due to a corruption case ([Surbakti, 2016](#)).<sup>13</sup>

University of Indonesia Political Department Instructor in Jakarta, Aditya Perdana, said that the Head of the Region's dynastic political products had a greater potential to get caught up in legal problems. This kinship politics is not only limited to blood ties, but also business networks and interest groups. Aditya Perdana said, as cited by newspaper of *Kompas* in Jakarta, on 6<sup>th</sup> September 2016, as following here:

*They are already in a strong network so they have no power to refuse, let alone political experience is minimal. Not infrequently they become family ATM [Automated Teller Machine] for projects. [...] in the long run, this condition had a negative impact on Indonesian democracy. The position of the political elite only revolved around families or networks of certain groups and closed the potential for political participation (*Ibidem* with footnote 13).*

The Executive Director of PERLUDEM (*Perhimpunan untuk PEMILU dan Demokrasi* or Association for General Elections and Democracy), Titi Anggraini, added that kinship politics cannot be separated from the context of direct elections. The community was unable to influence the recruitment of candidates for regional heads from political parties. In addition, voter political education was also inadequate. Voters usually only see figures, even though the duties of the Regent are getting heavier. Especially in the era of regional autonomy, the Regent is demanded to be creative, innovative, and visionary. A Regent must be able to manage the potential in their respective regions to advance the region and prosper its people (*cf Winarni & Widuatie, 2018 and 2020; Ibidem with footnote 13*).

The deterioration in the quality and competence of the candidates for Regional Heads was not merely the eyes of the sins or mistakes of political parties, but the laws and regulations concerning the nomination of Regional Heads also contribute to this. The requirements for being appointed as Regent had points that made it very easy for citizens to nominate themselves to become Regional Heads. For example, to be appointed as Regional Heads, the candidates must fulfill the conditions as stipulated in article 14 of the Republic of Indonesia Act No.5 of 1974. The important points from these conditions were smartness, capability and skill, sufficient work skills and experience in the field of government. The candidates had to be knowledgeable with the academy or at least educated that could be equated with High School for the Head of Level II

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<sup>13</sup>See also, for comparison, News on "Produk Politik Dinasti Bermasalah" in newspaper of *Kompas*. Jakarta: 6<sup>th</sup> September 2016; and News on "Produk Politik Dinasti Bermasalah, Bupati Banyuwasin 'Ijon' Proyek" in newspaper of *Kompas*. Jakarta: 6<sup>th</sup> September 2016.



(Soehino, 1980:126; Winarni & Widuatie, 2018 and 2020).

This regulation had indeed impacted the difficulty of cadres from outside the bureaucracy to penetrate the nomination market. Nevertheless such requirements, acknowledged or not, would affect the citizens who were netted to participate in the elections. They were citizens who had sufficient education and skills in government. In the past, this regulation could be dealt with by the Dutch East Indies government by setting conditions that must be possessed by a Regent candidate. These conditions were that a candidate for Regent must pass the *Groot Ambtenaar Examen* and must have Western education. To get Western education for the Regent candidates, the Dutch East Indies government established schools for the children of the indigenous elite. In order for the Regent candidates to gain knowledge related to government, the Dutch East Indies government established a special civil service school, *Hoofden Scholen* (King's School for Noble Men), which was later renamed OSVIA (*Opleiding Scholen Voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren* or Training Schools for Native Officials) and later MOSVIA (*Middelbare Opleiding School Voor Inlandsche Ambtenare*). At that time, it was still difficult to implement regulations effectively, because not all children were Western-educated. Therefore, the breakthrough was to implement an apprenticeship institution, so that candidates would get lessons and direct experience in the government (Niel, 1984:70).

Since 2014, the Indonesian Law No.5 of 1974 had been invalid, and was replaced with UU RI (*Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia* or Indonesian Republic Law) No.22 of 2014. This law did not contain requirements relating to sufficient work skills and experience in the field of government. The conditions were only the lowest educated Senior High School or SLTA (*Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat Atas*) or the equivalent. This regulation was actually democratic, because citizens who were not from the bureaucracy (bureaucrats) had a great opportunity to run as candidates for Regent.

