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A Case Study of Tunisia’s Path to Radicalization: A Lost Generation?

ABSTRACT: This article, using a qualitative approach, historical methods, and literature review, highlights the territorial decline of the Islamic state since 2014, which implies the defeat of terrorist organizations, but not the ideology. Based on the report of Soufan Group in 2015, Tunisia was the country that sent the most troops to support the Islamic State. Around 6,000 Tunisians are members of ISIS (Islamic States in Iraq and Syria). But other sources say that the total number of members coming from North African countries is 7,000, plus 1,500 soldiers from Libya. The presence of terrorism in Tunisia is still real; and this proves that the phenomenon of aggressive radicalization remains to be noted. The events after the Arab Spring became the reason for the spread of extreme ideas and acts of violence. But the real causes are deeply rooted, and can be linked to unique political and economic developments in North African countries. Therefore, root causes triggering violent activities present in political and cultural arenas were analyzed requiring a brief outlook on the historical past of Tunisia. The regional instability are also deemed responsible for the shifting of young Tunisians towards violent radical ideologies and the perpetration of terrorist activities inside the country.

KEY WORD: Radicalization; Poverty and Economic Inequality; Identity Crisis; Coercion of Modernization; Political Exclusion.


KATA KUNCI: Radikalisasi; Kemiskinan dan Kesenjangan Ekonomi; Krisis Identitas; Pemaksaan Modernisasi; Pengucilan Politik.

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INTRODUCTION

The paper aims to identify and analyze the root causes leading to the rise of extremists through the Tunisian example of the path to violent radicalization. Although the paper approaches this issue from an economic context and seeks to find an answer to whether a possible correlation between poverty and receptivity to radical ideologies does exist, the complexity of this question requires the observance of political, social, and cultural processes, too (Taspinar, 2009; UNDP, 2016; and Deman & Ouni, 2017).

The general circumstances, that evolved after the Arab Spring, are seen as accelerators of the proliferation of violent activities, but the causes are much deeper; and can be traced back to the unique historical, political, and economic evolution of the North African country. In order for the possible correlation be examined and to accept or disprove that young, under-educated and socially marginalized Tunisians are more prone to adopt extremist ideologies statistical data concerning unemployment and literacy rates of the different regions of the country will be applied (Fargues, 2017; Makdisi, 2017; and Macdonald & Waggoner, 2018).

Since the topic requires a deep analysis of the current processes, both quantitative and qualitative research methods, will be utilized. Following a comprehensive definition of the process of violent radicalization and a brief outlook on the conceptual difference between radicalism and extremism the collection of data on unemployment and literacy rates will enable us to draw a conclusion on the possibility of correlation between the aforementioned variables (cf Schmid, 2013; Bhatia & Ghanem, 2017; and INFID, 2018).

Moreover, the conceptual framework will also contribute to the assessment of numerical data. Besides this, the process of violent radicalization cannot be separated from taking a brief look at the measures of the first President of the independent Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987), and his successor, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011); and also the situation of the Post-Arab Spring period (Fahmi & Hamza, 2015; Makdisi, 2017; and CIA, 2018).

The relevance of the question of why it is worth dealing with the topic of violent radicalization in Tunisia is best understood through the survey conducted by Soufan Group in December 2015. According to the data indicated in the survey, Tunisia was the top nation concerning the ranking of foreign fighters in the Levant/as Sham (more precisely in Syria and Iraq) and in Libya. As of October 2015, about 6,000 Tunisians were fighting for Islamic State, but some sources estimated this number to reach even 7,000, including 700 women involved in Jihad al-Nikah (Struggle to Get Married), and another 1,500 fighters in Libya (The Soufan Group, 2017; Chehoudi et al., 2018; and Macdonald & Waggoner, 2018).

 Concerning the exact number of foreign fighters, it must be mentioned that the original numbers were reduced later by the Tunisian authorities. The Soufan Group’s report of October 2017 indicates that 2,926 Tunisians decided to join ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), which makes Tunisia only the fourth country in the row with the highest number of fighters. However, in terms of women and children joining ISIS, it is only Russia, with a total number of 3,417 women and children fighters that occupies the first place.

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1 All social sciences has very deep socio-historical roots, that is why the application of the perennialist approach could be very important. Because of belonging to social sciences, a perennialist approach has to be applied in the research field of international relations, so in order to analyse international relations correctly and exactly not only the economic, but, and mainly, social, political, and historical factors must be examined. See, for further information, V.K. Maheshwari (2011); P.A. Ertmer & T.J. Newby (2013); and W.K. Frankena, N.C. Burbules & N. Raybeck (2019).
before Tunisia, where 3,000 fighters of this category are registered (The Soufan Group, 2017:9-13 and 24-25; Macdonald & Waggoner, 2018; and Zelin, 2018).

Despite of the huge territorial losses that Daesh suffered in Syria and Iraq since the end of 2017, the possibility of future threats did not come to end (Jenkins, 2018; Winston, 2018:4-5; and Yashlavskii, 2018). The wave of terrorist attacks, that rocked Tunisia in 2015 and 2016 in addition to the latest incidents of 29 October 2018 and 27 June 2019 in Tunis, are also proofs that violent radicalization in Tunisia deserves full attention; and there is a great need for conducting a complex study on this issue (cf Deman & Ouni, 2017; Macdonald & Waggoner, 2018; Watanabe, 2018; AP, 2019; and Süß & Aakhunzzada, 2019).

