

**ABDUL HARIS FATGEHIPON**

## The 30<sup>th</sup> September Movement and the Emerging of the New Order Regime in Indonesia

### ABSTRAK:

*Peristiwa gerakan 30 September 1965 di Indonesia telah mengahiri persaingan politik antara TNI-AD (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan Darat) dengan PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia). Namun sampai saat ini peristiwa tersebut masih menjadi misteri dalam sejarah Indonesia modern. Pihak TNI-AD menyebut peristiwa tersebut sebagai GESTAPU (Gerakan September 30) dan memandangnya sebagai peristiwa makar yang dilakukan oleh PKI. Berbagai kajian akademik telah dilakukan terhadap peristiwa tersebut. Ada sementara kalangan yang setuju dan ada yang tidak setuju tentang keterlibatan PKI dalam peristiwa Gerakan 30 September 1965. Tulisan ini akan mengkaji berbagai perspektif tentang peristiwa Gerakan 30 September 1965 dan perubahan-perubahan politik yang menyertainya pasca peristiwa tersebut di Indonesia. Tulisan ini juga akan mengkaji tentang militer Indonesia yang setelah peristiwa GESTAPU tahun 1965 ianya muncul sebagai kekuatan yang memerintah. Dalam konteks ini TNI-AD memberi nama pemerintahan yang diusungnya dengan istilah "OrdeBaru". Tujuan utama pemerintahan Orde Baru adalah untuk mempertahankan wujudnya nilai-nilai Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Sementara itu pemerintahan Presiden Soekarno dicap sebagai kekuatan "Orde Lama" yang oleh pemerintahan Orde Baru digambarkan sebagai kurun waktu yang penuh dengan kegelapan, keterbelakangan, serta penyimpangan terhadap nilai-nilai Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945. Untuk mendapatkan legitimasi politik dari masyarakat, pemerintah Orde Baru menyelenggarakan PEMILU (Pemilihan Umum) tahun 1971 yang hasilnya dimenangkan oleh kekuatan politik dukungan pemerintah, yakni GOLKAR (Golongan Karya).*

**Kata-kata kunci:** peristiwa GESTAPU tahun 1965, kontroversi keterlibatan PKI, peran TNI-AD dalam politik dan pemerintahan Orde Baru.



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## INTRODUCTION

The GESTAPU (*Gerakan September Tigapuluh* or the September 30<sup>th</sup> Movement) in 1965 that killed seven Army senior officers is still mysterious in Indonesia politics. The TNI-AD (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Darat* or Indonesian National Army) named the event not as GESTOK (*Gerakan 1 Oktober* or the October 1<sup>st</sup> movement) as well as the President Soekarno called it. In the contrary, however, the movement then named by TNI-AD became the synonym of GESTAPU. To prove the involvement of PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or Indonesian Communist Party) on GESTAPU movement, the TNI-AD changed the term of GESTAPU into G-30-S/PKI (*Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia* or the September 30<sup>th</sup> movement/PKI). The TNI-AD accusation of PKI's involvement in that movement, however, brings up many big question marks as follows:

*First*, if PKI is involved with the goal to establish a Communism government in Indonesia, why did the member of Revolution Senate which is led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung was majority from senior officer of TNI-AD? Did the TNI-AD intentionally merge in GESTAPU Revolution Senate so PKI felt absolutely sure that the Army supported GESTAPU? After all, the TNI-AD had a rational reason to destroy PKI and stated the involvement of the Army senior officers in revolution senate was only a PKI camouflage. Some ex-members of the senate in *Orde Baru* or New Order regime sit in many important positions in government such as in Cabinet Minister. Moreover, President Soeharto gave Umar Wirahadikusumah, who was also one of the senate ex-member, a sit as a Vice President in 1982-1987.