However, regulations that stipulate that civil servants, military/police must resign as civil servants, military/police, have a bad impact, because they will think long to get out of civil servants, military/police. Whereas from this group, candidates for Regional Heads who already have the competence and experience in the government bureaucracy can usually be obtained. The next consequence was that political parties would find it difficult to find candidates for Regional Heads who were experienced in government. The reality of the many Regent candidates then came from wealthy and influential families, such as the family of former Banten Governor, Ratu Atut Chosiah. Her younger brother, Tubagus Chaery Wardhana alias Wawan, became Regent and her sister-in-law, Airin Rachmi Diany, became the Mayor of South Tangerang in Banten Province,

Western Java. Tatu Atut, her sister, also became Deputy Regent of Serang in Banten Province (Gunarso, 2013:7-8).

However, as the time passed, dynastic politics has been difficult to maintain. For example in Jember, the Regent M.Z.A. Jalal, who was about to expire his term of office, recruited the Head of BAPEKAB (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Kabupaten* or Regency Development Planning Agency) of Jember, Sugiarto, to advance in the 2015 regional elections. The election for the Regent of Jember Regency, East Java, in 2015 was followed by two pairs of candidates, namely the Sugiarto – Mohammad Dwi Koryanto pair carried by 6 political parties, these were GERINDRA (*Gerakan Indonesia Raya* or Great Indonesian Movement), PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* or National Awakening Party), PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or Prosperous Justice Party), GOLKAR (*Golongan Karya* or Functional Groups), PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or United Development Party), and PD (*Partai Demokrat* or Democrat Party) with a total of 33 seats in the Jember House of Representation. Meanwhile another candidate that was Faida – Abdul Muqit Arief supported by PDI-P (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan* or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), NASDEM (*Nasional Demokrat* or Democrat National), HANURA (*Hati Nurani Rakyat* or People's Conscience), and PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional* or National Mandate Party) with had 17 seats in the Jember House of Representation, but the candidate who was supported by the former Regent lost in the election (Winarno, 2015; Winarni & Widuatie, 2018 and 2020).

Thus, it can be said that political dynasties are not a guarantee that the candidates for Regional Heads will stroll smoothly in winning the election. In fact, candidates affiliated with political dynasties have suffered losses. The victory of the Presidential family, Ministers or other relatives of Regional Heads in the 2020 *PILKADA Serentak* (Simultaneous Regional Head Election) is nothing more than a story. Based on research conducted by the State Institute, the majority of candidates from political dynasties failed to become winners, of the 129 (related to political dynasties) only 57 were declared winners, said Mustakim, a researcher at the State Institute in his virtual presentation on 12<sup>th</sup> April 2021. As stated before that DPRD (Regional House of Representation) and the candidate Faida – Abdul Muqit Arief supported by PDI-P, NASDEM, HANURA, and PAN with a total of 17 seats in the Jember DPRD, but the candidate who was supported by the former Regent lost in the election (Winarno, 2015; Winarni & Widuatie, 2018 and 2020).<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>See also, for example, News on "Politika: Mayoritas Calon Dinasti Politik Tumbang" in newspaper of *Jawa Pos*. Surabaya, East Java: 13 April 2021.

Mulyadi, another State Institute researcher, added that the defeat suffered by the 72 candidates was positive. This shows that there is considerable resistance from voters, even though there are not many who speak out loudly. Furthermore, Mulyadi thinks there is a silent major, they reject the political dynasty candidate. According to Mulyadi, the existence of political dynasties in contestation is prone to deviations. One proof is the decision of the MK (*Mahkamah Konstitusi* or Constitutional Court) regarding PSU (*Pemungutan Suara Ulang* or Repeat Vote). For political dynasty regions that are not tested before the Constitutional Court, Mulyadi assessed that it does not mean they are clean. So far, there are indications that the opponents who are fighting are only puppet candidates or other candidates who do not want to be tired of suing some of them are also living candidates (Prayudi, 2016; Haboddin, 2017; *Ibidem* with footnote 14).

