Revisit Causality in Muslim Theological and Philosophical Works and Malay Muslim Thoughts of Causality

ABSTRACT: Historically, the Muslims in the early part of the eighth century AD (Anno Domini) are said to have denied causality and they maintained that God does not act through causality. “Causality” describes the relationship between cause and effect, and causality relates effects to their causes. It is interesting to note here that Professor Harry Austryn Wolfson from Harvard University discusses causality as understood and presented by Muslim theologians and philosophers. Muslim theologian and philosopher, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (died 1111 AD), is said to have denied causality, and the Ash’arite theologians have agreed with him. On the contrary, Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd or Averroes (died 1198 AD) is said to have affirmed causality, and the Mu’tazilite theologians also uphold causality. This paper explains causality in Muslim theological and philosophical works as well as to describe the theological and philosophical outlooks of Malay Muslims in relation to causality. To describe their thoughts of causality, this paper refers to the contents of the Malay Muslim theological works called the “Jawi books” since they have been written in the Malay-Jawi scripts. Five of them are referred in this paper. It seems that the Malay Muslims are not in favor of causality in their theological and philosophical outlooks.

KEY WORD: Muslim theologians and philosophers, thoughts of causality, Malay Muslims, and Malay-Jawi scripts.


KATA KUNCI: Ahli teologi dan falsafah Muslim, pemikiran kausaliti, Muslim Melayu, dan tulisan Melayu-Jawi.
INTRODUCTION

Historically, the Muslims in the early part of the eighth century AD (Anno Domini) are said to have denied causality and they maintained that God does not act through causality. “Causality” describes the relationship between cause and effect, and causality relates effects to their causes. A cause precedes its effect. Causality also denotes the existence of causal agency, force, or quality.

According to Harry Austryn Wolfson, John of Damascus has written “the fictitious disputation” between the Muslim and the Christian as found in his work named *Disputatio Christiani et Saraceni*. In that work, John of Damascus writes that the Christian maintains that after the six days of creation, all the normal processes of nature such as the reproduction of men and plants and herbs are the acts of God through intermediate causes; whereas the Muslim maintains that they are all the direct creations of God. From this disputation between the Muslim and the Christian, Harry Austryn Wolfson concludes that in the early part of the eighth century, the Muslim already denied that God acts through intermediary causes (Wolfson, 1976:518).

Still according to Harry Austryn Wolfson, the established Muslim belief during the early part of the eighth century was to deny causality and to affirm that God does not act through causality. However, in the early part of the ninth century, the Muslims began to think and reflect on causality after they encountered with the two contrasting philosophical views upheld by Greek philosophers on the issue of causality. They are the theistic and atheistic philosophical views. The theistic philosophical view was upheld by the majority of Greek philosophers who believed in the existence of a God conceived by them as a necessary remote cause of events in the world – a God who by necessity of His own nature causes all events in the world to take place through the intermediacy of things which act as the immediate cause of those events. Meanwhile, the atheistic philosophical view was upheld by the Epicureans who denied the existence of any God at all and denied also that things are the immediate causes of events. To them, all events in the world happen by mere chance (Wolfson, 1976:520).

The Muslims, who came across these two contradicting Greek philosophical views, approved of the theistic view of the existence of God but they rejected its conception of God as a non-volitional and remote cause and also its conception of things as having a causal power. The Muslim rejected the atheistic view denying the existence of God and asserting that “all events in this world happen by chance”. However, the Muslims who approved the theistic philosophical view of God’s existence agreed with the Epicurean view that denied that things are the immediate causes of events. This was due to the Muslim’s belief in God’s absolute omnipotence and just as by His unrestricted power God, created the world all by himself without any intermediary, so also by His unrestricted power does He govern the world all by himself without any intermediary causes. Everything in the world that comes into being comes directly by an act
of creation by God (Wolfson, 1976:518-520). Still according to Harry Austryn Wolfson, the Muslims denied causality because of their belief that:

Power is the primary and exclusive property of God. This belief they must have derived from the many verses in the Koran in which the true God of Islam is contrasted with the false pre-Islamic gods. The contrast is mainly between the true God who has power and the false gods who have no power (Wolfson, 1976:520).

