Preventing Religious Radicalism Based on Local Wisdom: Interrelation of Tarekat, Adat, and Local Authority in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia

ABSTRACT: The integrated relation between the sufi order of Syattariyah, the Minangkabau tradition or custom, and the local authority of Nagari Sungai Buluah, Sub-District of Batang Anai, Regency of Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera has become a local wisdom that acts as a social capital for the prevention of religious radicalism in the region. The relation is seen from three social domains, such as “bersurau kaum dan bemasjid nagari” (must have little mosque at the community ethnic level and have mosque at district or regency level); “berrnawad atab dan bernawad adat” (must have Islamic worship leader and custom or tradition’s leader); and “bermufti nagari dan bernagari” (must obey to the Islamic law adviser in the community and must have district or regency). This article, based on the qualitative study, tries to elaborate the position and roles of sufi order, custom, and local wisdoms in preventing the Islamic radicalism in West Sumatera. The findings show that the traditional institutions, such as little mosque and mosques in the village and regency level; Islamic worship and custom leaders; sufi order of Syattariyah, and Islamic law adviser in the regency level have the critical roles in preventing the Islamic radicalism. The radical organizations, such as the LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia or Indonesia Institute of Islamic Preaching) and “Salafi” (renewal of Islamic thought and movement) cannot growth develop well in Nagari Sungai Buluah, Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera.

KEY WORD: Preventing; Islamic Radicalism; Interrelation of Institutions; Islamic Community; West Sumatera People.


KATA KUNCI: Pencegahan; Faham Islam Radikal; Interelasi Institusi; Umat Islam; Masyarakat Sumatera Barat.
INTRODUCTION

As Lazuardi Birru mentioned that Indonesia is vulnerable to radicalism and terrorism (cited in Meijer et al. eds., 2012; and Abubakar, 2016). A survey on June-July 2011 shows vulnerability index of radicalism in Indonesia is 43.6%; it decreased 1.44% from previous year that was 45.4%. The survey employs multistage random sampling to 4,840 respondents in 33 Provinces. Religious affiliations of respondents are Islam (86.3%), Christianity (11.1%), and others (2.6%). Although the index is lowering, it is still vulnerable to possible radical activities. Indices 43.6 are far from safeness level, that is 33.3 (cited in IRI, 2009; and Abubakar, 2016).

The number is subject to change, due to escalation of religious radicalism which recently happens, such as in Talikota and Singkil. Even though vulnerable to radicalism and terrorism, still, the treatment is mostly by weapon rather than by cultural approach – repressive and curative rather than preventive and preservative. Curative social treatment is usually conducted to religious radicalism activity that already taken place, in order to recover situation (Ashour, 2008; and Bokhari, 2017).

Preservative treatment, through maintaining moderate-Muslim groups, is rarely taken in against radicalism in Indonesia (Rokhmad, 2012:110). Meanwhile, Mukhibat (2014b) stated that treatment for radicalism can also by re-education and re-motivation that should be taken by many parties, including government, society, Islamic educational institution, and kelompok pengajian or Islamic congregation forums (Mukhibat, 2014b:30).

Basically, a society has its own way to deal with its problems, including religious radicalism. One of them is by empowering its cultural potentials. Regrettably, this approach is not often implemented in Indonesia. In preventive and preservative level, empowering local wisdom is a better option, due to the levels are mainly associated with relevant values in countering religious radicalism. So far, local wisdom is merely implemented to handle social conflicts – people are safe from destructive conflicts since acting up to local norms and values (Hartomo, Dewi & Pancasiwi, 2015; and Rumansra, 2015).

Local wisdom is understood by cultural synthesis that initiated by local actors through repeated process; internalizing and interpreting teaching in religion and culture that are announced in norms and become daily way of life for people. Local wisdom as unwritten codes that covers all aspects of society are: firstly, codes of relationship, both interpersonal and personal to community, including relation with traditional authority or pemerintahan adat, inter-clan marriage code, and daily good manner; secondly, codes of human-nature relation, both animal and plant, with the intention of natural conservation, as in Maluku with its sisa darat and sisa laut; and thirdly, codes of human and spirits relation, including to God and other spiritual beings. Local wisdom can be manifested in custom, institution, and wise words (Ferguson, 2011; and Dahliani, Soemarno & Setijanti, 2015).

Local wisdom, as a culture, always does reproduction according to human needs and cultural adaptation patterns. Cultural reproduction is an active process that reaffirms the culture in social life; therefore, it requires adaptation to community which has different cultural background (Abdullah, 2010:41). As a product of culture, local wisdom reproduction depends on, as Clifford Geertz (1973) mentioned, “world view” of certain social group. World view refers to an intellectual understanding, a way to consider the world and how it works, in certain social group whether on the base of religion, ethnicity, or politics (cf Geertz, 1973; and Mufid, 2010:85).

When the world view considered to be powerless to solve social problems, for example pelagandong, which is believed as world view of social harmony but unable to diminish conflicts in Ambon and Maluku; therefore, cultural reproduction will take place to formulate a new world view. When villages in Ambon were suffering unrest ethno-religious conflicts, people of Desa Wayame, sub-district Teluk Ambon, Baguala,
reproduce and introduce the restored older code by unionizing “Team 20” to protect their village from destructive conflicts (Buchanan ed., 2011; and Ansori et al., 2015).

The team is formed by people through deliberation or musyawarah. The Team 20 consists of 10 Muslims and 10 Christians’ representatives. The task are to solve problems which cause conflicts, decide social sanction to people who break the rule, and coordinate with government. This local wisdom reproduction has been saved Wayame people, who have religious diversity, from destructive conflicts (Mufid, 2010:85; and Ansori et al., 2015).

In different circumstances and problem, people of Nagari (a conglomeration of villages or settlements) Sungai Buluah in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia succeeded also in implementing their local wisdom to counter religious radicalism. Integrative relation of tarekat (sufi order) of Syattariyah, Minangkabau tradition, and local authority has accomplished in shutting out radical religious movement, such LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia or Indonesia Institute of Islamic Preaching) and Salafi (Renewal of Islamic Tought) from institutionalizing their ideology.