*Second*, only in 9 hours, the RPKAD (*Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat* or Army Special Troops) could dominate strategic positions which were occupied by GESTAPU actors. This circumstance shows that GESTAPU rebellion was not well planned and had no enough army power. The troops used in that rebellion was the President safety guard troop *Cakrabirawa* (not a combat troop). There were only two infantry battalions which were originally from KODAM (*Komando Daerah Militer* or Army Region Command) Brawijaya of East Java (Battalion 530) and KODAM Diponegoro of Central Java (Battalion 454). Both battalions above had no preparation for battle, because they came to Jakarta to attend ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* or Indonesian Republic's Forces) anniversary on October 5<sup>th</sup> 1965. Before October 1<sup>st</sup>, Major General Soeharto as PANGKOSTRAD (*Panglima Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat* or Chief of Strategic Army) inspected the readiness of battalions 530 and 454 troops in attending the anniversary.

*Third*, Untung, who was the leader of coup d'état (revolution), was unfamiliar figure in Army and civil society. The ex-ambassador of the USA (United States of America) for Indonesia, Marshall Green, wrote in his book entitled *From Sukarno to Suharto*, that Untung was not famous because he was just moved from Central Java to lead the first battalion of President Safety Guard "Resimen Cakrabirawa" (Green, 1991:251). In every revolution done by Army

in many countries, the leader of the revolution is usually senior officer of Army who is wide familiar in the society and has a great influence to the internal Army. However, Untung was an Army junior officer who was always loyal to Soekarno and had never understood about politics, so that many sides viewed that Untung was only equipped and sacrificed to other side purpose.

It is interesting to note that Major General Soeharto knew Untung well. He had ever been Untung's leader when working in Solo, Central Java. Untung had together with Soeharto followed the Papua (West Irian) independence struggle from Dutch in 1962. Because Untung was a junior officer in Army who had left radical ideology made Soeharto concluded that GESTAPU is a left extreme class revolution (Roeder, 1969:13). Many sides were hesitate Soeharto accusation that Untung was a communist. In the court, there was no evidence that could prove that Untung was a Communist party agent (Crouch, 1984:115).

*Fourth*, there were different views about GESTAPU among Forces' leader. The KASAU (*Kepala Staf Angkatan Udara* or Chief of Air Force) Omardani, however, said that GESTAPU was purposed to save and rescue the revolution and the revolution's big leader, President Soekarno, from a subversive movement of CIA (Central Intelligence Agent); therefore, the Air Forces would support every revolutionary progressive movement and vice versa would destroy every attempt which would be dangerous for Indonesia revolution (Pusat Sejarah TNI, 2000:228). Suspicion appeared among Army. The TNI-AD blamed the Air Forces support GESTAPU/PKI, and vice versa with many reasons Air Forces blamed the TNI-AD. Until now, GESTAPU history still becomes a spine in Indonesia military history.

#### **THE GESTAPU AND TRANSFER OF POWER IN INDONESIA**

Many theories come up from politics and history researchers in Indonesia about GESTAPU, some believed and others did not. Benedict R.O'G. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey in January 1966 purposed a paper (released just in 1977). They stated that PKI was not involved in GESTAPU revolution (Anderson & McVey, 1971). Some Cornell University bachelors stated an alternative hypothesis that PKI was the TNI-AD internal problem in which many Colonels of the Army did not satisfy, disappointed and rebelled against Generals who did not support the confrontation to Malaysia. PKI was not the coup d'état promoter because it would just harm PKI. The PKI's place at that moment was so comfortable under President Soekarno regime. Whenever a change happened, there would not benefit for PKI and the best strategy for PKI was to keep it self on status quo (Brackman, 2000:226-227).

The revolution from Untung group was not a real one. This circumstance was manipulated by right side, the TNI-AD leded by Lieutenant General Soeharto to stop their enemy from central side Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani and friends; so that, a way was opened for right side (Soeharto side) to destroy PKI that had long been planned then build up an Army dictator next period (Scott, 2001:101).