The early Muslims of the eighth century AD thought that their understanding and belief in God’s omnipotence demanded or conditioned them to deny causality. The verses of the Koran stating God’s absolute power such as the Koran (7:191, 10:35, 30:39, and 35:38) become their textual proofs for their affirmation of God’s omnipotence and negation of causality (Wolfson, 1976:518-520).

Lastly, according to Harry Austryn Wolfson, the denial of causality is often expressed by certain circumlocutions or by certain terms used as the equivalent of causality. One of those terms is “nature”. Thus, Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Ghazali al-Tusi al-Sya’i’i (popular as al-Ghazali), in his denial of causality against the philosophers who supported it, says that philosophers believe that things affect each other by a nature which they possess (cited in Wolfson, 1976:559). Abu al-Walid Muhammad Ibn Rushd (popular as Ibn Rushd or Averroes) is said to have used the term “nature” in his refutation of al-Ghazali who denied the causality. Ibn Rushd argues that the denial of causality is tantamount to a denial that things have a nature and that the Mutakallimun of the Ash`arites deny the action of the natural powers which God has put in existent things (cited by Wolfson, 1976:559).

AL-GHAZALI’S DENIAL OF CAUSALITY

It should be acknowledged here that there are many published studies on al-Ghazali’s denial of causality. One of them is by Ilai Alon (1980) and another one is by Michael E. Marmura (1981). This paper also refers to al-Ghazali’s own works on the subject of causality. In his work, al-Ghazali (1987) writes that the relation or connection between what is customarily believed as cause and what is believed as effect is not necessary in our view but each of them, cause and effect, is independent. It is not necessary if one exists another one exists, and if one does not exists, another one does not exist such as thirst-quenching and drinking, satiation and eating, burning and meeting with fire, light and the sun rising, death and cutting off neck, cure and drinking of medication, diarrheic stomach and consuming the anti-diarrhea; and it goes on like that to all observables from the connections in medicine, astrology, vocations, and skills. Indeed, its relation or connection has been part of Allah’s decree by creating it on bearing, not by necessitating in itself that is inseparable but according to the decreed, the creation of satiation without eating, and the creation of death.1

1See, for example, al-Ghazali (1987:239). The Arabic words used by al-Ghazali are: al-iqtiran bayn ma ya`taqid fi al-`adah sababa, wa-bayn ma ya`taqid musabbaba, lyasa daruriyya `indana.
Al-Ghazali says that philosophers deny its possibility and they claim that it is impossible. However, al-Ghazali stresses that those things are possible and he maintains his denial of necessary connection between cause and effect by giving the example of cotton and fire. He stresses that it is possible that even though the cotton is connected with the fire, the cotton is not burnt; and it is possible also that the cotton is changed into the burnt ash without having any connection with the fire.

The philosophers deny this since they claim that the fire is the actor for burning and it acts by its own nature without any choice and it is impossible for the fire not to follow its own nature after its connection with the burnable thing or object. This is what al-Ghazali denies. He upholds that the actor for burning by creating blackness in the cotton and making its falling apart and ashes is Allah either through the intermediary of angels or without the intermediary. The fire is an inorganic or inanimate being that does not have any action (al-Ghazali, 1987:239-240).

Al-Ghazali continues to prove his point by giving the examples of human beings and animals. For him, a male human being like a male animal is not the actor (fa‘il) of his sibling since he does not create his own sperm that grows or develops in the womb or uterus and he is not the actor of his life, hearing, and seeing, and all notions which are with him, and it is known that these notions exist with him but not by him. Their existence is from the First [Allah] either without the intermediary or with the intermediary of angels who are delegated with these created things. It is evident that the existence with something does not indicate that it make that existence (al-Ghazali, 1987:241).