This research paper, by using the qualitative method (Creswell, 2009; Charmaz, 2000; Hackett, 2003; Piela, 2012; and Guest, Namey & Mitchel, 2013), explores the mechanism of countering religious radicalism, which has been existed and developed naturally in Nagaris, West Sumatera, Indonesia. Nevertheless, theoretical discourse in religious radicalism is not neglected.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Radical Islamic Group in Padang Pariaman. Before explains radical groups in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia, it discusses the meaning of religious radicalism and its earlier phase in West Sumatera. A. Hornby (1989), as quoted also by Ahmad Syafi’i Mufid (2012) and Yumimah Rahmatullah (2017), explained that “radicalism” is derived from radical that means root or foundation. As a noun, radical means a person who has radical views in politics and religion. Radicalism means belief in radical ideas and principles (Hornby, 1989; Mufid, 2012:2; and Rahmatullah, 2017).

Moreover, Ahmad Syafi’i Mufid (2012) proposes that indicators of religious radical group in Indonesia are as following here: look upon Indonesian government as thagut or evil; disrespect national anthem and national flag; has tighter emotional bound to group than to family, school, and workplace; exclusively religious gathering and training; atoning for sins or pay for redemption; has specific performance, such as wear pants with the end above ankle or cingkrang, keep the beard, and use veil or niqab/cadar for women; accuse Muslim outside the group as infidel, or kafir and fasik, unless they do hijrah; and unwilling to listen sermons from non-member (Mufid, 2012:2).

Azyumardi Azra (1996), beside categorizes radical fundamentalism movement into two types i.e. pre-modern that represented by Wahabi and contemporary by IM (Ikhwanul Muslimin or Muslim Brotherhood) with key-figures: Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Quthb, and Abu A’la Maududi, who concern on the failure of modernity – therefore should be rejected; he also mentions classical radicalism which was initiated by Khawarij, the more extreme group that held a motto “no law but law of God” (Azra, 1996:113).

Considering its symbolic and actual violent, Nur Syam (2011) releases the radical Islamic movements, i.e. HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or Liberation Party of Indonesia); MMI (Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia or Indonesian Mujahiddin Council); Salafi (Renewal of Islamic Tought); LD (Laskar Djundullah or Paramilitery Troops of God); LJ (Laskar Jihad or Endeavor’s Warriors); and FKAWJ as Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal-Jamaah or Communication
Forum for Islamic Sunni Members (Syam, 2011). Meanwhile, Islamic educational institutions which considered to the breeding ground of radicalism are Pesantren (Islamic boarding school) Islamic Center of Bin Bas in Yogyakarta; Pesantren of Illya’ al-Sunnah (Awakening of Islamic Sunni) in KAMPung Jawa Baru, Lhokseumawe, Banda Aceh, Aceh; Pesantren of Minhajus Sunnah (Principles of Islamic Sunni) Mungkid in Magelang, Central Java; and Pesantren of Hidayatullah (God Bless) Mataram in Nusa Tenggara Barat or Sundanese Little Islands in Indonesia (Mukhibat, 2014a:189).

In West Sumatera, religious radicalism is often associated to Padri movement (A’la, 2008; and Zakariya & Salleh, 2011). In this context, Azyumardi Azra (1996) said that Padri movement begun with moderate renewal that initiated by Tuanku Nan Tuo and his pupils from Surau Koto Tuo, Agam, since the last quarter of eighteen century (Azra, 1996). Tough opposition between moderate reformer and kaum adat (the traditional or custom faction) was a significant factor of radicalization progress among Tuanku Nan Tuo followers, particularly Tuanku Nan Renceh. In 1803, the return of tiga haji (three hajjs), namely Haji Miskin, Haji Sumanik, dan Haji Piobang, who went to hajj in the time of Wahabi glory in Mecca and becomes a trigger for Padri’s jihad movement against Muslim who reject their hard principles (Azra, 1996; and Yaakop & Idris, 2017).

Padri and Wahabi shares identical views on opposing heresy and superstition, or bid’ah dan khurafat, and banning tobacco and silk (Azra, 1996:113). In this context, Jeffrey Hadler (2008) mentioned that Padri war as the first “Muslim jihad against Muslim” in Southeast Asia (Hadler, 2008:9).

Salafi, which is often considered to be metamorphosis of Wahabi, encourages purification of practices (ubudiyah) from superstition, myth, and heresy; and confines to their selves to the life of the Prophet Muhammad SAW (Salallahu Alaihi Wassalam or peace be upon him), and his disciples, appeared in West Sumatera around 1998 (Hilmi, 2012:152). Salafi meetings in its members houses, for example, when it held in the house of dr. Amri Mansur, an ex-member of Laskar Jihad, declare the FKAJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah) and issuing jihad (endeavor or holy war in Islam) obligation to Maluku (Buchanan ed., 2011).

Necessity of jihad becomes polemic that splits of Salafi in West Sumatera into two groups: Salafi of Yamani that tightly holds Salafi principles, such as abstain in general election and uncooperative with other groups; and Salafi of Sururi that relatively lessen the principle by allowing its members to participate in general election as long as the candidate has conformity with Salafi principles or manhaj. Both of them, however, share the same commitment (Noorhaidi, 2005; and Jahroni, 2015).

Their existences, according to Minangkabau proverb, mambunkik batang tarandam (awaken a sunken tree) from the ruins of Padri. West Sumatran Salafi figure, Muhammad Elvy Syam, asserts that Salafi proselytizing in early period has been energized by Minangkabau figures two centuries ago that was initiated by three Minangkabau clerics or ulamas: Haji Sumanik, Haji Piobang, and Haji Miskin (Sumaniak, 2015). They studied in Masjid Haram from prominent teacher, Syeikh Muhammad Abdul Wahab. Their activities declined since Tuanku Imam Bonjol was arrested (A’la, 2008; and Zakariya & Salleh, 2011).