CIA was also accused behind GESTAPU by many sides, by doing a conspiracy with senior officer of TNI-AD (Harsutejo, 2000). The USA (United States of America) had a foreign affair interest to save the countries in South East Asia region, so that they would not be dominated by Communist government (Singh, 1996). The USA felt safer that civil government is led by Army, because they are the only one power in Indonesia that can destroy PKI. Indonesia's foreign politics at that time was so close to Communist countries (China and Soviet Union) and against Capitalist (USA). The only way to end PKI was that the US must cooperate with the senior officer of Army who were opposed PKI and brave to defy President Soekarno. Since the 1950s, the USA used to use Army who opposed Sukarno, to kill him but it failed (Widjanarko, 1988:108-117). The USA also supported and gave food relief and gun supplies to the rebelled group in many Indonesia regions who opposed President Soekarno (Djiwandono, 1996). The involvement of America can be real proved by the struck of plane that was used by PERMESTA (*Perjuangan Semesta* or the Great Struggle) troops in Ambon, on 18 May 1958. The pilot was an American, Alleen Pope. He then got death sentences by Indonesia Court; however, by the USA diplomacy, Alleen Pope finally was released by President Soekarno on 2 July 1962.

At the beginning of 1950s, many senior officers of Indonesia Army got education in the USA, and in 1951 till 1957 there were approximately 200 senior officers who learned in the USA and the large amount of them were from TNI-AD. In the middle of 1958, amount of Army who learned in the USA were 300 persons (Mrazek, 1997:30). The official data released by USA government until 30 June 1963, no less than 2,050 senior officers learned and trained many skills in America (Bachtar, 1982). America founded safety relief in 1950-1982, 13 million USD per year.

Many political leaders in Washington, such as CIA planning, had believed for a long time that Communist resistance politics in Indonesia would be happened by destroying President Soekarno regime and PKI (Scott, 2001:32). Ex-USA Ambassador for Indonesia, Marshall Green, on his book wrote that the TNI-AD and the group which was not Communist in Indonesia were fortunate, because Major General Soeharto was not assassinated by GESTAPU plotters. It might be because that he is not included in direct staff line with Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani or upper level command line.

The statement describes that the USA happiness of Soeharto's success in destroying Communism in Indonesia. Even though Soeharto was not involved in politics and did not get military education in USA as well as Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani and General A.H. (Abdul Haris) Nasution, but Soeharto was not likely a stranger to the USA diplomat. This situation strengthened an assumption that Soeharto and America (CIA) had made cooperation because they were equally in a profitable position. Soeharto was not really famous and meaningful before October 1<sup>st</sup> 1965. Soeharto came from a poor family in Central Java (Roeder, 1969:7). After the G-30-S/PKI movement, the star on Soeharto's shoulder continuously added. His military and political career shined.

It is also interesting to note that Malaysia supported the destruction of communism in Indonesia by giving politic protection to the politician who opposed Soekarno, like Des Alwi and Sumitro Joyohadikusumo.<sup>1</sup> Malaysia leaders also made cooperation secretly with the TNI-AD senior officers. Since the confrontation of Indonesia and Malaysia, the TNI-AD senior officers secretly took a different action with President Soekarno and his supporter. The leaders of Army and Navy Forces disagreed to make confrontation against Malaysia, so they made a sabotaging that there was no war with Malaysia (Crouch, 1984:228).

The Air Forces leader supported the confrontation, did politic relation with President Soekarno and PKI (Brackman, 1969:35). The Army and Navy Forces thought that the confrontation with Malaysia would be only profitable for PKI and strengthened Communist power in South East Asia. PKI was in the front line in the confrontation against Malaysia (Djiwandono, 1996:192-193). Malaysia Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman Putra stated that the Malay countries depend on Indonesia, if Communist success in dominating Indonesia politic, other Malay nations in South East Asia will just wait for the time to be conquered by Communist (Singh, 1996). Without Soekarno realizing, the leader of TNI-AD asked Des Alwi, who had close relation with Malaysia politicians to bring a way to peace negotiation between Indonesia and Malaysia (Pour, 1997:328).<sup>2</sup> The peace negotiation between Indonesia was achieved after the inauguration of General Soeharto as the Indonesia President in 1966/1967.