The other point that necessitates the analysis of the root causes of Tunisia’s violent radicalization is connected with the outstanding numbers of Tunisians leaving to fight on the side of the Islamic State in the Middle East or in Libya. This tendency is paradoxical as Tunisia is considered to be the only positive example of the Arab Spring that is undergoing a successful democratic transition; and, thus, compared with Libya, Yemen, or Syria avoided becoming a failed state (Lahoud, 2013;...
The paper centers around the question of direct causation between economic deprivation and extremism, but the complexity of the topic also requires the demonstration of root causes on the political, social, and cultural levels. As the possible correlation of the aforementioned, two variables has launched a wide debate among scholars themselves that led to their being split on this issue, the conceptual explanation tries to give a brief outlook on both perspectives by clarifying the basic notions related to the topic (cf Taspinar, 2009; Schmid, 2013; and UNDP, 2016).

The paper sets up the following hypothesis: “Although economic deprivation is among the possible causes leading to violent radicalization, it is rather an additional than a primary factor triggering violent activities”. The political, social and economic deficiencies created, such challenges that largely contributed to the violent radicalization of the Tunisian youth. The events following the fall of the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime, on 14th January 2011, and the regional context also reinforced the process of violent radicalization in the country (cf Veldhuis & Staun, 2009; Allan et al., 2015; and Hamelin et al., 2019).

The work of Tinka Veldhuis & Jorgen Staun (2009), entitled Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model, also serves as a basis for setting up the complex model of the Tunisian path.

While following the Arab Spring Tunisia stepped on the path of a successful democratic transition, the instability in neighboring Libya, that emerged after the fall of Muammar al-Gaddafi, resulted in a political turmoil that drifted Libya towards a failed state. See, for further information, D.B. Ellison (2015); G. Lopez (2015); and O.M.O. Alshareif (2016).
to violent radicalization by including the political, economic, and social/cultural arenas of analysis on the macro level (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). The complex model on the Tunisia’s path to violent radicalization, based on Tinka Veldhuis & Jorgen Staun (2009), is demonstrated in figure 1.

As causes present on the macro level are seen as pre-conditions of radicalisation, and indeed are regarded as root causes, the analysis of the micro level will be demonstrated in figure 2, but does not constitute an integral part of the paper. Besides applying different approaches when dealing with the topic, the paper involves the work of Martha Crenshaw (1981), entitled “The Causes of Terrorism”. The reason for adopting the work of Martha Crenshaw (1981), in this paper, is explained by the fact that Martha Crenshaw (1981)’s approached to the causes of violent radicalization from a different perspective and put emphasis on the political exclusion, too (Crenshaw, 1981). See again figure 2.

Taking into consideration that the Tunisian case study cannot be understood without having a general idea on the concept and different approaches to violent radicalization, including the possible correlation between poverty and extremism too, a brief outlook will be given on this matter (cf Schmid, 2013; Alava et al., 2017; and SESRIC, 2017).

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

- Conceptualizing the Process of (Violent) Radicalization. It will be elaborated pertaining: (1) A Conceptual Clarification between Radicalism or Radicalization, Extremism, and Terrorism; and (2) Certain Approaches to the Question of Economic Marginalization and Extremism. The elaboration on each section is following here:

Firstly, A Conceptual Clarification between Radicalism or Radicalization, Extremism, and Terrorism. It is indispensable to underline that no single concept can be highlighted and both political, sociological, economic, and psychological factors contribute to the process of violent radicalization. The paper describes radicalization as a process during which terrorism and extremist ideologies, both of them refusing the core values of the society, such as human rights and democracy are developed. The complexity of the phenomena of violent radicalization necessitates the elaboration of a complex model, which demonstrates the trigger events as well as the push and pull factors. Experts of this field all agree about the trigger events leading to violent radicalization, but there is a division between them concerning the level on which these factors are displayed and how they can be classified (cf Schmid, 2013; Dzhekova et al., 2016; Pisoui & Ahmed, 2016; Neumann, 2017; and INFID, 2018).

Another key point is the necessity for a conceptual distinction between radicalization and its violent or extreme form: terrorism. Taking into account the roots of the discipline, it is essential to apply and use the classical Greek and Latin meaning of the words “radical” and “extreme” to realize the aforementioned conceptual distinction. According to the well known – but not precisely used – Western conceptual terminology of “radicalism” is often used and interpreted as a synonym of “extremism”. However, this interpretation is not only inaccurate, but sometimes can be counterproductive, too. Taking into consideration its original meaning in Latin, “radicalism” is only defined as

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3 See also, for example, “Tunisian National Institute of Statistics”. Available online at: http://www.ins.tn [accessed in Budapest, Hungary: December 20, 2019].

4 The geographical distribution of unemployment together with regions affected by illiteracy can be best seen again in figure 2.

5 The word “radix” means root in Latin which later evolved into the adjective, called “radicalist”, meaning fundamental. But, in reality, fundamental is not used
a process that achieves fundamental – \textit{but legal} – change of established norms and policies; therefore, it could not be interpreted automatically as supporting 
\textit{jihadist} activities committed against the West (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009; Schmid, 2013; and Boncio, 2018).