Todays, people of West Sumatera are superficial in faith and practice religion accor with Sunnah or words and deeds of Prophet Muhammad SAW. The duty of Salafi in West Sumatera, as officially stamped in the Dar el-Iman (Belief Domain) Foundation motto is put Sunnah as the light to enlighten the darkness of heresy (cited in Sefriyono, 2015:33).

In Padang Pariaman, although FPI (Front Pembela Islam or Islamic Defender Front), MMI (Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia or Indonesian Mujahiddin Council), and Salafi (Renewal of Islamic Thought) exist, the radical religious groups do not raise significantly. The groups are not based on
Nagari, a traditional governmental system in Ranah Minang or Minang Area. Nagari is prototype of government with traditional autonomy. The groups run courses in urban mosques and private mushalla (little mosque), where surrounded people are follower of the group (Nurdin, 2009; and Kamal, 2014).

Presence of MMI Padang Pariaman delegation in 4th MMI Congress bears evidence of MMI Padang existence. The congress is held at Az-Zikra Islamic Centre in Sentul Bogor, West Java, on August 23-25, 2013. MMI of West Sumatera delegations, who depart from Payakumbuh, Lima Puluh Kota, Kota Bukittinggi, Padang Panjang, Solok, Pariaman, and Kota Padang.

Another proof of MMI existence in Padang Pariaman is the visit of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to Pesantren Darul Ulum in Pakandangan, Muhammadiyah’s pesantren in the center area of Tarekat of Syariah. Attendance of the MMI leader (amir) is result of MMI Padang board members coordination (interview with Respondent A, 22/4/2015).

FPI is said to be existed in Padang Pariaman, due to the visit of the FPI top leader (imam besar), Muhammad Habib Rizieq Shihab, on 23 Oktober 2014, in Mujahidin Mosque, Lubuk Alung, Padang Pariaman, for his safari dakwah or preaching series in West Sumatera. Through his speech, the Imam explains three modes of Muslim struggle, as following here:

[... ] firstly, struggle in asking out. This mode of da’wah should be done in politeness and good manner; secondly, struggle in amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar – keep a stiff and assertive to affirm correct and incorrect; and thirdly, struggle in jihad—consign everything, including his live, for the glory of the religion of God.3

Salafi in Padang Pariaman is supported by Pariaman people, who practice Salafism after shifted from Tarekat of Syariah practices, for instant Zulkifli Zakaria and Ali Musri. Their religious radical practice is, borrowing Ahmad Syafi’i Mufid (2010)’s term, radical in furu’iyah matters (Mufid, 2010). However, tarekat leaders worry about recurring, historically speaking, rivalry of Padri and Tarekat that happened in the past. Besides that, they also concern about the possibility of radicalism shifting into latent radicalism and manifest radicalism (Azwar, 2018).

Although latent radicalism is lack of power to resist, it will launch an attack whenever it has a power, even if it just a weak power. In sociology literatures, it is often called “manifest radical” (Berning, 2014; and interview with Respondent A, 22/4/2015). Moreover, Salafi declares itself as extension of unfinished Padri da’wah (preaching of puritanism in Islam). By its dakwah, Salafi group insult tarekat (sufi order) practices and the leadership of Tuanku as religious figure, particularly by sermons that are broadcasted by local radio station, such as Radio of Dara (Virgin) in Kota Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia (Hakim, 2012).

Responding this, numbers of Tuanku have ever planned to make petition. In higher tension level, such as terrorism, there was a case of arrested terrorist who did not come from Padang Pariaman, but Nagari Simpang, Kampuang Pauh, Nagari Cimpago (interview with Respondent A, 22/4/2015). In this context, Irvan Khairul Ananda (2015), as Chief of Kesbangpol (Kesejahteraan, Pembangunan, dan Politik or Political, Development, and Prosperity Affairs) in West Sumatera, said that Padang Pariaman vulnerable to religious radicalism, including terrorism (Ananda, 2015).

Edo, a resident of Simpang Kampuang Pauh, Nagari Cimpago in Padang Pariaman Regency was shot. Edo is accused for his part in preparing explosive to detonate Vihara Ekayana. Another West Sumatera resident engaged in terrorism is Beni Asri, member of Cirebon terrorist network, who was arrested by DENSUS (Detasemen Khusus or Special Detachment)
88 at his parent house in Koto Sani, Koto Singkarak Subdistrict, Solok Regency in West Sumatera. Among 19 Regencies in West Sumatera Province, the only two invulnerable Regencies are: Kota Pariaman and Kota Solok, the rest are vulnerable to radical terrorism (Ananda, 2015).

The condition worries mamak ibadat (a person who has authority in the field of Islamic religious service), mamak adat (a person who has authority in the field of tradition or custom), pemerintah nagari (government of a conglomeration of villages or settlements), and tuanku (royalty title or community leader), who keep Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jamaah (Majority of Islamic Sunni’s) principles in Padang Pariaman. Syafri Tuanku Imam Sutan Sari Alam, as leader of MAZIS (Majlis Zikir Istiqomah Syattariyah or Council of Consistency Zikir for Syattariyah Sufi Order) said that for Padang Pariaman people, Tuanku is palang pintu (gate) or stanchion of religion for the society. In case of religious radicalism, Tuanku is the forefront man to exclude it, because Tuanku is the main figure who should talk to umat or Muslim people in grass-root level (Rimadany, 2016).

In West Sumatera Province level, religious radicalism appears in following religious attitudes: firstly, accusation of socio-patologist as PEKAT (Ponyakit Masyarakat) by Salafi group to tarekat practices in Lima Puluh Karya and Payakumbuh that triggers social conflict; secondly, in Kota Padang, Salafi, particularly Yamani, reject to come to the ballot box or TPS (Tempat Pemungutan Suara) in general election by saying that Indonesian democracy is Western system and unsuitable with Islamic system (Sefriyono, 2015:105); and thirdly, related to the case of Muhammad Kristiawan, a philosophy lecturer at the UMSB (Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Barat or West Sumatera Muhammadiyah University), who accused insulting Al-Qur’an, radical groups in Sumatera Barat, such as MMI (Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia or Indonesian Mujahiddin Council), Paga Nagari Sumbar (Sumatera Barat or West Sumatera), Komite Syariat Islam Indonesia Sumbar (Indonesia Islamic Law Committee of West Sumatera), and MTKAAM (Majelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau or High Council of Minangkabau World Custom Deliberation) Sumbar held atonement for Muhammad Kristiawan at Nabawi Hotel in Padang, West Sumatera, on April 27, 2015 (Fadilah & Putra, 2015).