After GESTAPU rebellion, there were many demonstration held by students and civil society in order to struggle the three demands which is known as TRI TURA (*Tiga Tuntutan Rakyat* or Three People Demands), with the content to force President Soekarno to disperse PKI, reduce the goods' price and disperse DWI KORA (*Dwi Komando Rakyat* or Two People Commands) cabinet.<sup>3</sup> President Soekarno refused the demands. In the AMPERA (*Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat* or People Unhappy Mandate) cabinet meeting on 15 January 1966 in Bogor, he accused that the students action was influenced by NEKOLIM (Neo Colonialism and Imperialism), primarily by CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). In those demonstrations, a student of Doctoral Faculty of Indonesia University, Arif Rahman Hakim, died by the army shoot. This situation made Jakarta panic, riots happened everywhere in Indonesia. Until now, there is not clear information

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<sup>1</sup>Des Alwi was born in Banda Neira, Maluku. He is Sutan Syahrir and Mohamad Hatta's adopted child. Meanwhile Sumitro Joyohadikusumo was born in Central Java on May 26<sup>th</sup> 1917. He got Doctoral degree in Economy field from Rotterdam Economy High School, and sit as a Trading Minister of Indonesia in 1950-1955. He is also a famous economy expert in Indonesia and a member of Indonesia Socialist Party led by Sutan Syahrir.

<sup>2</sup>When studying in England, Tengku Abdul Rahman Putra, Tunku Abdul Razak and Senu Abdul Rahman were college friend with Sutan Syahrir and Des Alwi. Those Malaysia leaders learned independence ideas from Sutan Syahrir who was also Des Alwi adopted father.

<sup>3</sup>The TRI TURA concept was composed by students at University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta who were also supported by the Army.

that killed that man. President Soeharto on his biography book, there is no explicit explanation who is the actor who shot Arif Rahman Hakim (Dwipayana & Ramadhan K.H., 1998:163).

Responding the students' actions who against him, President Soekarno and his supporters founded an organization named Soekarno's line (*Barisan Soekarno*). Many students appeared to support that organization, including University of Indonesia Students Organization. This condition shows that President Soekarno had pretty much supporter who agreed with his ideas of struggling against Neo Colonialism which is made by super power countries. After the rebellion, there were still many people who believed Soekarno and hoped that he could make change on politic and economy crisis in Indonesia. Demonstration held by students who opposed President Soekarno was not alone; the students got protection from the TNI-AD, admitted by Soeharto on his biography, "I continuously make relation with the students, I listen to their idea, will and hope" (Dwipayana & Ramadhan K.H., 1998).

When President Soekarno gave an instruction in meeting with the Ministers in National Palace in Jakarta on March 11<sup>th</sup> 1966, at the out side palace there were many gun troops without army uniform, the troops was under Colonel Kemal Idris command. President Soekarno then stopped the meeting and with his staff flight with helicopter to save themselves to President Palace in Bogor. The placement of the un-uniformed Army around the National Palace by Lieutenant General Soeharto was kind of psychology pressure to President Soekarno. Lieutenant General Soeharto intentionally used the TNI-AD who supported him to press President Soekarno.

Soeharto asked then three senior officers of Army to ask President Soekarno to give an official letter of power change to save national security to Soeharto. There are still different opinions from history witnesses and politic researchers in Indonesia about the letter of power change from President Soekarno to Lieutenant General Soeharto which is known as SUPER SEMAR (*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret* or Instruction Letter of March 11).

Soeharto, without informing President Soekarno, then dispersed PKI and stated that PKI is a forbidden party in Indonesia. His action got many supports from many students and civil organizations such as KAMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* or Indonesian Student Action Union), KAPPI (*Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia* or Indonesian Youth Student Action Union), HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* or Islamic Student Association), IMM (*Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah* or Muhammadiyah Student Association), PMII (*Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* or Indonesian Moslem Student Union), GPA (*Gerakan Pemuda Anshor* or Anshor Youth Movement), PMK (*Persatuan Mahasiswa Kristen* or Christian Student Union), and so on. After PKI destruction, those organization with the protection by the TNI-AD, demanded to break down President Soekarno regime.