To prove his principle that the existence with something does not indicate that it makes that existence, al-Ghazali provides another examples in addition to the examples of the cotton and fire and man and his sibling. He takes the example of a born blind person whose two eyes are blind. If the veils covering his two eyes were removed and he was able to open his eyes and see the colors through his opened eyes, he assumed that he was able to see because he was able to open his eyes and perceive the colors. However, when he opened his eyes during the darkness of night, he was unable to see the colors. Hence, the cause of his seeing the colors is not his opening of his eyes only. It depends on other causes such as the light, the colors, the soundness, and readiness of his eyes to perceive the colors and etc. With this, it is invalidated the claim made by someone that the fire is the actor for burning, the bread is the actor for satiation, the medication is the actor for healthiness, and so on of the causes.2

What is denied by al-Ghazali is the necessary connection between cause and effect. He does not deny the probable connection between cause and effect. This is evident from his view on the relation or connection between the

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worldly events or occurrences and the causes for their occurrences. Al-Ghazali states that all earthly events or occurrences depend on the heavenly events or occurrences either without any intermediary or with one intermediary or with many intermediaries. In sum, every event or occurrence has its cause for its occurrence. Hence, there are causes and effects, *al-asbab wa-al-musabbabat*, in their series until the final series. With this, someone can predict what is going to happen or to take place since something happens due to its cause. We do not know what will happen in future since we do not know of its all causes and if we knew all causes, we would know all effects. What we know is that the fire burns when it is connected with cotton in the specific time, and we know when someone eats some food, he is satiated, and we know when someone happens to step on the lid or cover of the buried treasure, he is going to become a rich man. However, all these causes are not known to us and we perhaps know some of them only. Since we know some causes, we know some effects. If we knew all causes, we would know all effects. However, human beings are unable to know all causes since all earthly events or occurrences are related to the heavenly events or occurrences (al-Ghazali, 1987:227-228).

It is well proven that the main reasons for al-Ghazali’s negation of the necessary causal relation between what is customarily believed to be a cause and its effect are two theological principles that he upholds and defends. First, Allah is the first effective cause in the causal series on the earth and in the heavens, and He is the creator and actor of all causes and effects. Second, Allah is the creator and actor of the miracles and they are possible to take place such as the miracle of the Prophet Ibrahim when the fire did not burn him even though he was thrown into the big fire by his enemies during his lifetime. These two main reasons are evident from his explanation on the Prophet Ibrahim who was not burnt in the big fire because Allah made the fire safe for him and saved him from the burning flame since Allah is omnipotent on every possible thing. There should be no doubt about Allah’s omnipotence on every possible thing.

However, not every possible thing is done by Allah if He does not want to do. For example, Allah will not change fruits in the markets to human beings even though it is possible for Allah to do so. The custom of Allah persists and prevails as it is since Allah has implanted such knowledge in human beings. They have to rely on their implanted knowledge. Hence, they know, for example, that Allah will not change a book to a horse and a jar of water to an apple tree, and Allah does create a horse from a horse sperm and a tree from its seed. The fire was created to burn when it contacts with cotton. However, it was possible for the fire not to burn the Prophet Ibrahim who was thrown into the fire (al-Ghazali, 1987:243-246). According to Michael E. Marmura, al-Ghazali:

[…] may also have in mind those Muslims who do not reject natural causation, to provide them with an alternative theory that does not commit them to the philosophers’ denial of certain miracles. This would explain in part the care he takes in outlining the theory, particularly his avoidance of *necessitarianism* (Marmura, 1981:107).
IBN RUSHD’S AFFIRMATION OF CAUSALITY

Abu al-Walid Muhammad Ibn Rushd (popular as Ibn Rushd or Averroes) reproduces the causality as written and understood by al-Ghazali in order to refute al-Ghazali’s denial of causality. After rewriting al-Ghazali’s many words and sentences in his work, Ibn Rushd writes that the denial of the existence of effective causes, *al-asbab al-fa’ilah*, which are witnessed in the sensorial things, *al-mahsusat*, is the view of the Sophist and someone who speaks like that is either he denies with his tongue but not in his heart or he follows the confusion upheld by the Sophist in this case. Anyone who denies this is unable to know or acknowledge that every act has its actor. These causes of things are either self-sufficient in producing the acts from themselves or these causes are completed their acts by an external or exterior cause which is either separable or inseparable. This is not known by itself but it needs many studies and researches.