Moreover, to some extent, it is adaptive to certain elements of the Western culture. The gist of radicalism is the attainment of fundamental changes, but the thing which distinguishes radicalism from extremism is the fact that in radicalism, fundamental changes does not violate the legal framework. As the aim of radicalism is to achieve significant changes in the existing norms and political order, radicalism – as have already been mentioned above – is not always applied in a negative context. The measures introduced by the first president of the Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, meant a rupture with the traditional and religious principles of the country, but as they aimed to modernize the country, this modernization process is a great example of the positive reflection of radicalism (The CI, 2008; Derradji, 2011; and Neumann, 2017).

By placing the word \textit{violent} in front of radicalization, the paper aims to distinguish the current tendency from the aforementioned positive understanding of the term. To go even further and to refer to the violent activities committed by certain layers or individuals of the Tunisian society, the word “extremism” seems to be the most accurate one to be used as deriving from its name, extremism aims to violate the existing legal norms. Contrary to radicalism, terrorists legitimize themselves by violent actions (Schmid, 2013; UNDP, 2016; and Fakoussa & Kabis-Kechrid eds., 2018).

According to the officially adopted definition of the State Department in 1983, the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002a; Schmid, 2004; and Tilly, 2005). Despite of the dual judgment of radicalism, it is often seen as a prelude of terrorism and as both radicalism and terrorism are complex processes, their root causes are interlocked (Burchill \textit{et al.}, 2005; Mendelson, 2008; and Taspinar, 2009:76).

According to Anett Arany, Erzsébet N. Rózsa & Máté Szalai (2016), and other scholars, radicalization is regarded as a complex phenomenon and several circumstances play a significant role in pushing people towards extremist ideas. On one hand, external causes (political, economic, and social ones) can be mentioned among the aforementioned circumstances. On the other hand, internal causes also contribute to the process of radicalization. Moreover, to some extent prosperity offered by the Islamic State and the feeling of belonging to a community, i.e. group solidarity also serve as primary driving factors for young jihadists (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009; Arany, Rózsa & Szalai, 2016:195-198; and UNDP, 2016).

Secondly, \textit{Certain Approaches to the Question of Economic Marginalization and Extremism}. As the introduction of the paper has already mentioned the emphasis will be put on whether a possible correlation between poverty and receptivity to radical ideologies does exist. Martha Crenshaw (1981), and other scholars, refused the existence of correlation between poverty and terrorism, and argued that radicalization is the outcome of the

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\textsuperscript{6}The word “extremism” is derived from the Greek “exo” and Latin “extra” words, both of them meaning external.

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elite’s discontentment with the political system, corruption, group solidarity, and martyrdom. They, further, stated that perpetrators of terrorist attacks are educated young people belonging to the middle class (Crenshaw, 1981:383-384, 389, and 394-395; The CI, 2008; and Allan et al., 2015).

As experts of violent radicalization themselves are divided on the issue of whether poverty causes terrorism, several factors must be considered when dealing with this issue. Based on the empirical evidence, Avraham Jager (2018), and other scholars, refused the existence of correlation between these two variables, and stated that contrary to the Pakistani, Afghan, or Somali experience which indicated a positive linkage between poverty and terrorism, this question cannot be narrowed down to certain geographical regions or cultures (cf Angus, 2016; INFID, 2018; Jager, 2018:8-9 and 12; and Magen, 2018).

Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova (2002b), and other scholars, further strengthened this statement by focusing on a survey conducted in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which revealed that unemployed and under-educated individuals are less likely to support armed attacks against Israeli targets (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002b:27-30; Manenti et al., 2016; and Pape, 2018).

The refutation of correlation between poverty and receptivity to radical ideologies might be backed up by the rational choice theory, too. As the rational choice theory starts off the individual and helps to find answer to human behavior, the theory could also contribute to understanding the process of violent radicalization in Tunisia. According to the Rational Choice Theory, the actions of the individual are optimally chosen, taking into account the best option that would benefit them more (The CI, 2008; Ogu, 2013:90 and 92-93; Vlaev, 2018; and Amadae, 2019).

Gary S. Becker (1968), who first applied the Rational Choice Theory to other domains beyond economics, stated that when crime is considered, the individual takes into account several factors, including the invested money, the income from the crime and the risks (cf Becker, 1968; McKinnon, 2013; and Jager, 2018:10).

From this point of view, individuals living a tough life are more occupied with ensuring their very basic needs, whereas middle-class citizens who dispose of higher education are more likely to be involved in politics and devote themselves to invest in confronting existing norms and triggering change. All things considered, violent radicalization is seen as the manifestation of the individual’s discontentment with the existing political system and the feeling of indignity and accumulated resentment (McKinnon, 2013; INFID, 2018; and Jager, 2018).

The paper will start with the analysis of possible correlation between poverty and the receptivity to violent radical ideologies. However, taking into consideration the very complex character of the process of violent radicalization, additional factors present on the political and cultural arena will also be under analysis to give answer to the question of why immense number of Tunisians decide to quit the country and join ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in Iraq, Syria, or Libya.

The Root Causes of the Tunisian Radicalization. It is a critical question to be stated here: “A possible correlation between poverty and receptivity to violent radical ideologies or does poverty cause terrorism?”. Touching upon the economic field the main focus is the verification or rejection of the existence of a possible correlation between poverty and receptivity to radical ideologies. In order to answer the central research question, the application of the
qualitative and quantitative research methods will enable us to compare the statistical data of the regions emitting the biggest number of jihadi fighters with data from regions affected the most by unemployment and illiteracy (Taspinar, 2009; Allan et al., 2015; and UNODC, 2017).