Lieutenant General Soeharto kept dubious, on many of his official statements he kept saying to support and protect President Soekarno, but quietly he gather

a power to break down President Soekarno. This situation could be understood, if Soeharto openly stated opposition to President Soekarno there would have been antipathy from the people and soldiers who were still loyal and honored to President Soekarno. However, Soekarno in Indonesian eyes is not only as a President but also as a charismatic leader (Dakhidae, 2003:264).<sup>4</sup>

### THE ARMY AND NEW ORDER REGIME IN INDONESIA

The TNI-AD politically named their government with *Orde Baru* (New Order). The purpose of *Orde Baru* government, according to President Soeharto, is to keep PANCASILA (Five Pillars of State) and *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (1945 Constitution) values (Nasution, 1984:435). Meanwhile *Orde Lama* (Old Order) by New Order government used to be described as the time that is full of darkness, underdevelopment and deviation of PANCASILA and *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*.

President Soeharto, in the beginning of New Order also occupied the chief of Ministry of Defence and Security and the Leader of ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* or the Army of the Republic of Indonesia). The wide and powerful authority of General Soeharto made him success dominating the entire Army. President Soeharto realized that without dominating Army power, he would face many difficulties in creating the stabilization of politics and economy development in Indonesia. A reason why there were many politics problems happened in President Soekarno era is because of Soekarno was failed dominating Army. The Army in President Soekarno era made much disobedience toward his politics policies which were assumed to support the growing up of Communism in Indonesia. The army was also behind many murdering actions to President Soekarno (Sofhian, 1991; Bhakti, 1999; and Honna, 2002).

In the beginning of New Order government, many different points of view happened among the senior officer of TNI-AD about the establishing of New Order. The first group wanted the establishment of New Order begin with the fulfillment of prime necessary and not to do any politics development. This is based on experience during President Soekarno era where politics was the priority; and as a result, economy and education developments were left behind. However, the second group wanted that development must be hold in all sides, primarily in mentality, politics, bureaucracy and law enforcement (to destroy corruptions in Indonesia). This idea appeared among the intellectual and idealist Generals, like A.H. Nasution who did not want the New Order government become an authoritarian and military government which is adhesively tight by corruption (Nasution, 1984; and Koonings & Kruijtit, 2002). There were also many cracks among Generals of TNI-AD about development concept of New Order. Another critics general begun to disagree with Soeharto to keep prolonging

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<sup>4</sup>Charismatic term is used to show the special quality of someone self, where he/she is thought has extraordinary power like no others. The power is believed comes from God (Allah's gift), and based on that belief (irrational) someone is trusted to be a leader.

the political power. President Soeharto then moved out many senior officers who did not agree with his New Order policies from many important occupations.

To strengthen his political power, the General Election or PEMILU (*Pemilihan Umum*) in 1968 was delayed by President Soeharto until 1971 (Nasution, 1984:386). If the General Election had been done at that time, Soeharto would have been difficult to be elected as President. It is because of many reasons as follows:

*First*, General Soeharto had no any political parties which would support him, so that Soeharto need more time to be able to found a strong party which can accommodate Army and himself importance.

*Second*, even though Soekarno had been a politics prisoner, Soekarno's influence was still strong in the Army and society. President Soekarno can be destroyed politically, but culturally Soekarno's influence was still strong in society and military. By the power of TNI-AD, Soeharto attempted to harm Soekarno's politics power in party, like PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) and PNI (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* or National Party of Indonesia).

*Third*, General A.H. Nasution, chief of MPRS (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara* or Contemporary People Assembly) still had opportunity to be chosen as President of the Republic of Indonesia. Sympathy from many Islamic parties for General A.H. Nasution after GESTAPU was very high. General A.H. Nasution was viewed having clear Islamic comprehension. Different with President Soeharto who is rounded (*inner circle*) and influenced by some Moslem Generals who doesn't strictly adhere to the Moslem perception. General A.H. Nasution was not ready to candidate him self as President, because if he shifted Soekarno as President, the issue of reformation by General Council toward Soekarno would be assured by the society (interview with Abdul Kadir Besar, 5/10/2004). General A.H. Nasution also had conflict root with many senior officers of TNI-AD and President Soekarno. He was judged as an intellectual officer who had high political ambition, proven by the October 17<sup>th</sup> 1952 event and June 5<sup>th</sup> 1959 President Decree, where General A.H. Nasution had big involvement in it.