There are sensorial and necessary causes and there are non-sensorial and unnecessary causes. There are the real causes, *al-asbab al-dhatiyah*, which are not understood the existent, *al-mawjūd*, except by understanding them. If an existent does not have a particular act, it does not have a particular nature. If that existent does not have a particular nature, it does not have a particular name and definition. Hence, all things are one thing and not one thing because that one thing is asked if it can have its particular act or it cannot have its particular act. If that one thing can have its particular act, it can produce particular acts from its particular natures. If that one thing has no specific act, it is not one. When there is no one particular nature, there is no existent nature and when there is no existent nature, consequently, it is a non-existent (Rushd, 1981:781-783).

It seems that for Ibn Rushd, every existent thing exists with its particular natures and acts. If the existent thing exists without its particular natures and acts, that thing really does not exist since it has no name and no definition. Name and definition need to have particular natures and acts differentiating them from other existents. Hence, for Ibn Rushd, fire is named fire due to its burning nature and act. For Ibn Rushd, all created existents have four causes namely actor, material, form, and aim or goal. They are necessary for the existence of effects. Human minds or reason are able to understand the existents through their causes. Anyone who rejects the causes, he rejects reason, *al-`aql*. Logical reason depends on causes and effects. Knowledge about those effects is incomplete without the knowledge of their causes (Rushd, 1981:783-785).

Moreover, Ibn Rushd understands that the two verses in the Koran (al-Fath, 48:23 and Fatir, 35:43) prove that all existents have their particular natures and acts. It is impossible for Allah to have His custom since custom is acquired by an actor by repeating the same act or repeating the same act many times. The custom is for the living being and for the non-living being, it is its nature. For example, the reason has its particular nature and act to become the reason (Rushd, 1981:786).
It is clear from the work of Ibn Rushd that every existent being either living or non-living is created by Allah with its particular nature and act and, hence, it has its particular name and definition. That particular nature and act are identical with cause and effect. Human reason can comprehend every created creature through its particular nature and act or through its causality. No created creature exists without its causality.

MALAY MUSLIM THOUGHTS OF CAUSALITY

Malay Muslim thoughts of causality are based on the Malay Muslim theological works in written in the Malay-Jawi scripts called Kitab-Jawi. The Malay-Jawi alphabets are similar with the Arabic alphabets. However, the Malay-Jawi alphabets have few alphabets more than the Arabic alphabets.

Zainal Abidin bin Muhammad Fatani (popular as Zainal Abidin) wrote 'Aqidah al-Najin fi 'Ilm Usul al-Din in 1308 AH (Anno Hijriyah) as written on page 139, the last page of this work. This work clearly denies causality. It writes that the true or valid belief is the belief that Allah has created the power for human beings and that created power is to be used for human voluntary acts or actions. However, the created power is not effective and produces no effect because the only effective power is Allah’s power and His power produces effects. Human created power is like fire that burning is attributed to the fire because it is customary for the fire to burn when it is contacted with the burnable objects. However, the fire itself does not burn but Allah who burns (Zainal Abidin, 1308 AH:65).

In the same work, Zainal Abidin bin Muhammad Fatani stresses that the created beings have no effects. If they have effect, they would not need Allah anymore while Allah is needed by every created being. The created beings have their created natures and powers but they have no influence or effect upon other created beings and even upon themselves. The ignorant people claim that the created beings have effects upon other created beings through their created natures and powers. Their claim is wrong and invalid because if the created beings have effects upon other created beings through their created natures and powers, Allah would need the intermediary when He wants to do or to create something. This is impossible since Allah is independent and needs no intermediary in doing or creating something. The theological doctrine that the created beings have no effect through their created natures and powers is derived from the belief in the Divine Unity or Allah’s Oneness (Zainal Abidin, 1308 AH:93).