In this case, data collection is a bidirectional process. On one hand, statistical data measuring different categories enable us to develop a theory about the relationship between economic marginalization and violent radicalization. On the other hand, the theoretical framework is best supported by numerical facts. In order to ensure the credibility of the research, the data mentioned in the paper is collected from the official publications of the Tunisian Institute of Statistics or l’Institut National de la Statistique (Alava et al., 2017; Watanabe, 2018; and Süß & Aakhunzzada, 2019).

Since INS (Institut National de la Statistique) only publishes data of the geographical distribution of unemployment in the second trimester of every year, the numbers included here are involved accordingly. The geographical distribution of unemployment together with regions affected by illiteracy can be best seen again in figure 2.

Comprehensive publications that involve all governorates of the country are only available from the second semester of 2015, that is also in line with the analyzed period. A survey conducted by The Soufan Group, in 2015, identifies that one-third of Tunisian jihadiist are coming from three regions: Ben Gardane (15.2%); Bizerte Governorate (10.7%); and the capital, Tunis (10.7%). Except for the city of Ben Gardane, the name of which has always been interlocked with trafficking, due to its proximity to neighboring Libya, both places are found in the northern parts of the country (cf Fahmi & Hamza, 2015; The Soufan Group, 2015:5, 11, and 16; Watanabe & Merz, 2017; Watanabe, 2018; and Süß & Aakhunzzada, 2019).

To better understand the northern-southern and eastern-western division of Tunisia, it is indispensable to underline that Habib Bourguiba and his successor, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, put emphasis on the development of the northern and coastal (i.e. sahel) parts of the country, which resulted in the southern and western regions being marginalized. The sahel (Tunis-Sousse-Monastir) received 65% of public investment and only 3% of enterprises were located in the western part of Tunisia (Tsourapas, 2013; Daguzan, 2017:4; and Jules & Bouhlila, 2018). Based on these historical facts, it would be quite easy to believe that economically marginalized southern or western regions would be the number one regions concerning the emission of the biggest number of jihadi fighters.

The further analysis of the possible correlation between poverty and the receptivity to violent radical ideologies necessitates a brief outlook on other indicators, such as unemployment and literacy rates. The UN (United Nations) statistics defined the average unemployment rate in Tunisia to reach 13% in 2010 and 15.3% in 2014 (cited in Daguzan, 2017; Prince, Halasa-Rappel & Khan, 2018; and Goll, Colombo & i-Leca, 2019).

According to the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics, the unemployment remains stuck at 15.3% in the second trimester of 2019. In Ben Gardane, unemployment rate was 18.58%;

9 This rate was even higher among the graduated young people, where the average rate reached 23%. In addition to these statistical data, unemployment rate reached 24.5% in Sidi Bouzid and Jendouba Governorates. See, for further information, “Tunisian National Institute of Statistics”. Available online at: http://www.ins.tn [accessed in Budapest, Hungary: December 20, 2019].

10 See “UN Data: Tunisia”. Available

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Data indicates that since 2015, and even in 2012, the regions affected the most by unemployment covered the inner (e.g. Gafsa Governorate with 27.9% of unemployment rate in 2015; 28.2% in 2016; 27.3% in 2017; 28.9% in 2018; and 25.5% in the second trimester of 2019); and the southern regions of the country (Tataouine Governorate with 30% of unemployment rate in 2015; 32% in 2016; 32.4% in 2017 and 2018; and 28.7% in the second trimester of 2019). Based on these statistical data, the existence of a definite correlation between poverty and the receptivity to radical ideologies must be analyzed along with other factors (Zammit, 2015; Trip et al., 2019; and ibidem with footnote 11).

Although statistical data proved that receptivity to violent radical ideologies cannot be merely attributed to poverty, this factor cannot be neglected while analyzing the root causes of violent radicalization. Khodr M. Zaarour (2016), and other scholars, stated that modern states are regarded as servants of their people and are responsible for providing the necessary social welfare. Failing of a state to fulfil its very basic role results in the increase of general discontentment with the government; and this can easily be manifested in the perpetration of terrorist attacks (Zaarour, 2016; Fakoussa & Kabis-Kechrid eds., 2018; and Hasan et al., 2018). According to a survey conducted after the Arab Spring, 44% of Tunisians believed that no changes took place after the Arab Spring; and 46% declared that the situation of the country is worse than it was during the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime (Shults, 2014; Colombo, 2016; and Hubbard & Gladstone, 2019). In this context, Valentina Colombo (2016), and other scholars, shed light on political, social, and cultural exclusion; and emphasizes the enormous differences between the circumstances present in big cities and the peripheral regions. People living in the peripheral areas, including the marginalized quarters of the capital (Ben Arous, Ariana), experience huge disadvantages when settling in the labour market. In the whole Maghreb, Tunisia is the first country that disposes of the highest rate of NEET\footnote{NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) is the abbreviation of an indicator that shows the total number of people who are not involved in education, employment, or training.} (33%) among Tunisians aged between 15 and 29 years (Shults, 2014; Colombo, 2016; and Yom, Lynch & al-Khatib, 2019).

A reference to the Rational Choice Theory, which assumes that people from marginalized areas are more occupied with ensuring their very basic needs; therefore, young individuals that hold university degrees are more likely to involve into politics and step

up for triggering a radical change, more often with the application of violence, is of crucial importance to arrive at the conclusion. Based on the map of the geographical distribution of unemployment and illiteracy; and the analysis of statistical data compared to the survey which demonstrates the biggest emitters of jihadi fighters in terms of regions, a clear correlation between poverty and receptivity to violent radical ideologies cannot be verified (Derradji, 2011; Cook, 2018; and Amadae, 2019). This finding also necessitates the further analysis of the political and social fields.