President Soeharto in 1966 built new politics group which was known as Private Assistance (ASPRI or *Asisten Pribadi*). Major General Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranegara occupied as the chief of ASPRI. One of the main ASPRI's duty is to take care of many things, like politics and national intelligent, intelligent of foreign politics, monetary and General Election. The role of ASPRI in the beginning of New Order was very important and having a lot of duties. Many people said the Staff of ASPRI with negative idiom *Super Cabinet*, because the *over acting* of some ASPRI staff.

Students viewed that Private Assistance doing many interventions of cabinet minister duties. President Soeharto who was at that time needed political support from the students, had to agree with the students demands to resettle ASPRI. Major General Ali Murtopo and Major General Sudjono Humardani were still defended by President Soeharto as ASPRI with the reason to destroy the power



of opposition parties (Crouch, 1984:11). Major General Ali Murtopo dan Major General Sudjono Humardani cooperated with scientists which on 1971 founded CSIS (*Center for Strategic and International Studies*). At the beginning, CSIS became a place to drafting various important decisions (*think tank*) which would be done by *Orde Baru* government (Nasution, 1984:283; Penders & Sundhaussen, 1985; and Dhakidae, 2003).

Major General Ali Murtopo by his special operation success getting support from senior officers of Army, civil, bureaucracy and scientists group to found an organization namely GOLKAR (*Golongan Karya* or Functional Group). GOLKAR even though was functioned as political party, the New Order government would not declare GOLKAR as political party (Bhakti, 1999:32). Political party by the New Order government was issued to get political power and tend to cause destruction. Even though the ideology of GOLKAR was secular (*Pancasila*) which is the same with Indonesia Army (military) ideology (*Sapta Marga* or Seven Obligations and *Sumpah Prajurit* or Knight Pledge), but GOLKAR member and the government used to use religious symbols to find the support from Moslem groups (Suryadinata, 1982:15). The TNI-AD soldiers performed their authority since 1965, but they had no concept in arranging this nation. Whether they arranged this nation through a military government or a political party which would stand on army importance? The soldiers then chose to found GOLKAR to represent their importance (Suryadinata, 1982:25-26).

To make GOLKAR as a big and strong party in short time, President Soeharto utilized Territorial Command on TNI-AD from rural level to support GOLKAR. Indonesia society who was still in fear of assassination of PKI members by the soldier chose to follow Army political willing. The Army often accused the civilian who did not choose GOLKAR as PKI (Sulistyo, 2000). The New Order regime by using TNI-AD power attempted to weaken civilian political parties which were for a long time grew and had great influence in Indonesia society (Crouch, 1984:285-291). Party with religious ideology which had been forbidden by President Soekarno because of rebelling him like MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* or Indonesian Moslem Assembly League) party was also prohibited by President Soeharto. The members of MASYUMI party had big merit in destroying PKI and creating the New Order government (Yayasan Piranti Ilmu, 1992:29-33).

President Soeharto and his supporter who were generally from religiously untruthful Army were very afraid of the appearance of religious ideology party (Islam). They viewed Islamic power as a dangerous threat, after PKI. Islam political power which together with Army destroying PKI, started to left behind by the New Order regime. In the other hand, Christianization in Indonesia mushroomed and got great attention from Middle-East countries (Nasution, 1984:302; and Yayasan Piranti Ilmu, 1992).

General Election or PEMILU (*Pemilihan Umum*) result in 1971 showed that GOLKAR as a new party founded by Soeharto's government was successful gathering majority vote (62.8%). According to *Tempo* magazine, May 28<sup>th</sup> 1977,

GOLKAR triumph in the election was viewed by many sides as a result of Army hardworking by using violence and unfired way. General Soeharto re-elected as President through deliberation of MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*) and was inaugurated as President of Republic of Indonesia in October 2<sup>nd</sup> 1972 (Liddle, 1994; and Feith, 1999).