Religious radicalism in Nagari Sungai Buluh mostly manifested in structural and cultural violence. Structural violence was happen when Salafi group detaches itself from other Islamic groups in the Nagari, because of its different appearance and religiosity. Salafi members do not intermingle with tarekat (Sufi order) of people, who are majority in Nagari Sungai Buluh. Meanwhile, Salafi’s cultural violence is blaming them, whom do not agree as heresy, particularly tarekat group (cf Galtung, 2005; and Salim, 2013).

Salafi religious forum concentrated on a mosque in the Nagari, namely Masjid Jannatul Islam (Islamic Paradise Mosque). The forum that held every day after Maghrib (evening) prayer is led by Ustadz Latiful Kabir, an alumna of LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab or Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic). People around the mosque call him Tuanku Kacik. He also alumnus of Pesantren Salafiyah, namely Pesantren Lubuak Pandan in Padang Pariaman. However, after complete his study in LIPIA, Ustadz Latiful Kabir turn to oppose tarekat groups. Some people accuse him as Ustadz Sesat (heretic Islamic teacher), because his speech blame tarekat practices, the practices that formerly he did (interview with Respondent B, 8/8/2017).

Recently, Salafi activities in Jannatus Salam (Peace Paradise) are disturbed after conflict between people of Nagari Sungai Buluh and Salafi happened. The conflict occurs since Salafi changes the khutbah (sermon) in Jannatus Salam from Syattariyah to Salafi way. Finally, Mufti Nagari (adviser

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on Islamic law in Regency level) and the Elder of KAN (Keraptan Adat Nagari or Regency Custom Deliberation) remind the Salafi ustaz. By the reminder, the Salafi ustazs are prohibited to give sermon in that mosque (cf Shatzmiller, 2001; and Salim, 2013).

The control of the Jannatus Salam mosque is taken over by Nagari, it was the most unpleasant fact for Salafi group. After Jannatus Salam mosque being controlled by Nagari Sungai Buluah, Salafi is unable to develop their ideology. Because the tradition of Nagari is tarekat of Syattariyah, while Salafi is anti-tarekat (Manan, 2017; and interview with Respondent C, 3/8/2015).

Nagari Sungai Buluah in Padang Pariaman. Sungai Buluah, the name is related to buluah tree (genus of bamboo) that grows in that place. It is specifically in Kuliek, the first region of Nagari Sungai Buluah. Nagari Sungai Buluah is a unique society. At least, there are two distinctive manners that they have. Firstly, it is the only Nagari in Padang Pariaman which accepts Christian and Catholic Nias Ethnic by customary law or secara adat. Christian and Catholic minority has right to build house of prayer in land of people (tanah ulayat anak nagari) that has been granted after Christian-Nias maisi adat dan menuang limbago as many other Muslim ethnic that did malakok (Sefriyono, 2014).

In this context, Sefriyono (2014) reveals that the process of mengisi adat Minangkabau by Nias ethnic has been done on December 10, 1927. In that process, Nias ethnic presents traditional tribute payment (upeti adat) 40 rial Padang. After that, the ceremony continued with malewakan gala (bestowing title) by ninik namak (traditional leaders) in Nagari Sungai Buluah. The bestowed title is Tuheneri Datuak Gapuak. In malewakan gala ceremony, as many other penghulu (clan chief) in Minangkabau, the penghulu of Christian-Nias is also honored saluak (a kind of traditional hat) and traditional special suit of clothes for penghulu. By appointing Tuheneri Datuak

Gapuak as penghulu, the number of penghulu in the Nagari is summed up. As number of clans in Nagari, it previously has 16 penghulus, but now it becomes 17 penghulus (Sefriyono, 2014).

Melewakan gala traditional ceremony is not only to bestow the Penghulu Tuheneri Datuak Gapuak, but also panungkek-panungkek (the apparatus). The Datuak-datuak panungkek are Datuk Rajo Mudo, Datuk Rajo Kaciak, Datuk Rajo Bungsu, Rang Mudo, and Tuo Kampung. In addition, as Minangkabau ethnic has namak ibadat or commonly known labai, Nias ethnic also has labai who is not similar with labais in Minangkabau (Frey, 1986; and interview with Respondent D, 16/8/2015).

Beside penghulu, traditional figures who give signature in the ceremony are Katik Nagari, Imam Nagari, Labai Lingkung, and Muti Nagari (Sefriyono, 2014). Inhabitants of Nagari Sungai Buluah are 17,563. Nias ethnic concentrated in Korong Tanjung Basung II. In Nagari Sungai Buluah, Christian-Nias people are 935. It is 5.33% of the total inhabitants that are 17,533. In Korong Tanjung Basung II, there are 715 Christian or 42.61% of 1.678 people, while the number of Muslim are 963 or 57.38%. Profile of Nagari Sungai Buluah explains that in order to assure religious right, two churches were built: the church Banoa Krieso Protestan for Protestant Christian and Kristus Bangkit for Catholic (cited in Sipayung, Gulo & Nurhuda, 2014; and Prayuda, 2015).

People of Nagari Sungai Buluah are loyal members of tarekat (Sufi order) of Syattariyah. In many interview opportunities with key persons of religious, tradition (adat), and Nagari apparatus revealed that Islamic held by people of Sungai Buluah is Syattariyah (Manan, 2017; and interview with Respondent D, 16/8/2015).

People of Nagari Sungai Buluah are very firm in holding Syattariyah tradition, when another current comes in; people have fast response by report it to mamak ibadat (a person who has authority in the field of Islamic religious service). Then,
mamak ibadat will discuss with mamak adat (a person who has authority in the field of tradition or custom) as early resolution before bring the case to Mufti Nagari (Islamic adviser in a conglomeration of villages or settlements). Then, Mufti Nagari will take the case to KAN (Kerapatan Adat Nagari or Regency Custom Deliberation), in which all clerics and prominent figures in Nagari are the board members (Zainuddin, 2008; and Panuh, 2012).