**Additional Factors Contributing to Violent Radicalization.** It will be elaborated also pertaining: (1) *An Analysis of the Cultural Arena;* (2) *A Brief Analysis of the Tunisian Politics;* (3) *Tunisia After the Arab Spring: A New Era for Jihadists;* and (4) *The Result of the Rise of Salafi Jihadism in Tunisia After the Arab Spring.* The elaboration on each section is following here:

Firstly, *An Analysis of the Cultural Arena.* Following the central question of the research, the complexity of the topic also necessitates the observation of additional factors, such as the political and cultural arena. The political struggle on the secular-religious fault line has left its trace on the modern history of the country starting from Tunisia’s independence from France in 1956, and still determines the current political and cultural characteristics of contemporary Tunisia (Allani, 2007; Shults, 2014; and Torelli, Merone & Cavatorta, 2019).

Secularism was manifested in the measures of the first President of the Republic, Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987), and was followed by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011). Contrary to secularism, the religious line was represented by Salah Ben Youssef, President Habib Bourguiba’s main defiant who embraced more radical and violent methods during the country’s fight for independence. In this struggle for political control of the country, President Habib Bourguiba managed to defeat his opponent, Salah Ben Youssef, and started his well-known modernization process, i.e. the adoption of the Western-type model, which was radical in the sense that it meant a rupture with traditional principles deeply rooted in Islam (Perkins, 2005; Alexander, 2016:49-53; and Doğan, 2019).

However, as these measures aimed to modernise Tunisia, the term “radical” is rather used in a positive context. In his *Code du Statut Personnel* (Personal Status Code) in 1956, Habib Bourguiba abolished polygamy, allowed women the right to divorce, defined the minimum age to marriage, and introduced educational reforms which measures were considered unique in the Arab world at that time, in terms of the amelioration of the position of women. In order for Tunisia to embark on the path of rapid development, President Habib Bourguiba broke with centuries old traditions and abolished religious institutions, including *Sharia* (Islamic law) courts, and banned women from wearing hijab (veil) in the classrooms in 1957 (Boer, Moors & Teeffelen, 1995:59; Perkins, 2005; and Andrieu, 2016).

The process of the Tunisian state-building after its independence from France also meant the interlocking of the political and cultural field. The aforementioned measures of Habib Bourguiba resulted in the creation of the special Tunisian identity, the so-called *Tunisian Islam,* which was built on the fact that Tunisian identity had existed long before the arrival of Islam to North Africa; therefore, Islam was built on a Berber society (Boer, Moors & Teeffelen, 1995:60; Perkins, 2005; and Derradji, 2011).

Contrary to other Arab countries, the Tunisian identity shaping reflects a particular development path, where the roots of identity are not sought merely...
in the religion. The dual character of the Tunisian state-building – the definition of Tunisia as a civil state with Islam as its religion, but the enforced modernization and the marginalization of the practice of religion – and the double standard concerning the measures of Habib Bourguiba may result in the feeling of uncertainty among young and desperate Tunisians (Perkins, 2005; Lamloum, 2016; and Belaid, 2018).

This dual character of the Tunisian identity may contribute to the feeling of disharmony as a result of which Tunisian citizens would raise the question of what it is like to be a Tunisian; and what role Islam can play in everyday life. This might be the point when the individual gets rid of secularism and would reach back to the pursuit of traditional principles, easily leading to the misinterpretation of Islam. As a consequence of this process, the feeling of disharmony is also seen as a potential factor establishing the path to violent radicalization (Perkins, 2005; McCarthy, 2014; and Grewal, 2019).

With his coming to power in 1987, the successor of President Habib Bourguiba, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, further contributed to restricting the religious line of the country. In order to avoid mosques becoming the hotbeds of spreading radical ideologies, he ordered their closure outside prayer times (Pace, 2000; Alexander, 2010:60-61; and Hubbard & Gladstone, 2019). Besides the relationship between economy, economic marginalization and the receptivity to violent radical ideologies, the dual development of the Tunisian identity and the secular-religious fault line present since Tunisia’s independence are very crucial to be understood and are both indispensable to be mentioned as additional factors leading to violent radicalization. At certain people the enforced modernization along with the marginalization of religion are seen as one of the root causes responsible for pushing individuals towards the seeking of alternative methods, among others the adoption of extremist ideologies (Perkins, 2005; Alexander, 2010; and Abdalla ed., 2011).

Secondly, A Brief Analysis of the Tunisian Politics. Following the analysis of the economic and social/cultural fields, the political arena should also be put under examination. The secular versus religious fault line, deeply rooted in the enforced modernization process, is also present on the political field which led to the phenomenon of political exclusion in Tunisia. As the failure to integrate Islamists into the political system is regarded as one of the possible causes leading to violent radicalization in Tunisia, the political exclusion of Martha Crenshaw (1981) is applied when analyzing the political arena (cf Crenshaw, 1981; The CI, 2008; Abrahams, 2017; and Yerkes & Yahmed, 2019).14