According to Zainal Abidin bin Muhammad Fatani, there are four theological judgments passed on to four different people due to their beliefs in the created natures and powers of the created beings. The first judgment is unbelief as agreed by all Muslim religious scholars or ulema for the people who believe that fire and other created beings like fire have effects by their own natures i.e. by their own essences or substances. The second judgment is not unbelief as agreed by some ulema for the people who believe that fire and knife have
effects with the power created by Allah for them. This belief is said to be the belief advocated by the Mu’tazilites. The third judgment is unbelief as agreed by some ulama for the people who believe that there are the necessary connection between fire and its effect and knife and its effect and such belief leads them to disbelieve in the existence of the miracles of the prophets and the bodily resurrection after the death. The fourth judgment is the true and valid belief and free from any danger of unbelief for the people who believe that there is no other being but Allah who can affect on everything and Allah is able to break up the connection between fire and its effect and between knife and its effect.

The people who believe in this kind of belief are free from the danger of unbelief and they are successful because they uphold the true and valid belief that every created being has no effect upon anything from all customary causes as well as from the created voluntary acts or actions. Hence, sometimes the fire is connected with the burnable object and it does not burn even though nothing can prevent that fire from burning that object. This happened to the Prophet Ibrahim when he was thrown into the big fire by his people who opposed him. He was not burnt by that big fire and nothing prevented that big fire from burning him (Zainal Abidin, 1308 AH:93).

Ahmad Muhammad Zain bin Mustafa bin Muhammad Fatani (popular as Ahmad Muhammad Zain), who finished writing his theological work in 1313 AH as stated on page 21, the last page of his work, explains four different judgments given by the ulama for their different beliefs in the created natures and powers of the created beings. First, anyone who believes that something has effect by its nature i.e. its essence or substance is unbelief. Second, anyone believes that something has effect by the power created by Allah in it is dissolute and heretic. It is not agreed on his unbelief and the predominant view is he is not unbelief. It is included in this second category someone who believes that a man has effect on his actions with the power created by Allah in him. Third, anyone who believes that only Allah has effect but all customary causes have necessary effects according to human reason or mind is ignorant. Fourth, anyone who believes that only Allah has effect and the created beings have no effects by their created natures and powers is monotheist. He believes that Allah is the only One who affects satiation to someone who eats some food and Allah can make him satiation without him eating any food. Eating food is not the cause for satiation. Satiation is not the effect of eating food. The monotheist is saved by Allah’s grace (Ahmad Muhammad Zain, 1313 AH:9).

The Malay Muslim theologian, Muhammad Taib bin Masud Banjari (popular as Muhammad Taib) explains about causality in his Miftah al-Jannah was that completed in 1274 AH as stated on page 15, the last page of his work. The explanation on causality is related to the explanation about Allah’s indispensability for all created beings and He does not need anything from them. From this theological principle, the created creatures, all of them, do not have effects over themselves and other creatures. If they do have effective
natures and powers, they would no longer need Allah. This is unacceptable since every created being or existent needs Allah. Therefore, anyone who believes that he himself can produce effect on something is unbelief without any disputation as expressed by Shaykh Sanusi (Muhammad Taib, 1274 AH:11). Like Ahmad Muhammad Zain bin Mustafa bin Muhammad Fatani, Muhammad Taib bin Masud Banjari also explains four different judgments related to four different people who believe and disbelieve in causality (Muhammad Taib, 1274 AH:11-12).