People of Nagari Sungai Buluah have sealed their heart with Syattariyah religious tradition. Their children are trained to accept the tradition. In this context, Datuk Lembang as Chief of KAN Sungai Buluah, in an interview, said as following here:

My parent hold pure Syattariyah religious tradition, when they saw my religious practices were different with them, they would ask me: “Sia guru ang?” or who is your teacher? That is how Syattariyah people keep their religious tradition and heir it to their younger generation (interview with Respondent C, 3/8/2015).

The strong relation of Syattariyah (one of Sufi orders) with Minangkabau cultural institution, both in the level of kaum (ethnic or cummunity) and nagari (a conglomeration of villages or settlements), has become assets to preserve anak nagari (young generation) from radical religious ideology, such as Salafi-Wahabi (Renewal of Islamic Tought led by Muhammad ibn Wahab) movement and others (Sefriyono, 2015; and interview with Respondent H, 3/8/2015).

Indigenization Tarekat of Syattariyah in Minangkabau. The term embedded is often used by Azyumardi Azra (2015) to explain how Islam with vernacularization and indigenization patterns adhered to society. Vernacular means origin, while indigenous means native. The two terms indicate characters of Islamic da’wah (preaching) in Indonesian archipelago that was peaceful and accommodate the local culture by Sufism (Azra, 2015).

Quoting Anthony H. Johns (1995), Azyumardi Azra (2002) also explained that the succeed of sufi in converting people to Islam in Melayu-Indonesia archipelago at least achieved in thirteen century is result of sufi ability in offering Islam that maintaining the continuity of local belief and practices rather than a revolution (cf Johns, 1995; Azra, 2002:33; and Suwirta, 2003). Tarekat (Islamic sufi order) cannot be detached from tasawuf (Islamic sufism), because tarekat is institutionalized tasawuf. In tasawuf, personal religious manifestation is not institutionalized in a tarekat (Fathurahman, 2008:25). Among many tarekats, there is tarekat of Syattariyah. This tarekat of Syattariyah is very accommodating in its contact to culture and power. In its history, Shaikh Muhammad Gauth, lived around 970 AH (Anno Hijriah) / 1563 AD (Anno Domini), was the caliph of tarekat Syattariyah, who was wellknown as ulama who has closed friendship with Hindu figures (Azra, 2002; Suwirta, 2003; and Mufid, 2009).

Through his book, Jawāhir al Khumsa (the throne contains the five jewels), Shaikh Muhammad Gauth adopts Yoga (Buddha meditation) technic and practice as part of zikir or repeatedly chant part of the confession of faith in Islam’s method (cited in Fathurahman, 2008:30). Not only to culture, Syattariyah clerics also accommodating local politics. Historically, Abdurrauf Ali al-Jawi, carrier of tarekat of Syattariyah to Melayu-Indonesia world, has ever been believed by Sultanah Syafiyatuddin (1645-1675) as Qadi Malik al-‘Adil — religious scholar who responsible to social and religious affairs (in Fathurahman, 2008:34).

In West Sumatera, the complex relation between Islam and Minangkabau tradition results many kind of relations, including sosial conflicts, whether because of strict understanding on Islam that, therefore, lead to judgement on relation of tarekat and minangkabau tradition that unsuitable with strict Islamic utilitarianism, as Azyumardi Azra (2003:45-46) explained when talking about this relation; or whether it was competition of influence between traditional scholar and religious one as
identified by Christine Dobbin (1987).

Besides those possibilities, *tarekat of Syattariyah* is deep-rooted in the society. As many other traditional groups, *tarekat of Syattariyah* is also known tightly bound itself to traditional authority (Fathurahman, 2008:34). As *surau* (little mosque) tradition inheritant, *tarekat of Syattariyah*, since Syekh Burhanuddin era, make *surau* not only as religious institution but also traditional institution; although the practice is lessen today (Dobbin, 1987; Azra, 2003; Samad, 2003; and Fathurahman, 2008).

Duski Samad (2003), Oman Fathurahman (2008), and Uka Tjandrasasmita (2009) mentioned that deeprooted relation of *tarekat of Syattariyah* and Minangkabau tradition with the term *pribumisasi* or indigenizing. *Tarekat of Syattariyah* indigenizing is manifested in *Basafa* and *Salawat Dulang*. *Basafa* is pilgrimage ritual to graveyard of Syekh Burhanuddin Ulakan, great Syattariyah ulama in West Sumatera. *Basafa* is held annually in the tenth day of *Safar* month. Many people join the tradition, including common Muslim or non-Syattariyah members. *Tarekat of Syattariyah* indigenizing is also expressed in *Salawat Dulang* — a performance art by beating *dulang* or *talam* and chanting *shalawat Nabi* (invocation to Prophet). According to the traditional sources, the *shalawat Nabi* was firstly introduced by Syekh Burhanuddin Ulakan, when he saw art performance in Aceh that used *rebana* (tambourine). So, *Salawat Dulang* or *Salawat Talam* is still practiced today in Minangkabau (Samad, 2003; Fathurahman, 2008; and Tjandrasasmita, 2009).

*Syattariyah Relation to Adat and Nagari Sungai Buluah*. It is important to note here that *Syattariyah* (one of sufi orders) relation to Minangkabau *adat* (custom or tradition) and *nagari* (land) authority is very strong. The relation occurs in both *kaum* (ethnic or community) and *nagari* level. In the level of *kaum* is through *mamak ibadat* (elder of religious service) / *labai* (mosque official) of *tarekat of Syattariyah*; therefore, institutionalized in *surau* (little mosque) of *kaum*. The religious authority in this level is *Labai*. There are 16 *suraus* in Nagari Sungai Buluah, Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, as number of its clans (Azra, 2003).