The monopolization of political power by President Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was built on the exclusion of the opposition from power, namely the Tunisian Islamists who posed the biggest threat to the Presidents through their intent to gain a share from political power from the 1970s. In 1972, Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Community) founded by Rachid al-Ghannouchi did not step up with political aspirations, but the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 exercised a great impact on the organization; and in 1981, Al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya changed its name to Islamic Tendency Movement or MTI (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique). In order for MTI taking the shape of a political party, it deleted from its name any reference to Islam; and in 1989, MTI became the Ennahda, meaning

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Taking into consideration the fact that Tunisian Islamists cannot be considered heterogenous, and both moderate and radical branches are present within the religious arena of political parties, it is indispensable to make a distinction between Tunisian Islamists. The moderate course is represented by the founder of Ennahda movement, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, who emphasized the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Rachid al-Ghannouchi, the assessment of whose activity is dual, still considered Islam as a reference, but aimed to adopt the positive elements of the Western culture by revising them in a way that is compatible with Islam. While Rachid al-Ghannouchi preached political pluralism and emphasized the importance of civil society, which he also considered an Islamic concept, he saw the enforced modernization of the previous regimes a threat to the concept of civil society (Tamimi, 2001; Grewal, 2019; and Meddeb, 2019). For Rachid al-Ghannouchi, the reference to Islam was rather a tool that he applied in his intention of gaining political power. Besides the moderate branch, the radical course is also present within Ennahda movement, whose representatives preached the introduction of Sharia (Islamic las) into use and the re-introduction of the wearing of Hijab (Veil) in public institutions. As the already existing gap between the moderate and the radical wing of Tunisian Islamists intensified after the Arab Spring, namely around the adoption of the New Constitution, it is of crucial importance to understand the difference between the two branches of the Islamists in terms of ideology and approaches (Tamimi, 2001; Grewal, 2019; and Meddeb, 2019).

During the drafting process of the New Basic Law between 2011 and January 2014, the debate was about the involvement of certain paragraphs that aimed to refer to the Islamic character of the country (Moghadam, 2016; Redissi & Boukhayatia, 2016; and Meddeb, 2019). However, contrary to the preliminary assumptions of secular parties and the Western countries, Ennahda did not adopt the suggestions coming from the radical course of Tunisian Islamists, which meant the complete rejection of the aforementioned references (Marks & Ounissi, 2016; Grewal, 2019; and Meddeb, 2019).

According to some people, the fact that the founder of Ansar al-Sharia (Helper for the Islamic Law) in 2011, Abu Ayadh, was also member of the predecessor of Ennahda, raises some concerns about the real position and intentions of the movement of Rachid al-Ghannouchi (Allani, 2014:212; Grewal, 2019; and Meddeb, 2019). Referring to the exclusion from political power as a potential cause for triggering radicalization, it must mentioned that despite of the early expectances about the collaboration with the Tunisian Islamists, the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime could not break with the oppressive measures of his predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, and continued his modernization process in the political arena, too (Marks, 2015; Marks & Ounissi, 2016; and Meddeb, 2019).

In order to eliminate Ennahda,15

15Important to note that Ansar al-Sharia (Helper for the Islamic Law) terrorist organization was also responsible for the attack on the USA (United States of America) Consulate in Benghazi, which left the USA Ambassador, J. Cristopher Stevens, dead in 2012. See, for further information, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross (2013); Yasmine Ryan (2013); and USDS [United States Department of State] (2018).

17Taking into account that the former Islamic Tendency Movement or MTI (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique) won 14% of the votes compared
the biggest defiant of his RCD (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique) party, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali started a political cleansing process against his main political enemy, which resulted in 8,000 people being arrested between 1990 and 1992 (Perkins, 2005; Alexander, 2010:60-61; and Grewal, 2019). The two-year period was also the time when members of Ennahda, among them Rachid al-Ghannouchi himself, went into exile. Mosques were also closed outside prayer times (Mabrouk, 2012:59; Grewal, 2019; and Meddeb, 2019); and according to the 1959 Constitution and its Ammendment in 2008, the establishment of political parties based on religion was forbidden (see Article 8).

Whereas Zine El Abidine Ben Ali succeeded to liquidate its biggest enemy, the Islamists in reality, the period of the 1990s is regarded as the birth of Tunisian radicalism (Sadek, 2013; Tsourapas, 2013; and Hubbard & Gladstone, 2019).

Concerning the political field, the restrictive measures of the previous regimes in the political arena were due to the modernization process that placed the development of the country on a Western track; but, on the other hand, displaced the Islamic character of Tunisia. The effects of these measures were unseen at that time, but largely contributed to the process of violent radicalization from the 1990s and had a serious impact in the post-Arab Spring period. The suppression of the freedom of press and that of the the civil society, the immense rate of corruption, and the absence of economic reforms that could ease the gap on the northern-southern and western-eastern fault lines, in terms of poverty and illiteracy, can also be mentioned among the root causes of violent radicalization (Hinds, 2014; Alava et al., 2017; and Yerkes & Yahmed, 2019).

Khodr M. Zaarour (2016), and other scholars, described the failure of modern states, which process is also responsible for giving the place to violent radical activities/groups. According to Khodr M. Zaarour (2016), and other scholars, modern states are empowered by their citizens to fulfil tasks of crucial importance, such as good governance, the assurance of prosperity, well-being, and the security of their citizens. Khodr M. Zaarour (2016), and other scholars, explained that from the economic perspective, the failure of states is the result of the proliferation of corruption when leaders prefer to put their relatives into power. Following the failure of the economic field, the ban on civil societies in the political arena will enable the leader of the country to gain control over the security forces (c.f Daniel, 2016; UNDP, 2016; Zaarour, 2016; Alava et al., 2017; and Prince, Halasa-Rappel & Khan, 2018).