## CONCLUSION

Dynastic politics were carried out depending on the time, when dynastic politics was applied. The Dutch colonial era (1816-1942), for example, would be different from the New Order era (1968-1998) and the Reform era (1998 to date). In the era of the Dutch East Indies, dynastic politics formulated laws and regulations could guarantee offspring as one of the conditions in choosing a Regent candidate, for example *Regeerings Reglement* in 1836. The regulation allowed indigenous people to remain under direct leadership and power from their own heads, as far as conditions permit. This idea in *Regeerings Reglement* in 1854 was maintained.

The special position of the next Regent is also recognized in the government regulation by recognizing the right to replace the Regent's position from generation to generation within certain limits. Apprenticeship institutions, and special schools for prospective officials can only be entered by the children of the indigenous elite government. Likewise in the New Order era, to maintain the level I and II Regional Heads were still dominated by candidates from the ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* or Indonesian Armed Forces). The method used was to win GOLKAR (*Golongan Karya* or Functional Groups) in every General Election as single majority. In turn, to achieve a single majority, various regulations were created. The regulations are for example requiring officials to become members of GOLKAR, requiring civil servants, BUMN (*Badan Usaha Milik Negara* or State-Owned Enterprises), BUMD (*Badan Usaha Milik Daerah* or Regional owned enterprises) to become members of GOLKAR. Even, the Regional Heads who have been won in the Regional

Head Election had to win the GOLKAR. As a result, from the 1971 to 1997 General Elections, GOLKAR always won the elections, so the ABRI dynasty continued to rule.

In the era of dynastic political Reform (1998 to date), there was a decline. It can be seen that after the fall of the New Order (1968-1998), euphoria to carry out democracy has a profound effect on the recruitment pattern of candidates for Regional Heads. After the Regional Head was directly elected by the people, polarization led to wealthy families. Because it is expensive to nominate the Regional Head, only rich families are able to run for Regional Elections.

Dynastic politics was chosen, there were certain objectives, for example the Dutch East Indies government (1816-1942) retained the conditions of inheritance, because the Dutch East Indies government realized that the indigenous people had traditional authority. Indigenous people think specifically about the authority and tradition of their leaders. The people always respect, obey, obey, and obey the Regents who come from families that have ruled them for centuries. If a child replaced his father as Regent, respect and sense of devotion and loyalty to his ancestors automatically switched to the new Regent. This way, the stability of the Dutch colonial government can be maintained.

The Dutch East Indies government then tied influential families from the Regents to central authority. On this basis, the principle of inheritance based on inheritance was incorporated into the legislation of the Dutch East Indies colonial government. This was a common thread with the New Order government (1968-1998). The New Order government was convinced that by choosing ABRI to occupy the position of Regional Head, security and order would be guaranteed, because there was an assumption that development would succeed if conditions of security and order were successful. Polarization occurred during the era of dynastic political Reform (1998 to date) aimed at the governing Regional Head to ensure the welfare of the supporting parties and ensure security for the previous Regional Head.

The impact of dynastic politics is that certain groups can dominate the position of Head of the Region. For example in the Dutch colonial era, certain elite families coming from the Regent's family could dominate the position as Head of the Region. This can be seen both in West Java, Central Java, and in East Java. In the New Order era, the military elite dominated the position of Regional Heads; while in the Reform era, the position of Regional Head was dominated by political party elites and rich people. In the Dutch colonial era, it seemed to be undemocratic, so was the New Order era.

However, in the Dutch colonial and New Order periods, the government tried to make the candidates they chose met the qualifications and competencies in running the government in their area. This was different from the era of Reform. The process of selecting candidates for Regional Heads was more democratic than the two previous epochs. Nevertheless after the application of Law No.22 of 2014, many Regional Heads did not meet the qualifications in their fields. This was not only because of the law that did not require experience in the field of government for Regent candidates, but also it did not have a clear mechanism from political parties in the process of recruiting candidates for Regional Heads.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>**Statement:** I, the undersigned, declare that this article is my academic work; it is not the result of plagiarism, because the sources I cite and refer to are listed in full in the References or Bibliography. I am ready to accept academic sanctions, if what I say is not true and is not in accordance with applicable academic norms.

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