Shaykh Daud bin Abdullah Fatani (popular as Daud), 1769-1847 AD (Anno Domini), describes causality in his theological work, Ward al-Zawahir li-Hill al-Faz ‘Aqd al-Jawahir, completed its writing in 1138 AH as stated on page 430, the last page of this work. Daud describes five different judgments in connection with five different people who believe and disbelieve in causality. First, anyone who says that all customary causes have effects by their essences without Allah’s creation is unbelief according to the Consensus. Second, anyone who says that all customary causes have effects with the power created by Allah in them and if Allah takes away that power from the customary causes, they have no effects is a heretic and dissolute Muslim according to the most dominant view. Third, anyone who believes that human beings have effects on their voluntary acts or actions with the power created by Allah in them is a heretic and dissolute Muslim according to the more valid view. Fourth, anyone who believes in the necessary causal relation to the customary causes like a knife cuts without depending on the power created by Allah in it is astray and it can lead to unbelief if he denies the miracles of the prophets. Fifth, anyone who believes that it is customary for fire to burn and for food to satiate and Allah who makes burning and satiation is a monotheist believer (Daud, 1332 AH:69-90).

Abdul Ghani Yahya and Umar Yusuf in their theological work named Risalah al-Tawhid, published in 1372 AH / 1952 AD state that something from the created beings has no effect by its nature or existence. It is impossible for the created beings to produce effects by their natures or existences. If they have effects by their natures or existences, they no longer need Allah and consequently they are independent from Allah (Ghani Yahya & Yusuf, 1952:56).

Abdul Ghani Yahya and Umar Yusuf also present the four different judgments for the four different people who believe and do not believe in causality. The first judgment is unbeliever for people who believe that the created beings have effects by their natures or existences. The second judgment is heretic and dissolute for people who believe that the created beings have effects with the power created by Allah in them. This belief is held by the Mu’tazilites. The third judgment is not unbelief but ignorant for people who believe in the customary causes as have the necessary causal connection such as when someone eats, he must satiate. However, if these people deny the miracles of Prophets due to their belief in the necessary causal relation, they are unbelievers. The fourth judgment is the true belief for people who believe
that the created beings have no effects by their natures or existences as well as by the power created by Allah in them, and there is no necessary causal relation between the causes and effects and Allah is the only One who creates or makes effects after their causes. The existence of the causes sometimes does not produce effects such as the big fire did not burn the Prophet Ibrahim. This is the belief of the Sunnites (Ghani Yahya & Yusuf, 1952:57).

CONCLUSION

Based on the five theological works written by the Malay Muslim theologians, it is very evident that they do not accept the causality as understood and presented by Muslim philosophers like Abu al-Walid Muhammad Ibn Rushd (popular as Ibn Rushd or Averroes) and Muslim theologians in the Mu`tazilite school or in Mu`tazilism. However, they do not judge the Mu`tazilites as infidels or unbelievers because the Mu`tazilites, as understood and accepted by the Malay Muslim theologians, do not reject the miracles of the Prophets and the Mu`tazilites also believe that human beings have effects on their voluntary acts or actions with the power created by Allah in them. Meanwhile, the causality, as understood and advocated by the Muslim philosophers, is rejected by the Malay Muslim theologians. For them, such causality leads to the denial of the miracles of the Prophets because the necessary causal relation between cause and effect is unbreakable and inseparable.

The main proof given by the Malay Muslim theologians to disprove the necessary causal relation between the cause and effect is the fire did not burn the Prophet Ibrahim who was thrown into the big fire by his enemies. They also argue that if the created creatures have effects by their natures or existences, they no longer need Allah because they can produce their required effects by themselves. As their views found in their works, the Malay Muslim theologians maintain that Allah is the only One who is omnipotent can create and make the causes to happen or not to happen although the ordinary observable causes do have effects in most cases or in many customary cases. They consider that those people who believe in the ordinary observable causes as having the power to make the effects take place as ignorant as long as they do not deny the miracles of the prophets and the resurrection of the human bodies after their death.

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After rewriting al-Ghazali’s many words and sentences in his work, Ibn Rushd writes that the denial of the existence of effective causes, al-asbab al-fa`ilah, which are witnessed in the sensorial things, al-mahsusat, is the view of the Sophist and someone who speaks like that is either he denies with his tongue but not in his heart or he follows the confusion upheld by the Sophist in this case.