As the society experiences a continuous impoverishment, the general discontentment will be manifested in mass movements which gradually result in the collapse of the current political system. The uncertain and chaotic situation serve as a favourable milieu for spreading radical ideologies. In Tunisia, the aforementioned stages during the

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19 During the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime, corruption was present in every field of the society, but it touched upon the Police sector the most. According to Transparency International, in 2005, Tunisia occupied the 43rd place out of the examined 159; while in 2011, Tunisia finished on the 73rd place out of 183. See, for comparison, Paul Rivlin (2014:2); Tristan Dreisbach & Robert Joyce (2014); and B. Hubbard & R. Gladstone (2019).
previous regimes did not allow the establishment of a democratic state that resulted in a vacuum, where radical ideologies could gain ground (Derradji, 2011; Schmid, 2013; Marks, 2015; Zaatari, 2016:190; and Yerkes & Yahmed, 2019).

Thirdly, Tunisia After the Arab Spring: A New Era for Jihadists. The circumstances after the Arab Spring (a political vacuum, due to the unstable political situation, amnesty to political prisoners, among them to people linked to terrorist groups) opened the gate for the phenomenon of the so-called “re-radicalization” process, which manifested itself in the spread of violent radical ideologies. As a result of the circumstances in the post-Arab Spring period, a wave of terrorist attacks rocked Tunisia. Moreover, a huge number of Tunisian jihadi fighters got off to Syria, Iraq, or Libya to fight on the side of the Islamic State. Abu Iyadh, the founder of Ansar al-Sharia (Helper for the Islamic Law) was set free, due to the amnesty granted to political prisoners by the new regime (Bruce, 2013; Zaatari, 2016:190; and Macdonald & Waggoner, 2018).

Furthermore, the vacuum which came into being after the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali made the preaching of radical ideologies or Da’wah al-Jihad or Propagation for Struggle’s possible (Fahmi & Hamza, 2015; Law, 2015:344; and Hubbard & Gladstone, 2019).

While the former regimes maintained strict control over the practice of religious activities, by October 2011, the security apparatus lost control of around 400 mosques inside the country. In this unstable political and security situation, Ansar al-Sharia could also exercise its activities among locals underground (cf Gartenstein-Ross, 2013; Wolf, 2014; and Fahmi & Hamza, 2015).

Whereas one of the branches of Ansar al-Sharia chose more peaceful methods and aimed to preach its ideologies in the mosques with the intent of establishing an Islamic State, others went further and urged young Tunisians to join Daesh from 2012. In addition to this, radical courses within Ansar al-Sharia also took arms, which resulted in the political assassinations of two opposition leaders in 2013, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi (cf. Gartenstein-Ross, 2013; Fahmi & Hamza, 2015:8; and Fakoussa & Kabis-Kechrid eds., 2018).

Similarly to other Arab countries affected by the Arab Spring in 2011, the rise of Islamists during the first democratic elections organized after the fall of the previous regime did not evade Tunisia either. The outstanding victory of Ennahda (meaning Renaissance) during the National Constituent Assembly elections in October 2011 (41.5%) was a proof that the party aimed to offer a remedy not only to the social and economic problems, that were neglected during the previous regimes, but a return to those traditional principles rooted in the religion that had always been marginalized since independence (cf. Alexander, 2012:43; Darwisheh, 2014; and Grewal, 2019).

However, the mismanagement of the security situation did not allow the victory of the Islamists last long. The failure of the party and the rise of violent extremist activities is the result of the shuttlecock policy of Ennahda party that maneuvered among secularists and Islamists instead of seeking to establish a healthy balance between political and religious activities. On the one hand, there was a pressure from the conservative part of the society that pinned its hopes on integrating other, more radical Islamist

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20Ennahda (meaning Renaissance) party ran in the National Constituent Assembly elections of 23 October 2011, with a very promising political programme that aimed to find the right solution to the major political and social problems, such as the creation of new workplaces, the fight against corruption, and the establishment of a democratic state. See, for example, Le Programme du Mouvement Ennahda (2011:4-5); Monica Marks (2015); and Sharan Grewal (2019).
parties into the political system, such as Ansar al-Sharia or Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) in Tunisia. Moreover, conservative layers of the society also favoured the inclusion of religious elements into the New Constitution (Wolf, 2014; Fahmi & Hamza, 2015:4; and Grewal, 2019).

On the other hand, the establishment and consolidaton of the political position Ennahda was deprived of in the past required from the party the enhancement of political dialogue and Constitution building with other parties as well as the inclusion of members of the former regimes into the political arena. However, the worsening security situation of Tunisia and, thus, the intention of avoiding political chaos pushed Ennahda to handle the power to a caretaker government in December 2013 (Gall, 2014; Fahmi & Hamza, 2015:12 and 13; and Grewal, 2019).

Lastly, fourth, the Result of the Rise of Salafi Jihadism in Tunisia After the Arab Spring. It is indispensable to see that terrorist attacks committed in Tunisia can be classified into three major categories: (1) attacks with the aim of targeting the tourism sector of Tunisia, which makes up 7% of the country’s income and provides 14% of the Tunisian citizens with decent living; (2) politically motivated attacks in line with people’s discontentment with the corrupt and exclusive system; and (3) violent actions committed by terrorist organizations, e.g. the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade that is quite active in Jebel Chaambi in the western borderlands (Alby, 2015; Cook, 2018; and Zaiane, 2018).