#### **DOUBLE FUNCTIONED ABRI**

The concept of double functioned ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*) formerly was told by the staff chief of TNI-AD, Lieutenant General A.H. Nasution, in the Anniversary of National Military Academy in Magelang in November 12<sup>th</sup> 1958. Lieutenant General A.H. Nasution stated that Indonesia Army should not follow political attitude of Army in America Latin countries who took over political power of civil government. But, Indonesia Army also should not be the same like Army in West Europe who is passive of politics. Indonesia Army should took *middle way* from both politic attitudes, TNI (Army) will not take overall politic power through reformation and will not only be the audience in political arena (Nasution, 1965; and Bhakti, 1999:48).

In the New Order era, concept of double functioned ABRI gave chance to TNI-AD to be the main figure of New Order government (Dwipayana & Ramadhan K.H., 1998:369). Through *work concept* (part of double functioned ABRI concept), Army leader placed Army members on civil government occupation, courtesy, diplomacy and legislative. Even though the number of Army in Parliament was not the majority, the Army leader should have determined role in electing President, Governor and Regent. Political parties chose to support the candidate purposed by ABRI, they did not want to take risk of opposing ABRI political willing.

In arranging Cabinet, the Army used to given Minister occupation, even though they had no membership on the position they occupied. The placement of the Army senior officers on Cabinet Minister was based on the importance of politics of the New Order authority, not based on membership they had. For example, Major General M. Jusuf, who had no membership in business was inaugurated by President Soeharto as Industrialization and Trading Minister on the Cabinet *Pembangunan I* (Development Cabinet I). In the Cabinet, from 23 Ministers there were 8 (24%) Ministers from Army. In the Cabinet *Pembangunan II*, there were six Ministers who were Armies. In the Cabinet *Pembangunan III*, 15 Ministers were from Armies. In the Cabinet *Pembangunan IV*, there were 17 Ministers who were Armies. In the Cabinet *Pembangunan V*, 14 Ministers were Armies. And, in the Cabinet *Pembangunan VI*, 10 Ministers were Armies. In the New Order era, the position of Defense Minister, Internal Affairs Minister, and Minister of Defense and Security Coordinator, used to be occupied by Armies (Bachtiar, 1982; Singh, 1996; and Honna, 2002).

Territorial Command in the New Order era did not operate its main function as the guard and trainer of region defense area. It had been far made intervention politics area and regional government bureaucracy. The head of Territorial

Command had authority in deciding Governor and Regent positions. It also had authority to deciding whether the candidates of parliament from parties may candidate themselves in General Election (Astoeti, 1993). The parliament member or civil leader candidate, before following General Election, was investigated by Territorial Command, whether his family or himself had involved in forbidden organization such as left extreme (PKI) or right extreme organization (Islam radical). The candidate of parliament who was accused of his involvement in those organization by Territorial Command, would not have politics right in Indonesia (elect and to be elected in General Election).

In the President Soeharto era, concept doubled functioned ABRI which issued many debates from critical retired Army and internal or foreign scientist. General A.H. Nasution who was the thinker of middle way (*jalan tengah*) viewed that doubled function should be done in unsecured condition. In normal situation, ABRI have to leave the concept and give the political power to the civil government. Sri Bintang Pamungkas was in great opposing of the concept, the number of ABRI were only 500,000 persons or 0,3% of Indonesia population. ABRI should not get 20% capacity of parliament members. According to him, double functioned ABRI was the shortcoming of democracy. That's why the Army domination in political system should be stopped. Indonesia should follow the countries such as Latin America, Russia, South Korea and Thailand (Astoeti, 1993; and Rourke, 2003).

Bilveer Singh, who had done many studies on Army in Indonesia, said that the idea of leaving double function had never been thinking on ABRI mind. Double functioned ABRI had become a gathered agreement of Army senior officers. This thing happened because of the feeling of worry toward national security threat if army gave its role in politics to the civilian (Singh, 1996:137).

Harold Crouch stated that in ABRI there were two groups, they are structural (*dwifungsi struktural*) and mental double function (*dwifungsi mental*). Structural double function had the idea that Army senior officer should sit on many important civil positions, if the Army leaved the position, national security would be threaten. Mental double function saw the concept of "double function" is more than a right concept of guarding the nation, not the strategy of supporting political position. Armies must not occupy civil position, but they had to always keep the right attitude so that they would be ready if sometimes they are needed to sit civil position (Crouch, 1984:179).