While *Labai* is actually traditional identity, it is not religious title. Placement of *tuanku* (title of royalty or Islamic community leader) candidate as religious teacher in *surau of kaum* is result of agreement between *mamak ibadat* and *mamak adat* (elder of custom or tradition) in that *kaum*. The selection of religious teacher in a *surau* is based on religious tradition, particularly in Nagari Sungai Buluah, and commonly in Padang Pariaman. In other words, the *surau* teacher has to in line with *Syattariyah*. Otherwise, the teacher is possibly able to change the established tradition and trigger further dispute (Azra, 2003; Samad, 2003; Ashour, 2008; and Fathurahman, 2008).

In general, mosque and *surau*, whether it belongs to clan, *korong* (surroundings), or *nagari* in Padang Pariaman and particularly Nagari Sungai Buluah, it is controlled by *mamak ibadat* and *tuanku* candidate or senior student of *pesantren Salafiyah* (Islamic bording school of reform movement). *Tuanku* candidate fulfulling the duty in a mosque or *surau* is under order of *ninik mamak kaum* or the elders in a clan/community to *pesantren* (Azra, 2003; Fathurahman, 2008; interview with Respondent E, 5/4/2015; and interview with Respondent H, 3/8/2015).

Appoint teachers from non-Syattariyah can change the established religious tradition, *nagari* society do not want it to be happened. Concerning this, there is Minangkabau aporism that is strongly believed by people: “*jalan jan sampai dialiah urang lalu dan cupak jan sampai diganti orang panggaleh*”. It means that believed religious tradition (*Syattariyah*) should not be changed by stranger, who brings different religious tradition. Its including radical groups, such as *Salafi* or LDII (*Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia* or Indonesia Islamic Preaching Institution), who has tried to come in the *nagari* (Fathurahman, 2008; Wakhir, 2010; and interview with
Respondent F, 16/8/2015).

Based on Surat Keputusan Keanggotaan KAN (Kerapatan Adat Nagari) Sungai Buluh, Periode 2011-2016 (Membership Decree of KAN [Regency Custom Deliberation] Sungai Buluh, for Period 2011-2016), in nagari level, Syattariyah institution consists of two types: it becomes part of KAN institution. The chief of the division of Development and Preservation Adat Syarik (Custom and Islamic Law) in KAN management is seated by Syattariyah figure, Tunak Kuniang. The division members are Khatib Nagari or land preacher, Imam Nagari or leader of communal prayer, and Bila Nagari or land muezzin (Panuh, 2012).

At the nagari level also, Shattariyah figures occupy strategic positions in relation to religious authorities. Religious institutions at the nagari level, i.e. Mufti Nagari (Islamic law adviser in community) are also occupied by Syattariyah figures. These institutions have religious authority through their fatwas (advises or instructions) related to Islamic religious matters at the nagari level. Fatwas of Mufti Nagari became the basis for the KAN and Nagari governments in banning the religious activities of radical groups (Fathurahman, 2008; and Panuh, 2012). In this context, Datuk Lembang as Chief of KAN Sungai Buluh, Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia, is recorded in the interview as follows:

Mufti Nagari as the head of mamak ibadat has religious legality at the nagari level. Implementation of religious activities in the nagari must be permitted by Mufti Nagari. New religious streams coming to this nagari outside of established religious understandings should report to Mufti. So, Mufti Nagari with his apparatus, such as nagari priests, bilal, khatib, and nagari labai are entitled to decide whether or not the denominations should carry out their da’wah activities in the nagari.

Beside that, the permission to establish mosques, mushalla, and other places of worship must pass the fatwa of Mufti Nagari (interview with Respondent C, 3/8/2015).

Preventing Religious Radicalism: From Surau to Nagari. The important question that the answer will be explored in this paper is why radical religious groups as mentioned in the previous section are unable to grow and develop in, particularly Sungai Buluh, and generally in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia? The answer is there are some elements of local wisdom that live and they preserve, especially in responding to religious radicalism. These elements include: firstly, bersurau kaum dan bermasjid nagari or “must have surau (little mosque) at kaum (community ethnic) and have mosque at nagari (district or regency) level”; secondly, bermamak ibadat dan bernagari adat or “must have Islamic worship leader and custom or tradition’s leader”; and thirdly, bermufti nagari dan bernagari or “must obey to the Islamic law adviser in the community and must have district or regency”. The three aspects are gradually proceeding to manifest themselves in a peaceful coexistence of the peaceful santri (Muslim students’) society which is the main characteristic of the Pancasila (five basic principles of the Republic of Indonesia) philosophy, which emphasizes unity, stability, security and harmony (cf Lukito, 1997; and Mukhibat, 2015:178).

Firstly, Bersurau Kaum dan BERMASJID Nagari. Based on some theoretical studies on religious radicalism, house of worship is the most potential space for the growth and development of religious radicalism. One of many religious deradicalization attempts is to control religious activity in house of worship. House of worship, such as mosques and mushalla (little mosque), are not only a place of prayer but also a place for the institutionalization of religious values, ranging from moderate to radical, which can be obtained through religious sermon held. The institutionalization of religion through sermon is also highly dependent on for whom and for what purposes religious ideology is institutionalized (Azra, 2003 and 2006; Ranstrop, 2009; and Salim, 2013).

In Nagari Sungai Buluh in particular, and in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera in general, surau and mosque cannot be used freely by any group and religious
group, including by those who are classified as radical. *Surau* and the mosque are integrated with *adat* (custom or tradition). Therefore, permission to use *surau* and mosque is not finished at *marbot* (caretaker of mosque) level. *Surau* is the property of the *kaum*, and regulated by *mamak ibadat* (worship leader). *Mamak ibadat* is a traditional institution that has authority in the field of *Syarak* (Islamic religious law). Because the use of *surau* and mosques in *Nagari* Sungai Buluh has been well controlled, the young generation of the clan received a religious education in the *surau* (Azra, 2003 and 2006; and Amir, 2008).