Following the attack on a group of tourists in the El-Ghriba synagogue of Djerba in April 2002 (Aubin, 2011:23), Tunisia experienced its biggest wave of terrorist attacks from February 2013 with the assassination of Chokri Belaid, which was then followed by the murder of the other opposition leader, Mohamed Brahmi, in July 2013 (Moghadam, 2016). Ansar al-Sharia (Helper for the Islamic Law) claimed responsibility for both political assassinations. However, due to severe accusations that all shed light on Ennahda (meaning Renaissance)’s responsibility for mismanaging the radical course of Tunisian Islamists, the political assassinations resulted in Ennahda handling the political power to a caretaker government (Gartenstein-Ross, 2013; Gall, 2014; and Grewal, 2019).

Violent extremist activities reached their peak in 2015, when mainly tourists were in the crosshairs of radical Islamists. On 18 March 2015, two gunmen attacked Bardo Museum in Tunis, killing 21 tourists and a local Policeman. On 26 June 2015, Saif al-Deen al-Rezgui, a resident from the town of Siliana in the northern part of the country, killed 38 tourists during a massacre committed on the beach of Riu Imperial Marhaba Hotel in Port el-Kantaoui, Sousse (Elgot, 2015; Kirkpatrick, 2015; and Bobin, 2016).

As a result of both terrorist attacks the tourism sector that made up 7.4% of the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in 2014 suffered a huge loss and, thus,

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22 See also “Men Howa Saif al-Deen al-Rezgui al-Mustabab Bihi fi Tanfeed Itada’ Susa fi Tounes?” in France 24 in Arabic, on June 27, 2015. Available online also at: http://www.france24.com/ar/20150627-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A6-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%86%D9%8A [accessed in Budapest, Hungary: September 8, 2019].
declined to 2.5-3% in 2016 (Duthion & Mandou, 2016). The second type of terrorist attacks appeared at the end of 2015. On 24 November 2015, Daesh claimed responsibility for blowing up a bus carrying presidential guards in the capital that left 13 deaths behind (Izak, 2018). On 7 March 2016, about 36 militiants, 7 civilians, and 12 members of the security force died during an operation in the city of Ben Gardane, the name of which has long been interlocked with terrorism (Kartas, 2013:28-31), when militant groups attacked military officers (HRW, 2017).

This type of terrorist attack is strongly linked to the activities of certain violent radical elements of the Tunisian society that aim to destabilize the democratic path Tunisia decided to step on in 2011. On 29 October 2018, about 20 people were wounded when a 30 year old woman blew herself up in the central avenue of Tunis, targeting Police. Another wave of terrorist attacks rocked the capital on 27 June 2019, when two suicide bombers blew themselves up, killing one Police officer. A brief outlook of the result of Salafi Jihadism (Islamic Reform Struggle Movement) in Tunisia was necessary to understand the security challenges Tunisia has been facing since 2013 (Macmillan, 2016; UNDP, 2016; and Aliaga & O’Farrell, 2018).

CONCLUSION

The paper aimed to present a conceptual framework that sheds light on the complex and overlapping character of the root causes leading to the violent radicalization of approximately 7,000 young Tunisians in the peak of the appearance of this phenomenon in 2015. A distinction between radicalization and violent radicalization, extremism, and terrorism was also made to avoid the blurring of these concepts. The paper focused on the analysis of the possible correlation between poverty and receptivity to radical ideologies.

The comparison of the geographical distribution of unemployment and literacy to each other verified the initial statement, which rather saw economic marginalization an additional factor than a main cause. The Tunisian case study strengthened the previous findings by Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova (2002a and 2002b); Avraham Jager (2018); and other scholars that perpetrators of violent activities are rather young and educated people coming from middle-class.

This finding is also in line with the Rational Choice Theory, which suggests that people coming from marginalized regions often associated with an inadequate level of quality of education are busy with the daily struggle for survival and do not have enough time to plunge into the overthrow of existing norms. As violent radicalization is a complex process several factors must be taken into account while approaching this topic.

Therefore, root causes triggering violent activities present in political and cultural arenas were also analyzed requiring a brief outlook on the historical past of Tunisia. The paper also stated that these challenges are still unsolved, the circumstances that emerged in the post-Arab Spring period, and the regional instability are also deemed responsible for the shifting of young Tunisians towards violent radical ideologies and the perpetration of terrorist activities inside the country.

By analyzing the economic, political, and cultural fields, the paper also tried to seek an explanation on that

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A contradiction which lies in the fact that, on one hand, Tunisia was the top country in the ranking of the foreign fighters in the Levant and Libya in 2015; whereas, on the other hand, the North African country is mentioned as the only positive example of the Arab Spring that avoided falling into the row of failed states. Besides Tunisia’s path to democratization, state-building and the management of the economy still lacks some deficiencies that reflect the legacy of the the past.

As violent radicalization is a complex process, its solution also requires complex methods. In this regard, fighting against the phenomenon of radicalization and avoiding future terrorist attacks that would undermine Tunisia’s achievements could lie in the political inclusion mentioned by Martha Crenshaw (1981), and other scholars, the establishment of a balance between secular and religious principles, and a durable solution for the Tunisian economy that would include the development of the marginalized regions of the country and a wider range of possibilities for the younger generation.

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