The group of Army senior officer who supported double function stated that in viewing the concept, the Army should not use liberal democracy view because it would be only bring conflict in this nationality (Nasution, 1992). Double function is a political concept that supports army as the power of defensive power of security and social-political power. The system of parliament democracy or liberal professes civil supremacy concept on War Forces (*civilian supremacy*). The Army involvement in politic was viewed opposing the constitution. Vice-versa, in democracy political system of *Pancasila*, Army had the right to be involved in politic (Astoeti, 1993:189).

The involvement of civilian in politics during the New Order government was very limited. The people had no right to decide and choose the political leader. The political leader begun from the Village, Regency, Province and the Capitol were decided by some politician who came from the big family of ABRI (KBA, *Keluarga Besar ABRI* or ABRI's Big Family), Bureaucracy, and GOLKAR (political member). The result of discussion from those three powers resulted political leader. The opposition party like PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or Party of Development and Unity) as Islamic party; and PDI (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* or Party of Indonesia Democracy), as merger of parties which profess nationality, secular and Christian ideology, more agreed with the political decision that was resulted by the discussion of ABRI, Bureaucracy and GOLKAR.

Karl D. Jackson saw the New Order government as *bureaucratic polity*, where the civil society had no right in deciding and influencing the political decisions in this country. The politic decision was not only determined by the government. In 1970s, the New Order authority was directed systematically to become Soeharto as *Personal Power* (as cited by Dhakidae, 2000:237).

## CONCLUSION

The 30<sup>th</sup> September Movement in 1965 ended the political competition between the Army and PKI. Until now, this movement still becomes a mystery of Indonesia history. The group who killed seven senior officers of Army (TNI-AD) called the action as September 30<sup>th</sup> Movement. By TNI-AD, the September 30<sup>th</sup> movement was made the synonym as GESTAPU. To show the involvement of PKI, the TNI-AD then changed the term into September 30<sup>th</sup> Movement of PKI.

Many researches related to September 30<sup>th</sup> Movement of PKI is done, many theories appeared from the political and army history researchers about the phenomenon. Some people agree and some didn't about the PKI involvement in GESTAPU. Benedict R.O'G. Anderson and Ruth McVey on January 1966 proposed a paper (issued in 1977) and stated their opinion that PKI did not take a part in the revolution. The West scholar from Cornell University stated an alternative hypothesis that PKI problem was an Army internal problem where some Colonels who were from Java was not satisfied, disappointed and finally rebelled against the Generals who did not support the confrontation toward Malaysia. PKI was not the actor of the reformation, because it would be only defect PKI. PKI position at that time was very comfortable under President Soekarno's government. If there was any change it would only destroy PKI and the best strategy was to keep in *status quo*.

After September 30<sup>th</sup> Movement of PKI, the change of politics in Indonesia happened. The military who used to be under civil government control, appeared as the power of the government. The TNI-AD politically named their government with the term *Orde Baru*. The goal of the New Order (*Orde Baru*) regime, according to President Soeharto, was to keep the value of *Pancasila* and 1945 Constitution. Meanwhile *Orde Lama* (Old Order) by the New Order government used to be

illustrated as the darkness and under development time and also full of contradiction to *Pancasila* and 1945 Constitution.

The senior officer of TNI-AD at the beginning of New Order was broken up. Many of them wanted the government to begin with economy development and took aside the politics and law, while the critical senior officers still wanted the New Order regime to develop all aspect, not only economy. The different way of thinking and importance of politic among them who had a big deal in creating the New Order, caused many conflicts in the internal of Army. General A.H. Nasution and his group were banned from the authority cycle. The senior officers who were loyal to President Soeharto like Ali Murtopo, made a special operation to find political support from all side of the society to New Order regime. The result of General Election in 1971 where GOLKAR won showed that the New Order got big support from the majority of Indonesian. Even though, the support of GOLKAR was gotten by violence done by the TNI-AD

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