Traditionally, not only religious education has been obtained in *surau*, but also *adat* education. *Surau* of Sheikh Burhanuddin, in his history, taught Minangkabau people on Islamic religion and tradition at once in *surau*. After studying the *kitab* (book), the younger generation learn Minangkabau *adat*. Therefore, the *adat* and Islamic religious stakeholders are united in the institution of *surau* (Samad, 2003; and Yunas, 2005). The *Nagari* mosque basically belongs to the Minangkabau people, as *nagari* is an autonomous form of customary government. One of the requirements of the establishment of the *nagari* is the existence of a mosque (Amir, 2008).

In *Nagari* Sungai Buluh, as well as *surau*, mosques cannot be utilized by any group and religious stream. Not everyone can institutionalize religion in mosques and *surau*. Its use is governed by a *nagari* institution that holds *syarak*, namely *Mufthi Nagari*. Only *Tuanku* (royalty title or Islamic community leader) and *Calon Tuanku* (candidate of royalty title or Islamic community leader), who is privilege to institutionalize religion in these two house of worship. The appointment of *Tuanku* or *Calon Tuanku* to become a religious teacher in *surau* is basically to minimize the occurrence of changes in the religious traditions of society that have been in the tradition of *Syattariyah*. Changes in tradition will cause unrest in society (Samad, 2003; Yunas, 2005; and Rimadany, 2016).

Why should *Tuanku* who teaches religion in *surau* and *nagari* mosque? The answer, so that children in the *nagari* will not experience what the Minangkabau saying: *jalan jan sampai diatiah urang lalu, cupak jan sampai dituka urang panggaleh*. Concerning the teachings of religion, this proverb means: “when people in the *nagari* or people who have the same religious traditions teach religion, then taught will be in accordance with existing religious traditions”. It would be different when the teacher is an outsider. Moreover, since they have understood the religious traditions of the people to be taught, then, the Minangkabau saying goes: *sesuai mor dengan baut* or “teaching will be appropriate and will not cause unrest and turmoil in society” (Lukito, 1997; Amir, 2008; and interview with Respondent F, 16/8/2015).

The tradition of *bersurau* dan *bermasjid* with the framework of the *Syattariyah* has become an obstacle to radical religious groups to institutionalize their religious ideology in *surau* *kaum* and *masjid nagari*. Besides the differences of ideology between these two religious groups, *surau* and mosque are not only religious identities but also cultural identities at once. The explanation based on the above data confirms that the deradication of the radicalism that emphasizes legal-formal and repressive approach, which has implemented by the goverment, need to be reviewed. This is because the logic of legal approach contradict the logic of terrorist (Mufid, 2009; and Mukhibat, 2015a dan 2015b).

Secondly, *Bermamak Ibadat* dan *Bermamak Adat*. *Nagari* Sungai Buluh has 16 tribes with 16 penghulu (Muslim leaders in village level). *Penghulu* of the tribe commonly called the *mamak adat*. *Mamak adat* is accompanied with *mamak ibadat*, which also

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16 people as well as mamak adat. Mamak adat is a person who has authority in the field of tradition – in Minangkabau term commonly called urang adat/adat. While mamak ibadat is a person who has authority in religious field – usually called urang mameik syarak or “people who hold religious law”. Therefore, everyone in the Nagari Sungai Buluah has two mamaks with their respective positions and roles (Lukito, 1997; Abidin, 2014; and Nanny, 2016).

Each tribe in the Nagari Sungai Buluah also has a house of worship for the coaching and development of the religion of their young generation. According to the number of his tribe in Nagari Sungai Buluah, there are 16 surau kaums (ethnic or community little mosque). Surau kaum governed by mamak ibadat as syarak (Islamic law) holders. These arrangements include marriage, death, and religious education (Azra, 2003 and 2006; and Mawangir, 2015). Who will be the religious teacher and wirid (passage of Al-Qur’an)’s leader in the surau kaum is determined by the mamak ibadat through the deliberation of the kaum by involving the mamak adat, as explained by Datuk Sati, Vice Chairman of KAN (Kerapatan Adat Negeri or Regency Custom Deliberation) Sungai Buluah, for the following reasons:

Mamak ibadat is usually called labai here. They are called people who hold syarak (sharia) or mamack syarak. Religious affairs administered by mamak ibadat are funeral, from birth to ceremonies of one day to a hundred days commemoration. They also have representation in the Kerapatan Adat Nagari (KAN). Mamak ibadat at the tribal level is appointed by their tribe members through meetings, whilst the labai lingkung or labai pegawai is appointed by the nagari through the nagari meeting.

Each tribe has a mamak ibadat, because mamak ibadat is mawak pusako. Related to religious education for the people, mamak ibadat through meetings calling on Tuaniku or Calon Tuaniku to be able to teach reciting or wirid in their surau kaum. So, the existence of Tuaniku or Calon Tuaniku in surau kaum is not of their own will but at the request of ninik mamak. Tuaniku or Calon Tuaniku come from two Salafiyah pesantren in Padang Pariaman district, namely Pesantren Nurul Yakin and Pesantren Batang Kabuang.

The possibility of religious groups institutionalizing their religious understanding at kaum depends on the mamak ibadat, which of course is inseparable from the mamak adat as karib sabilah payakan sokali or leader in their tribe (interview with Respondent G, 16/8/2015).

Religious activities at the tribe are very dependent on the religious authority held by mamak ibadat. It is because surau is not only a house of worship, but also a place of adat (custom or tradition). Possibility of radical religious groups institutionalize their ideology in the surau kaum very depend on the mamak ibadat, mamak adat, and tuanku (Lukito, 1997; and Abidin, 2014).

Thirdly, Bermufit Nagari dan Bernagari. In Nagari Sungai Buluah, religious activities in house of worship, such as surau (little mosque) and mosque, are well controlled. At the level of kaum (ethnic or community), the control is done by mamak ibadat and tuanku. In nagari is performed by mufti nagari. Nevertheless, the mamak ibadat, tuanku, and mufti nagari have no administrative power to prohibit the practice of radical religious activities in house of worship. This institution is only at the fatwa or advice or instruction for implementation of Islamic matters (Zein, 1999; Azra, 2006; and Abidin, 2014).

The fatwas become the basis for the nagari authority in giving permission or forbidding a religious group from carrying out religious activities in the nagari. Before the fatwa became the basis of the ban, Mufti Nagari communicates it first to ninik mamak through organizing KAN (Kerapatan Adat Nagari or Regency Custom Deliberation). So that the prohibition of radical religious activity is not done partially, but is an integrated effort involving mamak ibadat, mamak adat, mufti nagari, and nagari authority (Setiadi & Kolip, 2011:298-299; and Abidin, 2014).

Confirmation has also been made against the Salafi (renewel of Islamic thought and movement), who want to change the religious procession, especially the Friday prayer that has been commonly held in Nagari Sungai Buluah. The practice of the Friday prayer is common in the Syattariyah tradition by means of giving
sermon by Mufti Nagari or his aparatus before the sermon. After the sermon, then next sermon that commonly called khutbah ayam or chicken sermon (cf Samad, 2003; Yunas, 2005; and Jones, 2014).

It is Arabic sermon, and is in accordance with the provisions of Syattariyah. It is not a sermon delivered in Arabic or an Indonesian sermon translated into Arabic as done by Salafi. The Salafi who is none other than the son of the mosque board, who is studying in LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab or Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic), replace the sermon with Arabic, in the sense of different with Syattariyah sermon tradition. The community or congregation that has been raised in the Syattariyah tradition realize the change and feels the change is contrary to the religious tradition that they have held for generations from their ancestors. So, this phenomenon caused unrest in society (Samad, 2003; Yunas, 2005; and Salim, 2013).

The case is reported to Mufti Nagari, because the Jannatussalam (peace paradise) mosque is a nagari mosque and because Mufti Nagari, in the nagari tradition of Sungai Buluah, is urang nan ampek jinih. Written warning is agreed to be given, after giving advice by Mufti Nagari. Before the letter signed by the Chairman of KAN is given, the pattern of Salafi (Islamic reform)-style preaching has changed. Therefore, the letter is not given (Amir, 2008; and Panuh, 2012).

Prevention of religious radicalism through the media, especially through bulletins, has also been done in Nagari Sungai Buluah by banning the bulletin of HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or Liberation Party of Indonesia) and Salafi. Radical religious doctrines are also potentially propagated by radicals through reading. Hence, reading is an important factor in the involvement of religious radicalism (cf Wildan, 2007; Anspaha, 2008; and Ranstrop, 2009).

Based on questionnaires filled by 61 pilgrims who are active in following Salafi studies, comencing to questions, “interested in Salafi after reading Salafi books and bulletin” obtained data in the form of frequencies: 13 people congregate strongly agree; 43 stated agreed; 1 person expressed doubt; and 4 people expressed disagreement.

Finally, it is interesting to note here that Sefriyono (2015), in his study pertaining Salafi group movement, has expossed the percentage form of the conversion data, as following here: 21.31% choose the option strongly agree or ST (Sangat Setuju); 70.49% choose the option agree or S (Setuju); 1.63% choose the option hesitate or R (Ragu-ragu); 6.55% choose no agreed or TS (Tidak Setuju); and 0% who voted strongly disagree or STS (Sangat Tidak Setuju). This evident is shown in the matrix 1.

CONCLUSION

The prevention of religious radicalism based on social culture is rarely empowered in the handling of religious radicalization. Basically, social practices developed in the society are more effective, because they are built from local awareness and culture.

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2See also “Surat Keputusan Keanggotaan Kerapatan Adat Nagari (KAN) Nagari Sungai Buluah, Periode 2011 s/d 2016”. Unpublished Letter, owned by the authors.
So that the de-radicalization effort is not in the mind of the state, but is in the mind of society. The two important things for the prevention of religious radicalism are the control of religious activity in house of worship and educational institutions; and also the control of the use of funds from radical groups against religious institutions and religious organizations.

In reality, local communities also have their own religious radicalism prevention mechanisms similar by exploiting their local wisdoms. People of Nagari Sungai Buluh in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatera, Indonesia, for example, has succeeded in counteracting radical religious group activities by empowering the role of mamak ibadat (a person who has authority in Islamic religious field) and mamak adat (a person who has authority in the field of tradition or custom) on the basis of their surau kaum (ethnic or community little mosque) in arranging their house of worship. At the nagari (regency or district) level, the nagari people have Mufti Nagari (Islamic law adviser in the regency or district level), who acts as fatwa (advice or instruction for implementation of Islamic matters) giver of whether or not certain religious groups institutionalize their religious beliefs in the nagari.

This fatwa is the basis for the nagari authority in banning the activities of radical religious groups. About the funding as a source of religious radicalization, nagari has its own fund-raising ways without relying on funds sourced from radical religious groups. With regards to the control of radical bulletins as a source of religious radicalism, the suraus and mosques of the nagari with their religious beliefs became the basis for banning the bulletins. Through institutionalization of Syattariyah, people do not want to read bulletins that are religiously different from their ideology.

Besides, through Mufti Nagari and adat institutions, these radical bulletins are not allowed to circulate in the kaum and nagari mosques. People of Nagari Sungai Buluh firmly hold their religious culture. Cultural power is a powerful tool for preventing religious radicalism. The deradicalization can be done with cultural strength. The strength of charismatic leadership can also serve as a towing carriage of deradicalization. Tuanku (royalty title or Islamic community leader) at Nagari Sungai Buluh became a religious leader, who is still obeyed by the nagari community.

 Tuanku is the main resource person for the people of nagari in solving their religious problems. Suraus and mosques of kaum are nurtured by Tuanku, all their religious affairs are handed over to Tuanku, including the present of radical religious groups. So, the people of Nagari Sungai Buluh hold a Minangkabau proverb: dagang batapatan dan rantau balabuhan – newcomers in this case is new religious groups coming to the Sungai Buluh River are obliged to report their religious activities to the nagari religious leaders, namely Mufti Nagari; and Mufti Nagari must hold Tuanku.  

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Statement: Herewith, we affirm that this article is our original work and not a product of plagiarism, and that the article has not been submitted, reviewed, or published in another scholarly journal. Upon acceptance for publication, we will not withdraw my manuscript from the SOSIOHUMANIKA journal.
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